Organi bled 10 DOWNING STREET 6 June 1979 From the Private Secretary The Prime Minister's Talks with President Giscard d'Estaing in Paris on 5 June 1979 The Prime Minister's discussions with President Giscard at the Elysee in Paris yesterday fell into three parts: a tête-à-tête talk of one hour, for which only notetakers were present; a further hour's discussion, for which the Prime Minister and President Giscard were joined by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and M. Raymond Barre; and informal conversation over lunch, during which very few matters of political substance were raised. I enclose a copy of my note of the discussions before lunch. It was very clear that President Giscard regarded these discussions, and particularly his tête-à-tête conversation with the Prime Minister during the first hour, as particularly private and confidential in nature. I should therefore be grateful if you would take special care in the handling of this record and if you would ensure both that it is seen only by Ministers and officials with a real need to be aware of its contents and that those who do see it are aware of its sensitivity. I should also be grateful if you would ensure that, with the exception of a copy which may be sent to HM Ambassador in Paris for his personal information, no extracts are copied outside the FCO without reference to me. I am myself sending certain extracts to HM Treasury the Ministry of Defence, Department of Energy and to MAFF and shall copy my covering letters to you for information. The Prime Minister is seeing the Secretary of State for Energy this afternoon and will take this opportunity of following up with him President Giscard's suggestion of bilateral Anglo/French consultations in advance of the European Council meeting at Strasburg. I shall be seeking advice from the Defence Secretary on how President Giscard's further suggestion of bilateral

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consultations on strategic nuclear matters might be pursued. So far as the FCO is concerned, I should be grateful if you would let me know in due course if the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary proposes to follow-up President Giscard's suggestion of an approach to President Tolbert with a view to diminishing the risk of an unhelpful statement on Rhodesia by the forthcoming OAU Conference.

I am sending a copy of this letter and, strictly for Sir John Hunt's personal information, of its enclosure, to Martin Vile (Cabinet Office).

B. G. CARTLEDGE

G.G.H. Walden, Esq Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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PM/Grocard Meeting Note: 5 June 1979 Original on: France: PM's visit: May 1979. Would be needed against the possibility of further trouble from the miners during the coming winter. The Government might,

therefore, have to reconsider.


President Giscard asked who in the British Government would be responsible for preparing the UK position on energy at the European Council in Strasbourg. The Prime Minister said that she thought she would. Lord Carrington asked whether President Giscard was suggesting that it would be useful to have bilateral consultations on energy in advance of the European Council and President Giscard confirmed that he was. It was agreed that bilateral consultations would be arranged, at the highest practicable level, as a matter of urgency.

## South Africa

Lord Carrington explained that the proposals put forward by the Five on Namibia were still blocked by South Africa. The British Government, which might have little leverage with the South Africans who felt that the new Government had a better understanding of South Africa's internal problems than the Labour Government, had decided to send an Envoy, Mr. Luce, to assess the prospects for reviving the U.N. Secretary General's proposals. Mr. Luce's assessment was that there might just be a chance of succeeding in this; if so, it was important to take it since the consequences of abandoning the plan would be very serious. The Five had therefore agreed to have another try. Lord Carrington expressed the view that the prospect of a move to impose economic sanctions against South Africa had such grave implications for the Western world that every step towards that situation demanded very careful consideration. The Prime Minister said that the British Government, for their part, could not possibly contemplate sanctions against South Africa.

Turning to Rhodesia, Lord Carrington said that the British Government's position was that five conditions had been laid down for Rhodesia's return to legality and that, by the end of 1978, the only one of those remaining unsatisfied was that requiring any settlement to be put to the test of its acceptability to the Rhodesian

/ people



people as a whole. The Conservative Party had therefore sent observers to assess the validity of the elections held in Rhodesia last April: their report had shown that, in all the circumstances, the elections had been both free and fair. The last remaining pre-condition for Rhodesia's return to legality had, therefore, been broadly satisfied. The new Rhodesian constitution was not perfect but this was a matter for the people of the country. Looked at from the standpoint of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, however, recognition by the UK alone would not amount to very much: what the country needed was wide international recognition. The new British Government had therefore decided to build on the recent elections and to send an Envoy to meet the Front Line Presidents, and others, to see if there was any flexibility in their attitude to the recognition issue. Progress would clearly not be easy but there were some encouraging signs, including the fact that President Nyerere seemed, at present, to be less denunciatory of the internal settlement than, for example, President Kaunda. When the British Government emissary, Lord Harlech, returned from his mission it would be possible to make a better assessment of the possibility of bringing Nkomo and Mugabe on the one hand, and Bishop Muzorewa on the other, closer together. The timetable, however, was very tight given the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka at the beginning of August.

