

GR 1200

CONFIDENTIAL

\* AMENDED COPY 4 MARCH

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WASHINGTON 011800Z MAR 80

TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 926 OF 1 MARCH

INFO BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, TOKYO,  
OTTAWA

MIPT: MEETING WITH VANCE

1. VANCE FOCUSED DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN, AND ON THE US PAPER QUOTE GOALS AND ACTIONS UNQUOTE. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE RESPONSE FROM THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WOULD COME THROUGH THE NINE OR COUNTRY BY COUNTRY.
2. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THE IDEA OF A QUOTE COORDINATED UNQUOTE RESPONSE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND THAT IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF THERE WAS NOT TOO MUCH COORDINATION. HE MENTIONED THAT DE LEUSS AND ROBIN WOULD BE GOING TO MOSCOW ON 3 MARCH TO TRY TO CLARIFY THE HORIZON ON AFGHANISTAN AND TO SEE WHAT THE PROSPECTS WERE FOR MADRID. HE SAID THAT THE IMMEDIATE TASK FOLLOWING THE COMMUNITY MEETING OF MINISTERS ON 19 FEBRUARY WAS TO PUT OUT FEELERS TO THE RUSSIANS TO FIND OUT WHAT CONDITIONS THEY WOULD ATTACH TO WITHDRAWAL. THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT SO FAR ON WHAT SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE PUT TO THE RUSSIANS AND WHEN THIS SHOULD BE DONE.
3. VANCE THEN GAVE AN ACCOUNT (SEE MIFT) OF A MEETING HE HAD HAD THE SAME DAY WITH DOBRYNIN. THE GENERAL VIEW AMONG THE SIX WAS THAT EVERYTHING THAT DOBRYNIN HAD SAID EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING A LITMUS TEST BY WHICH SOVIET INTENTIONS COULD BE GAUGED. I SAID THAT THE NEUTRALITY PROPOSAL SEEMED IDEAL FOR THIS PURPOSE. IF THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO RESPOND, HERE WAS A WAY OUT. BUT I HAD NOT SEEN MUCH EVIDENCE FOR IT SO FAR. PERSONALLY I THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE THE SOUNDEST BASIS FOR FUTURE ACTION TO ASSUME THAT EVERYTHING THE RUSSIANS HAD DONE IN AFGHANISTAN HAD BEEN A MISCALCULATION. THE IMPORTANT COURSE SURELY NOW, WHATEVER THE ORIGINAL SOVIET MOTIVES HAD BEEN, WAS TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THEIR ACTION HAD PRODUCED EXTREMELY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND TO LEAVE THE RUSSIANS IN NO DOUBT WHATEVER HOW STRONGLY WE FELT ABOUT IT. THE MORE UNTENABLE THE SOVIET POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE GREATER THEIR DIFFICULTIES INTERNATIONALLY THE MORE LIKELY WERE THEY TO RESPOND FAVOURABLE TO OUR LITMUS TEST OF NEUTRALITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

/4

## CONFIDENTIAL

4. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED FEAR THAT IF LIFE WAS MADE TOO DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN, THIS COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF ENCOURAGING THEM TO INVADE PAKISTAN.

5. VANCE SAID THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY WAS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE WAY TO DO THIS WAS TO KEEP OPEN A WINDOW THROUGH WHICH THEY COULD WITHDRAW WITHOUT LOSING FACE. IT MUST ALSO BE MADE CLEAR THAT ANY FURTHER STEP WAS UNACCEPTABLE. IT WAS VERY COMPLICATED AND WE WOULD HAVE TO GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO QUOTE TYPES OF WINDOWS UNQUOTE.

6. REJECTING BY IMPLICATION THE FEARS EXPRESSED BY THE CANADIAN, VANCE SAID THAT THE US WERE PROVIDING \*THE INSURGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN WITH \*AK47S, ANTI-TANK WEAPONS AND

ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. THERE WAS A RISK IN DOING THIS BECAUSE IT COULD LEAD TO THE SOVIETS TAKING ACTION ACROSS THE BORDER INTO PAKISTAN.

7. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, EXPRESSING PARTICULAR INTEREST IN SOVIET FEARS OF A FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC STATE ON THEIR SOUTHERN BORDER, SUGGESTED THAT THE US SHOULD STEP UP THEIR BROADCAST TO THE MOSLEM POPULATIONS IN RUSSIA. MR VANCE SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WERE GOING TO DO SO FROM A STATION IN SRI LANKA. THE FRENCHMAN WENT ON TO TALK ABOUT THE DOVES AND HAWKS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY AND TO INDICATE A PREFERENCE FOR THE IDEA OF A QUOTE SPECIAL STATUS UNQUOTE FOR AFGHANISTAN RATHER THAN NEUTRALITY. HE EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. VANCE ACCEPTED THAT A DIALOGUE WITH THE RUSSIANS SHOULD NOT BE SHUT OFF. BUT PRESSURE ALSO HAD TO BE MAINTAINED. THE MORE THE SOVIETS BECAME DUG IN AND COMMITTED IN AFGHANISTAN, THE HARDER IT WAS GOING TO BE TO GET THEM OUT. THE URGENT NEED FOR THE WEST WAS TO GET THEIR THINKING IN ORDER QUOTE TO FIND WINDOWS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE RUSSIANS UNQUOTE.

8. VANCE SAID THAT HE THOUGH THE SOVIET DECISION TO INVADE HAD BEEN TAKEN LAST SEPTEMBER, WHEN THE SOVIETS FELT THEY COULD NOT PERMIT THE GOVERNMENT THERE TO BE DEPOSED. HE REPEATED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE RISKS THEY WOULD RUN IN INVADING PAKISTAN OR IRAN OR IN INTERFERING WITH OIL SUPPLIES OUT OF THE PERSIAN GULF. BUT HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT NOT BE SO CLEAR ABOUT HOW FIRM THE US WERE IN THEIR INSISTENCE ON GETTING THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. HE ADDED THAT IN CONSIDERING SOVIET

<sup>2</sup>  
CONFIDENTIAL

/ MOTIVES

## CONFIDENTIAL

MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS IT SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN THE RUSSIANS VERY CLEAR SIGNALS ON HOW GRAVELY THEY WOULD REACT TO A SOVIET INVASION. HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THIS.

9. THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TENDED TO EMPHASISE THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES THE RUSSIANS WERE IN, THE WORSENING OF THEIR STRATEGIC POSITION THROUGH THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE LIMITED NATURE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.

10. THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THIS INTERPRETATION. NOR WAS I. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT WHATEVER THE ORIGINAL SOVIET MOTIVES THEY HAD NOW BROUGHT ABOUT A SITUATION WITH SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS OUTSIDE AFGHANISTAN. THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH EAST ASIA NOW KNEW THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED IF NECESSARY TO SEND TROOPS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS OUTSIDE THE WARSAW PACT. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO UNDERESTIMATE THE DESTABILISING EFFECT OF THIS BOTH INTERNALLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND INTERNATIONALLY. MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT THIS WAS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR. THE LATTER EXPRESSED PARTICULAR WORRY ABOUT NORTH AND SOUTH YEMEN. AND ASKED WHETHER VANCE HAD RAISED THIS WITH DOBRYNIN. VANCE SAID HE HAD - DOBRYNIN'S ANSWER HAD BEEN TO SAY THE HE QUOTE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF WHAT VANCE HAD SAID UNQUOTE.

11. VANCE EXTENDED THE DISCUSSION TO SOUTH WEST ASIA AND ASKED HOW THE COUNTRIES THERE COULD BE ENCOURAGED TO RESPOND FIRMLY. HE SAID THAT THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD MUCH BETTER RELATIONS WITH NEW DELHI AND ISLAMABAD THAN DID WASHINGTON.

12. VANCE EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA. SINCE MECCA THE SAUDIS HAD NOT TACKLED THE QUESTION OF CORRUPTION. HE HOPED THAT GISCARD, WHO WAS GOING TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF SHORTLY, COULD GET ACROSS THE MESSAGE TO THE ROYAL FAMILY THAT THEY HAD TO GET THEIR OWN HOUSE IN ORDER. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF IMPROVING THE SAUDI ARABIA'S RELATIONS WITH EGYPT UNTIL THE PALESTINE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED.

# CONFIDENTIAL

13. SUMMING UP THIS RANDOM TALK, VANCE SAID THAT MORE WORK WAS NEEDED ON THE FOLLOWING:

- A. AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES ARE NOW, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THEIR ORIGINAL MOTIVES MAY HAVE BEEN FOR INVADING AFGHANISTAN:
- B. WHAT KIND OF ACTION WE OUGHT TO TAKE TO EXERT CONTINUING PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION:

AND

- C. WHAT KIND OF WINDOWS ACCEPTABLE TO ALL OF US MIGHT PROVIDE A WAY OUT FOR THE RUSSIANS?

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

SAD	WED
EESD	TEED
N AM D	SEAD
MED	UND
RENAD	FED
FED	ECD (E)
SED	CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTR.

