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NOTE FOR RECORD

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Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Monsieur Jacques Wahl, Herr von Staden and Sir Robert Armstrong met in the Palais Marigny, Paris, on Tuesday, 15th January 1980 for a tour d'horizon following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

General assessment

Dr. Brzezinski said that, whatever view one might take of the subjective motivations for the Soviet invasion - and his own view was that these motivations were primarily provincial and parochial rather than strategic - it had major strategic consequences. Afghanistan had been a buffer; now it was a wedge. Whether or not this was intended or foreseen by the Russians, the risk was that the next stage would be political intimidation by the Soviet Union of Pakistan and Iran, leading to a major crisis. The United States Government did not wish to reignite the cold war (sic). They hoped to keep arms control negotiations alive, insulated from measures to demonstrate the unacceptability of the Soviet invasion; they also hoped in due course to reactivate SALT II. But they saw the invasion as a qualitatively new step in Soviet behaviour. The West's reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia had been half-hearted and of short duration. The Soviet Government had probably calculated that the reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan would be similar. There was reason to believe that they had been surprised and dismayed by the strength of the initial reaction. The West must now avoid repeating the mistakes of 1968. The United States Government were not contemplating further measures at this time; but there was need to concert a long-term response to the regional problem. Two aspects of this were important:

- (a) the West should not get too far ahead of the Moslem world, which had reacted strongly to the invasion;
- (b) the countries of the West should consider how they could help each other.

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Monsieur Wahl, while going along with much of Dr. Brzezinski's analysis, thought it impossible to assess the likely consequences of the Soviet invasion without first assessing the causes of it. Were the Russians protecting a buffer or creating a wedge? He thought the former: Amin had proved incapable of crushing the Islamic rebellion in Afghanistan, and the Russians were forced to move in to prevent the infection from spreading to the Islamic Republics in the Soviet Union. The invasion was a sign of Soviet weakness and failure, not just of strength. This was the first Soviet intervention in a country of the Third World and an Islamic country: what we had now was the first development of an East-South confrontation, which the West should seek to exploit rather than take over.

Sir Robert Armstrong was inclined to share the view that the causes for the Soviet invasion were primarily defensive rather than strategic. But it changed the strategic position in the area, and the West must consider the consequences. In the British Government's view it would be important for the Western countries to preserve the strength of the Islamic reaction to the Soviet invasion: to move so far as possible by supporting and strengthening the Islamic countries in their determination to resist Soviet aggression rather than by direct intervention in the area.

Herr von Staden was in general agreement, adding that he thought that the timing of the Soviet invasion was related to the difficulties created for the United States and other Western countries by the situation in Iran. He shared the view that the Third World countries should be in front, and should not be allowed to lose sight of the feeling that this was their affair. But they would not follow a coherent and co-ordinated line if the West did not. They were not individually strong, and constituted potential bases for Soviet action.

Dr. Brzezinski, noting a wide measure of agreement on the general assessment, said that he thought that recent developments had implications for the succession to the Soviet leadership, which might now be more hard-line and militarily orientated than had previously been supposed.

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Pakistan

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Pakistanis needed reassurance on the political, military and economic levels. The test they were most likely to face was that of political intimidation, reinforced by subversion. It was in order to provide reassurance that both publicly and privately the United States Government had reiterated its commitments to Pakistan under the 1959 Agreement. The Pakistanis were apprehensive of the possibility of ground incursions from Afghanistan against the refugee camps, where there were now getting on for 400,000 refugees. The United States did not propose to send in troops to defend the camps. They would, however, give the Pakistanis equipment to fight attacks on the camps. The Russians would then have to choose whether to desist, or to escalate. It would be clear to them that escalation could involve confrontation with the United States, not necessarily in Pakistan: the form of United States action would be a matter for choice; and it could be in Cuba or in the Far East rather than in Pakistan. The United States Government were proposing to provide \$100 million of military aid in 1980 and a similar amount in 1981: it would include anti-tank weapons, destroyers and helicopters, but no aircraft. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the French would be providing Mirages.

