

ArgentinaFALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP : 0730 HOURS : 2 JUNE 1982Military Action

1. The Ministry of Defence announced that initial estimates indicated that some 250 Argentine personnel were killed in the repossession of Darwin and Goose Green. Funeral arrangements are being made in accordance with Article 17 of the 1949 Geneva Convention.
2. Included in the weapons and equipment captured at Goose Green airstrip were two nearly complete Pucara aircraft, 20 mm cannon and 2.75 inch rockets.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

3. No declaration has yet been adopted at the NAM meeting in Havana. Both the Cubans and the Argentines have, however, tabled texts which are hostile to the UK. These texts are being resisted by a group of mainly African countries and, as a consequence, the Cubans are reported to be seeking some form of compromise.

2 June 1982

Emergency Unit

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :
0700 HOURS, 2 JUNE 1982

UN

(a) Sir A Parsons' Discussion with Secretary-General and his Staff

: (FOO telno.
 88 to UKMIS
 ew York)
 : (UKMIS New
 ork telno.
 06)

1. Sir A Parsons spoke as instructed. The Secretary-General was disheartened by our 'clarifications'. In a wide-ranging discussion the Secretary-General and his staff raised a number of points:-

(a) Ceasefire

Even if we could not accept UN observers, could we not accept some UN presence in negotiations between the military commanders on the spot?

(b) Administration

Would it be possible to refrain from sending the Governor back? Could a military officer be appointed, on an interim basis, to carry out the functions of the Governor during the cooling-off period?

(c) Observers

Could we accept that in the closing stages of the Argentine withdrawal UN observers should 'begin to trickle in' so that by the time of complete Argentine withdrawal there would be a small core of UN observers who would monitor non-re-introduction of Argentine forces and the gradual running down of the British military presence?

Sir A Parsons said he was prepared, without commitment, to ask London's views on these points.

(b) Argentine Views

: (UKMIS New
 ork telno.
 99 para 5)

2. The Secretariat reported that the Argentines could accept the Secretary-General's 5 point plan on condition that:-

- (i) Point 3 means token commencement of the withdrawal but the completion of the total British withdrawal would be within Y days;
- (ii) it is clearly understood that British forces would not remain alone on the Islands: withdrawal of Argentine forces from the areas they occupy should correspond with a gradual take-over of those areas by UN forces;
- (iii) British forces shall abstain from widening their areas of occupation at the date of ceasefire.

Our Mission said that these conditions were not acceptable.

(c) Likely Developments Today

: (FOO tel.
 o.485 to UKMIS
 ew York)

3. The Secretary-General has asked the Argentines and us to respond to the ideas at paragraph 1 by 1600Z today. On the assumption that neither side can agree quickly to these new points and that Argentine conditions concerning the Secretary-General's 5 point plan are unacceptable, the Secretary-General will report to the Security Council today that his efforts have been unsuccessful. He will not include the text of the Secretary of State's message of 31 May. There will be informal Security Council consultations at 1500Z today.

(d) Sir A Parsons' Recommendations

4. (i) For tactical reasons, and with the Secretary-General's Report in mind, we should provide comments on questions (a) and (c) at paragraph 1 and while it may be difficult, any comments on (b) would be useful. (ii) That we should give Sir A Parsons discretion to float amongst delegations, as he thinks fit, a draft Resolution. The objective would not be to table it (unless it seemed likely to be adopted) but rather to indicate to the moderate states what in practice would be acceptable to us in terms of a ceasefire, thereby influencing them and conceivably starting a negotiation which might buy us more time.

US(a) Sir N Henderson's Meeting with Judge Clark

5. Sir N Henderson explained our attitude on ceasefire, withdrawal, and the future. Judge Clark was somewhat equivocal about timing, though he gave the impression that the best moment would be immediately after the surrender of the Argentine garrison. Clark emphasised the strength of the President's support for us even though the President believes considerable damage has been done to US/Latin American relations. Clark has undertaken to arrange for Sir N Henderson to call on the President this morning.

(b) Sir N Henderson's Discussions with Mr Haig

6. Mr Haig is unable to come to London today. Mr Haig accepts that there is no point in pursuing further his ideas on the Falklands. But Haig is concerned about how to end the conflict after Argentine surrender. He does not believe independence is a viable option. At the UN he hopes we can avoid a situation in which the UK and the US are isolated. According to Haig, the President will wish to discuss with the Prime Minister ways of trying to mend fences with Latin America and preventing the Russians from exploiting the crisis. (The State Department has now suggested that the Prime Minister's meeting with the President might take place in Paris from 1530 to 1630 on 4 June.)

(c) Sir N Henderson's Assessment of US Support

7. Sir N Henderson reviews the way in which policy has been formulated and the scale of the support we have received. He judges that: we should not take US assistance for granted; constant work is necessary to keep the Administration, Congress and public opinion on the right lines; the value of US support is great.

Comment

8. With continued Argentine insistence on a total British withdrawal (even if apparently on a different time-scale to Argentine withdrawal), the Secretary General seems certain to report failure to the Security Council today. Informal consultations of the Council will begin at 1500Z today. These are expected to lead to a formal meeting of the Council in the afternoon, New York time. We need to give Sir A Parsons instructions by 1600Z, for his meeting with the Secretary General.

9. These instructions will need to cover:

- (a) comments on the Secretary General's new points on UN participation in ceasefire negotiations, the future administration of the Islands and the timing of an observer presence (points (a), (b) and (c) of para 1 above of Sitrep). Sir A Parsons recognises that we may not want to give a specific reaction on the question of the Governor's return. But he recommends that for tactical reasons we should at least feed in comments on (a) and (c);
- (b) whether we should instruct him to say that the Argentine conditions on the Secretary General's Five Point Plan are unacceptable;
- (c) whether Sir A Parsons should have discretion to float our own draft Resolution in the Security Council.

10. Although Mr Haig was unable to stop over in London today, Sir N Henderson has asked to see President Reagan before the latter's departure for Europe. We shall need to consider whether he should have further instructions for this meeting (eg at least to inform the President of the position we shall be taking with the Secretary General and in the Security Council). We shall need to work hard to retain American support in the Council and Mr Haig has emphasised to our Ambassador his hope that we can again 'manoeuvre' to avoid US and UK isolation at the UN.

11. We need also to respond to the State Department's new proposal for the timing of a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in Paris.



P R Fearn
Emergency Unit

2 June 1982