HAIG ADVANCES

PS/MR HURD

PS/MR ONSLOW

PS/PUS

MR GIFFARD

MR WRIGHT

MR GILLMORE

MR URE

HD/SAMD

HD/DEFD

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PS/No 10 DOWNING STREET PS/S of S DEFENCE

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG

PS/SIR M PALLISER

MR WADE-GERY

MR FULLER

DIO

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) CABINET OFFICE

FLASH

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GR 1500
SECRET

DESKBY Ø51200Z UKMIS NEW YORK

DESKBY Ø51600Z LIMA

FM WASHINGTON Ø50400Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1597 OF 5 MAY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK AND LIMA (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADORS)

YOUR TELNO 909: FALKLANDS

- 1. I HAVE JUST HAD A THREE-HOUR SESSION WITH HAIG ABOUT YOUR MESSAGE AND PROPOSALS. HE CANCELLED A MEETING IN NEW YORK FOR THE PURPOSE, AND FROM WHAT HE SAID AND THE WAY HE SAID IT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT HIS GREAT ANXIETY.
- 2. UNDERLYING HAIG'S REACTIONS IS HIS BELIEF THAT THE USA AND THE UK WILL DIMINISH THEMSELVES IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD IF THEY LET FIGHTING CONTINUE IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC WITH FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE. HE REALISES THAT HMG CANNOT GET EVERYTHING THEY WANT, AND THAT NOT GETTING EVERYTHING YOU WANT WHEN YOU HAVE OUR SUPERIOR MILITARY

THE POWER AND THE ARGENTINES ARE NOT, AND THAT THIS IMPOSES CERTAIN CELICATIONS, AND INDEED PROBLEMS, FOR US IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD.

3. HE THINKS IT IS NOW OR NEVER. WE MUST PUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING AND, AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED, HE BELIEVES THAT IF THE FIGHTING GCES ON WE WILL INCREASINGLY LOSE THE SOLID WORLD SUPPORT THAT WE HAVE GOT NOW, APART ALTOGETHER FROM THE TRAGEDY OF CASUALTIES.

4. HAIG DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE OF THE PERUVIANS BEING PREPARED TO AGREE TO OUR POINTS OR OF BEING READY TO TRANSMIT THEM TO THE ARGENTINIANS. HE COULD NOT PUT THEM TO THE PERUVIANS. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS WHY WE WISH, FOR INSTANCE, TO INSERT A REFERENCE TO THE RESTORATION OF THE FORMER ADMINISTRATION, TO THE NEED FOR THE WISHES OF THE ISLANDERS TO BE RESPECTED, AND AN EXPRESSION OF OUR DOUBTS ABOUT REACHING A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT BY 3Ø APRIL 1983. BUT HE INSISTS, ON THE BASIS OF HOURS AND HOURS OF ARGUMENT WITH THE ARGENTINIANS, THAT THERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE CHANCE OF GETTING AN AGREEMENT IF WE INSIST ON OUR LANGUAGE.

BHAIG ATTACHES THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO AN EARLY CEASEFIRE. HE BELIEVES THAT THIS IS THE FIRST AND OVERWHELMING NEED AND HE FULLY APPRECIATES YOUR READINESS TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT A CEASEFIRE WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR US UNLESS IT IS LINKED WITH SOME PROCEDURE THAT ENSURES ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL: AND IT WILL HOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARGENTINIANS UNLESS IT IS LINKED IN SOME WAY TO A LONGER TERM SOLUTION.

6. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I LEFT HAIG IN NO DOUBT ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE FEELING IN LONDON AND OUR CONVICTION IN OUR CAUSE. WE HAD SEEN NO READINESS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINIANS TO BE FLEXIBLE. IT DID NOT THEREFORE SEEM REASONABLE FOR US TO HAVE TO START WHITTLING AWAY WHAT WE THOUGHT NECESSARY JUST BECAUSE THE PERUVIANS HAD COME FORWARD WITH A TEXT THAT THEY THOUGHT WAS WEARABLE BY THE ARGENINIANS. (THOUGH THEY HAVE SAID THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT IT UNDER DURESS) THE PRIME MINISTER, YOU AND OTHER MINISTERS HAD GIVEN GREAT THOUGHT TO THIS AND HAD MADE A HIGHLY IMPORTANT PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE INITIATIVE.

7. HAIG EXPRESSED FULL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTNESS OF OUR CAUSE AND OUR GOOD FAITH IN COMING FORWARD WITH THE CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL. BUT HE REPEATED TIME AND AGAIN THAT OUR LIST OF POINTS WERE COMPLETELY UNNEGOTIABLE. THEY WOULD SIMPLY HAVE THE EFFECT, IF WE

TELY UNNEGOTIABLE. THEY WOULD SIMPLY HAVE THE EFFECT, IF WE STUCK TO THEM, OF ENSURING THAT THE FIGHTING WOULD GO ON, WITH ALL THE UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES.