Monsieur Wahl said that they were not so far in precise negotiations with the Pakistanis on this. If the Pakistanis wanted to purchase Mirages, he thought that the French would be willing to sell.

Sir Robert Armstrong said, in response to a question from Dr. Brzezinski, that the British were in discussion with the Pakistanis on the supply of communications equipment, mortar locating radar and 105 mm. light guns.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government was also considering funding for military production in Pakistan; debt relief; food aid; and an increase in aid for refugees. Congress would be invited to waive restrictions on military aid to Pakistan.

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Monsieur Wahl drew attention to the problems presented by the undemocratic nature of the regime in Pakistan, and by Pakistan's nuclear programme. Dr. Brzezinski said first things first: it was no doubt desirable to broaden the base of the regime, but the first consideration must be to ensure that the Pakistanis were not politically intimidated by the Russians. He judged that the Pakistanis were, like the Poles, fighters by instinct and spirit; what they needed was reassurance and support. The present state of their nuclear development was a threat to no-one, since even if they could make a warhead they had no means of delivery.

Sir Robert Armstrong drew attention to the need to reassure India, if military aid to Pakistan was increased. Mrs. Gandhi was acutely sensitive to the threat from Pakistan and to the implications for India of an alliance between China and Pakistan. Dr. Brzezinski thought that these fears were in the nature of a phobia, and would respond to rational argument. Pakistan would hardly take India on, with the Russians on her North-West Frontier. The Pakistanis were equally nervous of India, and were already talking of a Moscow-Kabul-New Delhi axis.

India

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were very worried about the attitude of the new Government in India, in the light of Mrs. Gandhi's previous positions. Her suspicions of the United States were likely to be exacerbated, when she learned that the United States were prepared to go ahead with expanding their facilities in Diego Garcia. Mr. Clark Clifford would be leading a high level mission to India. The United States would be prepared to offer India military assistance. He enquired what plans there might be for other visits to India in the near future.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that Lord Carrington was hoping to visit India later in the week on his tour of the region. There was no doubt that Mrs. Gandhi would be very preoccupied with what she would see as the threat to India from an alliance between China and a Pakistan reinforced by military assistance from the United States.

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Monsieur Wahl said that President Giscard was proposing to visit India shortly. The programme was being adjusted so as to leave more time for tete-a-tete discussions between the President and Mrs. Gandhi.

It was agreed that it would be useful for all the Governments represented at the meeting to be fully informed about the outcome of visits from any one of them to India in the coming weeks and months.

East-West relations

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government took the view that no further actions to register disapproval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were necessary at this stage. There would be no announcement to this effect. It was not intended that the measures taken should be of short duration: if they were to impinge upon the Russians, they should last for some time. The United States Government hoped, however, to insulate arms control discussions from the general cooling of relations with the Soviet Union, and eventually to resume SALT discussions. Discussions on arms control in the context of theatre nuclear forces in Europe should be kept going, but at a measured pace. Dr. Brzezinski thought that a major peace "offensive" by the Soviet Union in Europe was now to be expected, with the object of driving a wedge between the United States and her European allies. He asked what measures the other Governments represented were proposing.

Monsieur Wahl said that the basic principle of the French measures was that there should be no substitution from French suppliers for goods denied to the Soviet Union by the Americans. The French Government had no high level visits to the Soviet Union planned, though M. Chaban Delmas was due to go very shortly. For the rest, it would be business as usual, but without any haste. Negotiations would go forward on a deal involving the Peugeot/Citroen group. The Franco-Soviet credit agreement would be renewed, but the French Government would adhere to consensus rates.

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Dr. Brzezinski suggested, rather sharply, that the French appeared to be conspicuously avoiding any action which might cost them anything.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the Anglo-Soviet credit agreement which expired on 16th February 1980 would not be renewed. The British Government would also adhere to consensus rates in respect of any credits that might be granted. They would favour applying the full rigour of COCOM restrictions on exports of technology. Trade matters would be dealt with in a Community context, but the British Government would firmly support the principle of no substitution for cancelled grain exports, and would press for an end to subsidised sales of butter to the Soviet Union. The British Government took the view that the measure that would have the most impact would be for the Western countries to boycott the Olympics, or to arrange for the venue for the Olympics to be moved to, say, Munich or Montreal.

