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MUSKIE'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA: US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

1. MUSKIE TOLD A GROUP OF AMBASSADORS TODAY (NATO, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, SPAIN AND JAPAN) ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO. HE HAD NOT HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS IN ADVANCE. HE WAS NOT MORE PESSIMISTIC AFTERWARDS THAN HE HAD BEEN BEFORE. BUT NOR HAD HE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY ANYTHING HE HAD HEARD TO BELIEVE THAT ANYTHING WAS GOING TO BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY. HE CERTAINLY DID NOT INTEND TO RAISE EXPECTATIONS AS THIS WOULD RELIEVE THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. HIS OVER-RIDING VIEW WAS THAT THE BUILDING PROCESS WOULD BE A SLOW ONE. THE USA WISHED TO RESUME ARMS CONTROL TALKS BUT COULD SEE NO WAY OF MOVING UNTIL THE AFGHANISTAN PROBLEM HAD BEEN DEALT WITH. HE DID NOT WISH TO BLUR THIS ISSUE. THE RUSSIANS WERE HAVING GREATER DIFFICULTIES THAN THEY HAD EXPECTED IN AFGHANISTAN.
2. ON A PERSONAL PLANE, GROMYKO HAD GIVEN MUSKIE THE IMPRESSION OF MAKING AN EFFORT TO BE RELAXED AND NOT TO BE ABRASIVE. ON SUBSTANCE HE HAD TAKEN A HARD LINE, BUT HE HAD BEEN READY TO SMILE, SOMETHING THAT HAD NOT HAPPENED WHEN MUSKIE HAD SEEN HIM A FEW YEARS AGO. THIS MEETING HAD BEEN INTENDED TO LAST TWO HOURS BUT GROMYKO HAD EXTENDED IT TO THREE. EVEN SO, THEY HAD NOT HAD TIME TO DO MORE THAN DISCUSS PRINCIPLES. MUSKIE THOUGHT THAT GROMYKO'S AIM HAD BEEN TO TEST HIM OUT, TO PROBE POTENTIAL SOFT SPOTS IN THE US ATTITUDE AND IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.
3. MUSKIE SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH GROMYKO'S DESCRIPTION OF THE MEETING AS NECESSARY. HE SAW IT AS A BEGINNING OF THE OPENING OF A DIALOGUE TO RESOLVE THE GROWING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAD HAD TWO PARTICULAR PURPOSES IN MIND:
(A) TO SHOW THAT THE US WERE PREPARED TO KEEP CHANNELS OF DISCUSSION OPEN TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND
(B) TO CONVEY US CONCERN OVER AFGHANISTAN.
4. GROMYKO HAD OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY ASKING MUSKIE WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD DECIDED TO DISRUPT DETENTE. MUSKIE HAD LEFT GROMYKO IN NO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET INVASION HAD BROUGHT ABOUT A SEA CHANGE IN THE US PERCEPTION OF HOW THE SOVIETS REGARDED DETENTE. AFGHANISTAN

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WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLE TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS, AND IT HAD AN IMPORTANCE GOING BEYOND THAT OF AFGHANISTAN ITSELF. IT WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SENATE TO RATIFY SALT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. MUSKIE HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT US/SOVIET RELATIONS WERE CENTRAL TO WORLD PEACE AND THAT THE USA ACCEPTED THE SOVIET UNION AS A SUPER-POWER. HE, MUSKIE, HAD SPOKEN OF EQUALITY RECIPROCITY AND RESTRAINT.

