

SECRET

Prime Minister

(2)
6(A)



PM/80/8

PRIME MINISTER

A proper report. The idea of a Treaty of Neutrality for Afghanistan is an interesting one (para 9).

MS.

Para 1/2

Afghanistan: The Next Steps

1. In our discussion at OD on 22 January we agreed on a number of measures proposed in my minute PM/80/5 of the previous day. Action to put these into effect is now in hand, in concert with our European partners and the Americans where appropriate. We should now look at the next stage and consider what further action we need to set in train.
2. The decisions we have already taken were intended to promote two major objectives:
 - (a) to secure widespread condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and to impose certain penalties on the Soviet Union;
 - (b) to find ways of supporting the countries of South West Asia and the Middle East against further Soviet attempts to secure advantage by subversion, if not by force. I shall shortly be circulating an analysis of the situation in the countries under threat.
3. These two objectives remain valid and need to be sustained. I am looking into a second series of actions which might be taken when NATO stocktaking is complete and when we have been able to judge the effect on the Soviets of the West's initial response.
4. Our ultimate aim should be to create a situation in which the Soviet Union concludes that it has ^{*much to lose*} nothing to gain from further adventures. This must be part of the process of putting the East/West relationship on to a more stable basis, free of the illusions which characterised the 1970s.
5. Within this framework, there are a number of other objectives

/which

SECRET



which we should pursue. All contribute to our ultimate aim; some would be of value in themselves. I have the following in mind:

Afghanistan

6. First, the future of Afghanistan itself. Two ideas are already been pursued. The first is support for patriots inside Afghanistan through the covert supply of arms and training, amongst other things. French officials favour this; the Chinese are also interested; and the US are already active in this respect. Moslem money is already flowing, and may be sufficient. There is a risk that the Russians would see this as a pretext for raiding over the Afghan frontier. The Pakistanis are understandably nervous.

7. Secondly, the various Afghan patriotic organisations announced a few days ago that they were setting up a joint organisation. They have asked for representation in the Islamic conference. This may be a sign that the Afghans are trying to overcome their chronic disunity. This new body may not survive. But in so far as we can see, we should encourage the Islamic countries to support a united "Afghan Liberation Organisation".

8. The purpose of these actions is to maintain military pressure on the Russians inside Afghanistan; to demonstrate more widely that the Russians are not having things all their own way there; and to maintain an alternative Afghan regime. The prospect of an early Russian departure is, of course remote. But both for our immediate purpose and with a view to the longer term we should, at least in our public statements, continue to demand this, and encourage others to do the same.

9. The demand for Soviet withdrawal would be more plausible if a positive solution to the Afghan problem could be proposed. One possibility would be a Treaty of neutrality for Afghanistan, guaranteed by the countries of the region, including the Soviet Union, Iran, Pakistan, China and India. At the least, once such

*I would
be
needed!*

/a



a proposal entered the public domain, it would substantially increase political pressure on the Russians. There is a model to hand in the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, which the Russians signed amongst others. The idea might best be promoted by the Islamic countries, or by one of the countries of the region. I have set studies in train.

*NATO
was near.*

Sino-Indian Relations

10. The effectiveness of action to contain the Soviet presence in Afghanistan will depend to a considerable extent on India, and on the extent to which India continues to rely on the Soviet Union for diplomatic and military support. This in turn will be affected by the state of Sino-Indian relations. The Indians will not be reliable, nor detach themselves from the Russians, as long as they fear the Chinese. Both the Chinese and the Indians have an interest in a gradual process of rapprochement. But mutual suspicions remain; each regards the other as its natural enemy and rival for influence in the area; and the recent Soviet actions will polarise them still further, particularly over their differing attitudes towards Pakistan. I have asked my officials to consider what we can do to encourage both sides to look at each other more objectively. But we have to accept that the Chinese will not be ready to offer the Indians much, until they see from evidence that they are distancing themselves from the Soviet Union; and whatever the Chinese offer, the Indians will in practice continue to cleave to the Soviet Union.

Western Unity

11. Finally, the present crisis has demonstrated yet again how difficult it is for the Europeans to unite effectively with the United States and even among themselves. Despite our basic community of interest, our perceptions and our short-term needs inevitably differ. The secret four power talks between British, French, German and American officials in London last week showed that it was not too difficult to reach agreement on the analysis. But the particular interests of the French and Germans lead them

_____/to



to differing conclusions about policy. We need consciously to exploit the present crisis in East/West relations to strengthen unity amongst the European countries rather than the reverse. President Carter has suggested a new ad hoc body; and the Italians have pressed that they should be included. I am not sure that a proliferation of groups will help much. But none of the present bodies include the Japanese, apart from the Economic Summit, whose purpose is different. There may be room for something which would include them. My officials are studying this matter.

12.. When the studies which I have commissioned on these and other related issues are complete, I shall make more detailed proposals for further action by ourselves. These seem bound to cost money, but pending further discussion with our Allies it will be possible only to give very rough figures.

13. I am sending copies of this minute to other member of OD, the Secretary of State for Energy and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 February 1980

1- Feb 1980