Monsieur Wahl intervened at this point to say that the French Government would support decisions agreed in the European Community.

Herr von Staden suggested that Monsieur Wahl's phrase "business as usual" was semantic. General moral and political condemnation of the Soviet invasion was of very high importance. In considering what measures to take, the German Government had to have regard to the fact that West German trade with the Soviet Union was twice as large, in volume terms, as United States trade with the Soviet Union, and Germany's GNP was  $3\frac{1}{2}$  times less than that of the United States; so that what Germany had at risk was proportionately 7 times greater. The Germans would support the principle of no substitution, and they would discuss sympathetically operating the COCOM rules at their full vigour. There should be further discussions about exports of civil technology; Herr von Staden understood that Mr. Cooper would shortly be consulting other Governments on this. As to contacts between the West German Government and the Soviet Government, a meeting of the German/Soviet Joint Commission had been postponed indefinitely. There were provisional plans for the Federal Chancellor to see Brezhnev, and Herr Genscher to see Mr. Gromyko. No dates had been discussed for these exchanges, and the West German Government would take no initiative. If the East German leader, Herr Honecker, showed interest

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in a meeting with the Federal Chancellor, the Federal Chancellor would be bound to respond positively, in the interests of relations between the two parts of Germany. Herr von Staden asked what view the United States Government were taking about the export of oil-rig technology to the Soviet Union, which had been mentioned in a recent article in the New York Times. Dr. Brzezinski said that for the time being all exports of technology were suspended and under review. The United States Government's inclination was to hold up on exports of oil-rig technology.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the British Government might wish to look at the possibility of high level contacts with the Polish Government, if it appeared that that Government was distancing itself from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

On the Olympic Games, Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government had taken no formal position. He thought that it would be advantageous to keep the matter in a high state of uncertainty for the time being. There would be much to be said for finding another venue for the Olympics. So long as the Soviet Government were perceived as defending the Olympics, their propaganda position was strong; if they could be put into the position of defending Moscow as the venue, against some competing venue, their position would be weakened. Monsieur Wahl said that it would only be practicable to move the Olympics to another venue if the International Olympic Committee could be persuaded to agree. Herr von Staden said that he thought that at this stage there was little chance of being able to organise the Games in another venue: even if it were practicable at this late date, it would be very expensive. If it was not possible to prevent the Olympics taking place at Moscow, it would be possible to consider a concerted policy of denying official visits to the Games. It was agreed that this was a matter which ought to be discussed further by political directors.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States had stepped up the level of broadcasts directed at the Soviet Union and at the Moslem world. He suggested that the other Governments represented should consider doing likewise. This also was a matter which could be discussed by political directors.

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Detente, SALT, etc.

Dr. Brzezinski repeated that the United States Government did not intend to close all the doors in this area, though the atmosphere was bound to become chillier and discussions more difficult.

Herr von Staden said that the Federal Chancellor was to make a statement in the Bundestag on 17th January. He would argue that detente was indivisible, and that Soviet actions in Asia could not be without repercussions in Europe; but that the West should not cut communications or reduce co-operation with the Soviet Union in areas where continued communication and co-operation were in the interest of mutual security, such as arms control, and CSCE.

Monsieur Wahl agreed that detente was global, and said that the French Government were firmly, though not unconditionally, attached to detente. They were convinced that the United States also put a very high price on preserving detente, as witness their failure to act in Angola, and in Afghanistan in 1978. The only alternative to preserving detente could be the resumption of cold war.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government wanted a debate that was reciprocal, and in which each side showed respect for the other side's susceptibilities. Recently detente had not been fulfilling these objectives. It was not dead, but injured; and the injury would not heal in a few weeks. The President of the United States was now expecting to be re-elected; so the United States position on these matters could be expected to continue for some time. Nonetheless he emphasised that the United States Government wished to preserve detente, provided that it could be made to meet the objectives he had outlined.