AFGHANISTAN

4

CONFIDENTIAL

GP 500  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

*Read in full*

FM WASHINGTON 011750Z MAR 80  
TO PRIORITY F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 927 OF 1 MARCH

INFO BONN, PARIS, ROME, UKREP BRUSSELS, UKDEL NATO, MOSCOW, TOKYO,  
OTTAWA

MIPT: VANCE'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN

1. REPORTING ON THIS MEETING, VANCE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE HOW MUCH CREDIBILITY SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO WHAT DOBRYNIN HAD SAID. HE HAD CLAIMED THAT HE HAD HAD NO PART IN THE POLITBURO'S DECISION TO INVADE AFGHANISTAN AND THAT HE HAD BEEN IN HOSPITAL AT THE TIME. THE POLITBURO HAD TAKEN THE DECISION IN VERY RESTRICTED SESSION AND THE PROFESSIONALS HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CRUCIAL MEETING.

2. VANCE'S IMPRESSION FROM WHAT DOBRYNIN HAD SAID ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN WAS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE IN REAL TROUBLE THERE AND KNEW IT. HIS GUT-FEELING, TO USE HIS OWN WORDS, WAS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT WITHOUT HAVING TO LOSE FACE BUT THAT THEY HAD NOT YET REACHED A VIEW ON HOW THIS MIGHT COME ABOUT. HE THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD MISCALCULATED BOTH THE WAY THE SITUATION WOULD DEVELOP IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION (EG NON-ALIGNED OPPOSITION AND OLYMPICS). THE US AUTHORITIES WERE QUOTE GETTING MANY SIGNALS UNQUOTE THAT LOTS OF PEOPLE IN AUTHORITY IN THE SOVIET UNION WERE SAYING THAT THERE HAD BEEN THESE MISJUDGEMENTS. THERE WAS ALSO INTELLIGENCE BUT LESS FIRM THAT THIS WAS LEADING TO CONSIDERABLE QUOTE BACK-BITING IN THE HIERARCHY UNQUOTE.

3. VANCE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MIGHT TRY TO POSTPONE THE OLYMPIC GAMES FOR A YEAR. BREZHNEV HAD JUST TOLD HAMMER THAT QUOTE GAMES ARE GONE UNQUOTE. (THE FRENCHMAN INTERJECTED THAT RAYMOND BARRE HAD BEEN INFORMED ON THE BEST AUTHORITY THAT THE ORIGINAL DECISION BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT THE GAMES IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN TAKEN BY A VERY NARROW MAJORITY IN THE POLITBURO. THE MINORITY HAD BEEN AGAINST HAVING THE GAMES IN MOSCOW BECAUSE THEY DID NOT LIKE THE PROSPECT OF HAVING 50,000 WESTERN WITNESSES THERE.)

4. VANCE ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION THE MILITARY HAD BEEN DECISIVE IN THE DECISION TO INVADE AFGHANISTAN AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN OVER-OPTIMISTIC IN WHAT THEY WOULD ACHIEVE AND WERE NOW UNABLE TO DELIVER.

CONFIDENTIAL

15.

# CONFIDENTIAL

5. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, VANCE CAME OUT WITH THE FOLLOWING REVELATIONS OF WHAT DOBRYNIN HAD SAID. HE HAD INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE WILLING TO GIVE COMMITMENTS AGAINST ANY INTENTION TO INVADE PAKISTAN OR IRAN, AND THEY WERE PREPARED TO RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO BE ABLE TO MOVE OIL OUT OF THE PERSIAN GULF FREELY. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THESE UNDERTAKINGS WOULD BE PUBLIC OR PRIVATE OR WHAT FORM THEY WOULD TAKE.
6. VANCE HAD SAID TO DOBRYNIN THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH. THE SOVIETS HAD TO GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. TO WHICH DOBRYNIN ASKED, WHAT ABOUT GOING BACK TO THE OLD IDEA OF THE KING? THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT BOTH THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION COULD ACCEPT. BUT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE A FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC STATE ON THE SOVIET BORDER. THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A GUARANTEE OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. DOBRYNIN SAID THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT THE IDEA OF UN TROOPS OR AN ISLAMIC PEACE-KEEPING FORCE.
7. DOBRYNIN HAD MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE NEUTRALITY IDEA OF THE NINE.

HENDERSON

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

#### DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

SAD	WED
EESD	TRED
N AM D	SEAD
MED	UND
NENAD	FRD
FED	BCD (E)
SED	CABINET OFFICE

#### ADDITIONAL DISTR.

AFGHANISTAN

2  
CONFIDENTIAL