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ADVANCE COPY

WONFO 005/08
OO F C O (DESKBY 080600Z)

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Ps LPS

GR 700 *Dis 050600Z*

Ps. *Ad Trefgarne* (Hd Vnd)
Ps *6/1/82* (Hd NA)
in A ALLAND (No to DSt)
Mr Giffard (Mo Cab Office)
Mr VAG
(Hd S.A.M.) R.C.

DE T I P

SECRET

DESKBY 080600Z

FM WASHINGTON 072142Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1174 OF 7 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK (PERSONAL FOR ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE).

FALKLANDS.

1. BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER AND YOU SEE SECRETARY HAIG TOMORROW YOU MAY LIKE ME TO TRY TO PULL TOGETHER AMERICAN VIEWS.

2. THE AMERICANS THOUGH PERHAPS LEAVING IT TOO LATE, MADE GREAT EFFORTS TO DISSUADE THE ARGENTINIANS FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE INVASION AND IN DOING SO MADE CLEAR TO THEM THAT WE WOULD BE LIKELY TO REGARD IT AS A CASUS BELLI. IF IN RESPONSE WE HAD NOT PROCEEDED TO SEND SHIPS TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, WE WOULD HAVE LOST ALL AUTHORITY HERE.

3. NEVERTHELESS THE AMERICANS NOW FACE A DILEMMA. AS EXPECTED, THEY ARE CAUGHT BETWEEN THE DESIRE TO SUPPORT US, REALIZING WHAT IS AT STAKE IN LONDON (WITH HAIG TELLING ME IN THE clearest terms THAT THERE QUOTE CANNOT BE ANOTHER SUEZ UNQUOTE) AND THEIR EXTREME CURRENT SENSITIVITY TO THE DANGERS FOR THEM OF INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AMERICA, AND TO THE RISKS OF A SPREAD OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE IN THE EVENT OF A FURTHER DECLINE OF U S STANDING IN THE REGION. THE PRESENT U S ADMINISTRATION HAS DEVOTED OVER THE PAST YEAR GREAT EFFORTS TO IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, TO TRY TO DRAW THEM CLOSER TO THE UNITED STATES AND GET SOME (VERY RELATIVE) IMPROVEMENT IN THE APPALLING RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ENDERS HAS BEEN THE PRINCIPAL ARCHITECT OF THE POLICY OF TRYING TO GET ACTIVE ARGENTINIAN SUPPORT IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

4. BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS THE FEAR THAT IF THERE IS A NAVAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE OAS STATES, MANY OF THEM AT PRESENT BELIEVE IN THE CREDIBILITY OF ARGENTINA. WILL BE DELIVERED THROUGH

4. BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS THE FEAR THAT IF THERE IS A NAVAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, THE OAS STATES, MANY OF THEM AT PRESENT PRIVATELY CRITICAL OF ARGENTINA, WILL BE DRIVEN THROUGH LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY TO SIDE WITH THE ARGENTINIANS. THE AMERICANS WOULD THEN FIND THEMSELVES PULLED PAINFULLY IN BOTH DIRECTIONS.

5. SO FAR AS OUR OWN POSITION IS CONCERNED I HAVE LEFT NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT WITH THE U S ADMINISTRATION THAT THE SINE QUA NON FOR US IS THE ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS. HAIG IS WELL AWARE THAT THIS IS OUR QUOTE BOTTOM LINE UNQUOTE. I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF HE SOUGHT TO PRESS IDEAS FOR JOINT ADMINISTRATION.

6. BUT THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH WILL BE LEADING THE AMERICANS TO TRY FOR A LONGER TERM SOLUTION. SO FAR AS THE MILITARY SITUATION IS CONCERNED, THE U S ADMINISTRATION DO NOT DOUBT OUR NAVAL SUPERIORITY. THEY DO, HOWEVER, SEE POTENTIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR US, OPERATING FAR FROM HOME AND WITH LIMITED AIR SUPPORT, IN GETTING THE ARGENTINIAN GROUND TROOPS OFF THE ISLANDS WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE CASUALTIES.

7. THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION AFTER WE SUCCEEDED IN RECAPTURING THE ISLANDS BY FORCE. GALTIERI'S GOVERNMENT WOULD NO DOUBT FALL; BUT THE ARGENTINIANS WOULD NOT GIVE UP THEIR CLAIM. WE SHOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE TO DEPLOY CONSIDERABLE FORCES IN THE AREA TO DEFEND THE ISLANDS AND THE ISSUE WOULD REMAIN A RUNNING SORE UNLESS ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL IS ACCOMPANIED BY SOME LONGER TERM SOLUTION.

8. I HAVE NO DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT THE AMERICANS ARE HANKERING AFTER SOME KIND OF SOLUTION WHICH WOULD ENTAIL ARGENTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ISLANDS AND THEIR RETURN TO BRITISH ADMINISTRATION; BUT WHICH WOULD OFFER THEM THE PROSPECT OF SOME SATISFACTION IN TERMS OF AN EVENTUAL SOLUTION ON SOVEREIGNTY.

9. ALL THESE FACTORS, PLUS THE HABITUAL DEGREE OF INCOHERENCE WHICH CHARACTERIZES THE U S ADMINISTRATION, HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THE SOMEWHAT CONFLICTING STATEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE HERE OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE AMERICAN ATTACHMENT TO SOME MEASURE OF QUOTE NEUTRALITY UNQUOTE IS RELATED TO THEIR DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE A SOLUTION AND MUST THEREFORE RETAIN SOME INFLUENCE IN BUENOS AIRES. IT HAS ALSO BEEN RELATED TO THE USUAL FACTIONAL STRUGGLES HERE WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION, WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND ENDERS ESPOUSING A PRO-ARGENTINE LINE.

ADMINISTRATION, WITH MRS KIRKPATRICK AND ENDERS ESPOUSING A PRO-ARGENTINE LINE.

10. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY TELEGRAMS, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HAIG AND WEIMBERGER ARE SOUND, THOUGH THEY WILL REMAIN ANXIOUS TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO PROMOTE AN HONOURABLE SOLUTION AVOIDING THE NECESSITY FOR A FULL-SCALE NAVAL ACTION. I HAVE MADE QUITE CLEAR TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO NOT NEGOTIATING UNDER DURESS.

11. I THINK YOU WILL FIND HAIG FULLY CONSCIOUS OF OUR ABSOLUTE DETERMINATION TO GET THE ARGENTINIANS OFF THE ISLANDS BUT ANXIOUS TO EXPLORE WHETHER THIS COULD NOT BE COUPLED WITH SOME PROPOSAL WHICH COULD OPEN THE WAY FOR AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION, WHILE MEETING OUR FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS.

HENDERSON

NNNN

1) B.A. - 12-17th April

Principles of American

U.S. not join.

2) German. - Obj. - Sov. assistance would
be accepted.

3) Falklands. - None important to van Agt.

4)

Thatcher. -

Timing.

Flavour of political situation

Today. — Diplomatic means.
15 years.

Brit. admini.^{tion}

Sovereign attitude.