Monsieur Wahl drew a distinction between detente between states and detente between peoples. Detente between states tended to be in the short term, and to favour the Soviet Union; detente between peoples was longer term, but would in the end benefit the countries of the West.

Iran

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government had a feeling that ruling groups in Iran were now beginning to want to see a solution of the problem of the hostages. They did not think that the authority of Khomeini had been behind previous overtures, but they thought that it might be different this



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time. The trouble was that there were three centres of power in Iran: the "soviet" which was in charge of the siege of the United States Embassy; the Revolutionary Council; and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Since the invasion of Afghanistan the United States had come away from the idea of "having a smack" at the Iranians. Once the hostages were out, they would be prepared to work with Iran, and thought that they could come to arrangements with the Iranian authorities, who were frightened of what was happening on their Northern and Eastern frontiers. The United States Government were indicating their willingness to consider a package whereby they acquiesced in arrangements to investigate "legitimate" Iranian grievances in exchange for Iran's release of the hostages. It was necessary to get the hostage issue out of the way, before they could get into other business with Iran. But Dr. Brzezinski stressed the need for voluntary implementation of the sanctions which the Security Council had been unable to vote. This was essential for United States domestic public opinion, if the United States Government was to be able to avoid having to proceed to more drastic measures. They could not be left in the lurch on this. If they were, they would have to go further: they did not want to, but American public opinion would not sit it out, especially if they felt that the United States were isolated.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the problems which voluntary implementation of the sanctions would create had been explained to Mr. Warren Christopher by the Prime Minister and her colleagues the previous day.

Monsieur Wahl said that, even if it was not possible to achieve the full range of the sanctions, measures would have been taken which would be very significant. He asked what would be the United States Government's estimate of the reaction in the Gulf to resort to further measures. Dr. Brzezinski said that, since the invasion of Afghanistan, the reaction would be more mixed, and would depend on whether those concerned saw the measures as "the logical final step".

Monsieur Wahl expressed doubts about the effect of sanctions in Iran. Dr. Brzezinski said that sanctions would increase their sense of isolation, and could thus help to change political attitudes.

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Saudi Arabia and Yemen

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were increasingly concerned about security in the Arabian peninsula. There were indications of developments in North Yemen which could lead to the establishment of a union of North and South Yemen under a Soviet controlled left-wing government. This could happen within days; and if it happened, the united Yemen would have a larger population than Saudi Arabia. There were signs that the North Yemen leadership were in touch with the PDRY about bringing pressure on Saudi Arabia. Soviet officials were becoming very visible in North Yemen, and were already heavily represented in the PDRY: 25 senior advisers, 200 other advisers, 500 Russian technical instructors, 500 Cuban instructors and 50 East German intelligence instructors. At the same time recent events had demonstrated the deficiencies of the security systems in Saudi Arabia whether in fighting subversion, in obtaining intelligence on subversion, or in domestic policing. Worries about the peninsula were not confined to the Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but extended also to Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Dr. Brzezinski proposed the establishment of a Middle East regional security group to look at this problem systematically.

Monsieur Wahl agreed that such a group would be useful if it led to action which could help the Saudis. There were things that could be done to help, though it would be necessary to guard against the risk of upsetting the balance in the Saudi Royal Family. The organisation of security in the region would not be easy; the UAE had refused to enter into a regional structure. President Giscard was proposing to visit the area at the beginning of March, and could perhaps begin to bring pressure to bear for the improvement of regional security.

Herr von Staden said that all these matters had to be considered in relation to the Palestinian problem. Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government had been trying to get that problem forward; this was an area where it should be possible for the European Governments to be ahead of the Americans.

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It was agreed to propose to Heads of Government that a quadripartite Middle East regional security group should be set up, to consist of senior officials at approximately Deputy Assistant Secretary of State level.