The Prime Minister commented that most of the countries to be represented in Lusaka could not claim to hold elections on the basis of one man, one vote, with a choice between four different political parties. A more crucial deadline was, so far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the fact that sanctions against Rhodesia would lapse in November unless renewed by Parliament. There was no prospect whatsoever of such a renewal. The Prime Minister said that she, for her part, was convinced that the test of acceptability had been satisfactorily completed; this was, after all, a matter for the people inside Rhodesia to decide. It was now the British Government's duty to restore Rhodesia to full independence. She had found both the United States and the FRG co-operative in their attitude to this objective.

/President Giscard


President Giscard said that he would be happy to see a more active British policy in Africa. So far as South Africa was concerned, he agreed that sanctions must be avoided. The South African regime was not, however, acceptable in terms of its internal policies. Everything possible should be done to create a more democratic approach in South Africa. On Namibia, President Giscard agreed with Lord Carrington that the plan of the Five should not be abandoned: it was a fact that South Africa had been deceived by the United Nations. Turning to Rhodesia, President Giscard said that he had never understood the policy pursued by the United Kingdom in recent years. He had always believed that a moderate African Government offered the right solution and this would not be achieved without a new commitment to Rhodesia by the UK. What was required was a solution on the Kenyan pattern. Continuing pressure from the Front Line Presidents could only result in the installation of a radical regime in Salisbury and a bloody exodus by the Whites. The attitude of the other African countries would, however, pose serious difficulties; they had formed a collective position and most of them had links with the guerrillas. President Giscard commented that the Prime Minister could face really serious problems at the Lusaka meeting

President Giscard went on to say that at the Francophone African Summit meeting at Kigali which he had recently attended he had found the position of many Heads of State and Government to be moderate towards Rhodesia; they seemed to recognise the importance of the elections which had taken place. There was, however, a problem over timing: the time was not yet right for international recognition of the new Government of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. The prospects would be better if Bishop Muzorewa's regime was seen to adopt progressive internal measures. France, for her part, would try to use her influence helpfully: but the UK might be well advised to move forward step by step.

with, for example, Nigeria. The <u>Prime Minister</u> agreed and said that Nigeria had already taken steps to deprive British firms of

contracts.

/ The Prime Minister



The <u>Prime Minister</u> said that the British Government would certainly not recognise Bishop Muzorewa's regime before the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. The critical time would be between that Conference and the Parliamentary debate on sanctions in November. <u>Lord Carrington</u> said that more would be known of the American attitude when President Carter made his determination on the Case/Javits amendment: this would probably be to the effect that the settlement was not acceptable as it stood but could be made so. There was no real distinction between the lifting of sanctions, which were imposed by a mandatory UN resolution, and recognition of the new regime.

President Giscard repeated that the French Government would do everything it could to be helpful on this issue. He pointed out that the next meeting of the Organisation of African Unity would take place before the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka and that the one could very well have an effect on the other. The President of Liberia would be Chairman of the OAU Conference and it would obviously be useful if the UK were to make contact with him. The best outcome from the OAU meeting would be the appointment of a Committee to review the situation in Rhodesia, thus postponing any immediate judgement as to the new regime's legality. In that situation, the UK's hands would still be free at the time of Lusaka. If the OAU Conference adopted a public position, this could only be a negative one. The Prime Minister agreed and said that the prize for the West in a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia would be enormous: a prosperous Rhodesia would bring great benefit to the whole region.

## Defence

The <u>Prime Minister</u> said that the British Government was being pressed by President Carter to support Salt II. The Government had some worries about it but had concluded that the consequences of failure by the United States Congress to ratify the Treaty would be more serious than any shortcomings in the Treaty itself. The UK was concerned about the Soviet SS20 missile, to which the Russians could easily add a third stage. The British Government also faced major decisions on the replacement of its Polaris deterrent and would have to choose between a new missile of that type or cruise missiles. She understood that France would soon have its own

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