- B. I ASKED HIM WHAT, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE THOUGHT COULD BE DONE AND THIS LED ON TO A PROLONGED ANALYSIS OF TEXTS, THE OUTCOME OF WHICH WAS A NEW SET OF POINTS, AS GIVEN IN MIFT, THAT HE HOPED MET SOME OF OUR REQUIREMENTS, WITHOUT INVOLVING LANGUAGE THAT WOULD BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND BOTH BY PERU AND ARGENTINA.
- 9. AS REGARDS THE IDEA OF A GUARANTEE, HAIG, AFTER REFERRING TO ADVISERS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, SAID THAT WHAT WE WERE ASKING FOR POSED ALL SORTS OF DIFFICULTIES, THAT EVEN IF THEY WERE SURMOUNTABLE WOULD TAKE A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME. TO MEET OUR NEEDS AND AVOID THIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM, HAIG HAS INCORPORATED LANGUAGE IN THE NEW POINTS THAT HE CONSIDERS A GUARANTEE ON THE PART OF THE USA, AND FOR THAT MATTER OF THE OTHER CONTACT GROUP POWERS, OF THE HON-REINTRODUCTION OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND OF THE OTHER TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. HE MAINTAINS THAT THE SUREST GUARANTEE IS THE USA PRESENCE.
- 10. WE HAD A LONG WRANGLE ON OUR PROPOSED WORDING ABOUT QUOTE THE RESTORED ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE, HAIG SAID THERE WOULD BE NO POINT WHATEVER IN DISCUSSING ANY AGREEMENT THAT CONTAINED A COMMITMENT THAT THE PREVIOUS BRITISH ADMINISTRATION SHOULD RETURN TO THE ISLANDS. I REFERRED TO OUR CONVICTION THAT AS THE ARGENTIN-TANS HAD TAKE THE ISLANDS BY FORCE AND USURPED THE BRITISH AUTHORITY, WE HAD EVERY RIGHT, IN SEEKING A RESTORATION OF THE STATUS QUO, TO ENSURE THAT OUR ADMINISTRATION WAS REINSTATED. HAIG SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY IT WAS NOT GOING TO BE POSSIBLE TO GO BACK TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD PREFER TO COMMIT SUICIDE THAN PUT THEIR SIGNATURE TO A DOCUMENT COMMITTING THEM TO ACCEPT A RESTORATION OF THE ERITISH ADMINISTRATION AS IT WAS. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE WORDING HAIG HAS COME UP WITH IS A REFERENCE TO QUOTE THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION UNQUOTE. HE ADMITS THAT THIS IS IMPRECISE. BUT HE REGARDS IMPRECISION AS A VIRTUE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES BOTH IN THIS PASSAGE OF THE TEXT AND IN SOME OTHERS. HE KNOWS THAT THERE WILL BE WRANGLES IN THE CONTACT GROUP ABOUT THE MEANING OF THIS PASSAGE BUT MEANWHILE WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVES, WHICH IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARGENTINIAN FORCES.
- 1. I WILL NOT RECOUNT THE PROLONGED ARGUMENT WE HAD ABOUT RESERT.

- 1. I WILL NOT RECOUNT THE PROLONGED ARGUMENT WE HAD ABOUT RESPECT FOR THE WISHES OF THE INHABITANTS BECAUSE IT ALWAYS CAME UP AGAINST HAIG'S CONVICTION THAT THIS IS ANOTHER ABSOLUTE STICKING POINT FOR THE ARGENTINIANS, JUST AS IT IS FOR US. THE WORDING THAT HAIG HAS COME UP WITH ON THIS SUBJECT READS, AS YOU WILL SEE, THAT QUOTE THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE ASPIRATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE ISLANDERS WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE STATUS OF THE ISLANDS UNQUOTE.
- 12. HAIG CONSIDERED THAT THE LANGUAGE OF OUR POINT 6, WHICH LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT BY 30 APRIL 1983, WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE. I SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS THERE WAS A POINT OF SUBSTANCE HERE. WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IF A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN ARRIVED AT BY THAT DATE? WAS THERE NOT A DANGER THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD SAY THAT IF THAT POINT HAD NOT BEEN COMPILED WITH THEN THE REST OF THE AGREEMENT WAS INVALID? HAIG ARGUED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THEY COULD DO THIS: IN PRACTICE THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD CONTINUE THEIR FUNCTIONS. IN THE END HE CAME FORWARD WITH A NEW PASSAGE WHICH AS YOU WILL SEE, STATES THAT QUOTE THE CONTACT GROUP WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS REACH A DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT PRIOR TO APRIL 30, 1963 UNQUOTE.
- 13. HAIG IMPLORES YOU TO HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THIS AND SEE WHETHER YOU CANNOT ACCEPT HIS LATEST PROPOSALS, GIVEN EVERYTHING THAT IS AT STAKE. HE DOES NOT REALLY THINK THAT WE CAN GO ON DRAFTING AND COUNTER-DRAFTING. IF THIS NEW TEXT CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LONDON, HAIG IS THINKING OF A PROCEDURE AS SET OUT IN MY SECOND IFT.
- 14. FERHAPS I COULD CONCLUDE WITH A FINAL WORD ABOUT THE MOOD HERE. HAIG IS FEARFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGATION OF THE FIGHTING, PARTICULARLY IF IT CAN BE REPRESENTED, HOWEVER UNFAIRLY, THAT HMG HAS NOT PURSUED EVERY POSSIBLE CHANCE OF A SETTLEMENT. HE FORESEES THAT WE MAY INCREASINGLY COME TO THE USA FOR SUPPORT AND THAT, IF OPINION TURNS TO BELIEVING THAT WE HAVE MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY OF PEACE, IT IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT FOR THE USA TO STAY IN THE SUPPORTIVE POSITION THEY HAVE NOW ADOPTED. EVEN IF HE THOUGHT THAT THE PROSPECTS OF CONTINUED FIGHTING WERE NOT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE RISKS FOR US, I DO NOT THINK THAT HE WOULD BELIEVE THAT IT WAS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE THE BATTLE TO THE BITTER END.