Regional security

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were investigating the possibility of a regional structure of facilities in the Middle East, to compensate for the loss of the two "shields" against the Soviet Union, Iran and Ethiopia. Survey teams were already visiting Mombasa, Berbera and Oman; other possible sites for facilities were Diego Garcia, Masirah, Mogadishu and perhaps something in Egypt. It was essential for the United States in particular and the West in general to have a military presence in that part of the world. What was proposed was not a system of bases or of alliances but of facilities, which would provide increased access, greater proximity to potential trouble spots, a communication system, capacity to receive rapid development forces, and some measure of pre-positioning of materials. This would facilitate better and quicker reaction to contingencies. The United States already had a partial naval presence in the region, and marine and airborne divisions ready for deployment in that part of the world, together with a considerable air presence; what was now proposed was additional support facilities. Dr. Brzezinski enquired what contribution could be made by the French forces in Djibouti.

Monsieur Wahl said that the French forces were in Djibouti to keep the peace and to prevent the two neighbouring states partitioning the territory. It would be difficult for them to be engaged outside the area. Nonetheless oil supply from the Near East was vital for France, and it was for that reason that the French had a naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

It was agreed that, if the proposed Middle East regional security group was set up, it should consider whether the French forces in Djibouti and naval presence in the region could be related to the general regional security efforts.

Turkey

Herr von Staden said that the German Government understood that Mr. Demirel was in principle prepared to "let the Market in"; but the country needed additional aid: they were talking in terms of \$1 billion dollars military aid and \$1 billion dollars economic aid. The Federal Chancellor was willing to take the lead in organising further aid to Turkey, and had instructed him to find out what the intentions of the Secretary General of OECD might be: if OECD was likely to take an initiative, it might not be necessary for the German Government to do so.

Dr. Brzezinski welcomed this forthcoming attitude. He suggested that Germany would be the natural leader for a consortium on aid to Turkey. The United States would be ready to take its part. This could lead to the development of a tripartite relationship between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, once current Iranian problems were out of the way.

Monsieur Wahl said that France would be ready to follow.

Sir Robert Armstrong said that the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had just visited Turkey, and would no doubt want to tell Herr Genscher the outcome of his conversations.

Iraq

Monsieur Wahl said that the French Government had always assumed stability of the regime in Iraq. Under the impact of events in that part of the world, the Iraqi Government was becoming progressively more inclined towards the West, and was looking for scope for diversifying and enlarging its relationships with the West.

Dr. Brzezinski seemed a little sceptical about this analysis of the position of the Iraq Government, and preferred to describe it as "non-aligned towards the West". He recognised, however, that there had been a shift of attitude. There appeared to have been a similar shift of attitude in Libya, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: President Qadhafi had sent President Carter a private message of violent denunciation of the Soviet Union, and could be expected to support Islamic reaction to the invasion. As for Iraq, if the French Government could do anything to improve relations between the United States and Iraq, President Carter would be very grateful.

Yugoslavia

Dr. Brzezinski said that it was important to consider as a matter of urgency how to deal with the crisis which would follow the death of President Tito. The United States was considering how it could provide bilateral military assistance in the first fortnight after such an event.

It was noted that there was to be a meeting of quadripartite political directors on 31st January on Yugoslavia, and that that meeting should discuss contingency plans for the situation that would follow President Tito's death.

Monsieur Wahl asked whether the United States had made clear to the Soviet Union the consequences that would follow their invading Yugoslavia.

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Soviet Union knew the consequences that would follow, and they knew that the Yugoslavs would resist such an invasion.

China

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States Government were redefining their readiness to help the Chinese in technology, including some security equipment. They were willing to provide certain non-lethal sophisticated equipment. They would not themselves be selling arms, but would have no objection to the Europeans doing so. A delegation led by the Chinese Minister of Defence would shortly be coming to the United States. The United States Government favoured the Belgian formula for treatment of exports to China in COCOM.

After the meeting concluded, Dr. Brzezinski said in informal conversation that he thought that it had been very useful, and he hoped that further such meetings could take place from time to time.

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

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18th January, 1980