5. GROMYKO REJOINED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ACCEPT PRE-CONDITIONS FOR TALKING. THE SENATE HAD DECIDED AGAINST RATIFYING SALT II BEFORE AFGHANISTAN. THE DECISION BY NATO COUNTRIES TO INCREASE DEFENCE EXPENDITURE BY 3 PER CENT WAS AN INDICATION OF THEIR INTENTION TO SEEK SUPERIORITY. HE ALSO DENOUNCED THE US PERSHING MISSILE DECISION. (MUSKIE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT FOR THE RUSSIANS, PERSHING WAS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM OTHER TNF.) ALL THESE WERE INDICATIONS IN THE SOVIET VIEW, THAT THE U S HAD ABANDONED THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND WERE SEEKING DOMINATION. TO THIS, MUSKIE REPLIED THAT THE CONTINUED SOVIET DEFENCE EXPENDITURE OVER 15 YEARS WAS ENOUGH TO EXPLAIN THE NATO DECISION TO INCREASE THEIR DEFENCE EXPENDITURE. THE PERSHING DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET DECISION ON SS20S. THE US WERE PREPARED FOR TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES, WEAPONS THAT WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS. THE U S WERE STILL COMMITTED TO SALT BUT THE CALENDAR WAS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF AFGHANISTAN.

6. EXPLAINING THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN, GROMYKO REFERRED TO CONTINUED ARMED INCURSIONS FROM PAKISTAN INVOLVING AMERICANS AND PAKISTANIS. THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN INVITED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN TO SEND IN TROOPS. MUSKIE HAD CHALLENGED THIS FIRST POINT BY SAYING THAT THE MAN WHO HAD ISSUED THE INVITATION HAD NOT SURVIVED THE ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TROOPS.

7. MUSKIE REPORTED THE SCEPTICISM THAT GROMYKO HAD SHOWN ABOUT AMERICAN STATEMENTS THAT THEY INTENDED OBSERVING THE TERMS OF SALT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A TREATY. MUSKIE HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE PROSPECTS OF THE TREATY ALIVE AND THEREFORE TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. THIS DID NOT DEPEND UPON A TREATY. GROMYKO DID NOT REPLY TO THIS POINT BUT MUSKIE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS QUOTE NOT UNRESPONSIVE UNQUOTE.

8. GROMYKO ADVANCED THE PROPOSALS OF THE AFGHANISTAN GOVERNMENT RELATING TO THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN: A SETTLEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN (MENTIONED BY GROMYKO AS AN AFTER-THOUGHT). TROOP WITHDRAWALS WOULD TAKE PLACE IF SUCH A SETTLEMENT WAS WORKED OUT AND WHEN THE CAUSES OF THE INTERVENTION HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. NO INDICATION HAD BEEN GIVEN OF WHO WOULD JUDGE WHEN THE CAUSES HAD BEEN ELIMINATED.

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9. MUSKIE HAD PROTESTED THAT THIS AMOUNTED TO LEGITIMISATION OF THE SOVIET INVASION AND OF THE KARMEL GOVERNMENT. IT LEFT THE DECISION ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL UP TO THE SOVIETS. MUSKIE THOUGHT THAT THIS HAD BEEN A SUFFICIENTLY NEGATIVE REACTION TO DETER GROMYKO FROM COMING BACK FOR MORE; BUT THE LATTER HAD ASKED FOR A FURTHER REPLY, WHICH INDICATED TO MUSKIE THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TALKS TO CONTINUE.

10. MUSKIE SAID THAT THE NEUTRALITY IDEA HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED. GROMYKO HAD TALKED ABOUT NON-ALIGNMENT BUT HAD NOT MENTIONED NEUTRALITY.

11. ACCORDING TO MUSKIE, GROMYKO HAD RIDICULED THE NOTION THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN TO CONTROL THE OIL OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE SOVIETS DID NOT NEED PERSIAN GULF OIL.

12. GROMYKO SAID NOTHING ABOUT WESTERN ECONOMIC MEASURES THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE SOVIETS ON ACCOUNT OF AFGHANISTAN. NOR HAD GROMYKO RAISED THE OLYMPICS OR GRAIN. BUT MUSKIE DID NOT THINK THAT THIS NECESSARILY MEANT ANYTHING VERY MUCH AS THERE HAD NOT BEEN TIME TO DISCUSS EVERYTHING.

13. NEITHER MUSKIE NOR GROMYKO HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF A FURTHER MEETING.

FCO PASS TO ALL SAVING POSTS.

HENDERSON

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