



Prime Minister

Mr Day

You may like to see this succinct summary of the present situation. The same analysis is reflected in Lord Soames' telegram in your telegram folder.

RHODESIA

1. In the period during and following the assembly of the Patriotic Front forces, it has been possible to persuade the Rhodesian forces and the police to act sensibly and with restraint in virtually all the difficult and dangerous confrontations which have taken place with elements of the Patriotic Front forces. Phw  
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2. The cease-fire so far has been a remarkable success; but it is fragile and will break down if there is precipitate action by either side.
3. Relations with the Rhodesian administration, and in particular the military commanders, are at present in a very difficult state because:
  - a. they fear that the Patriotic Front will win the elections and that there will then be no future for the white community in Rhodesia;
  - b. they do not believe that we will take any effective action to deal with violations of the Lancaster House agreements by ZANU (Mugabe).
4. On the credit side they are moving towards the conviction that it may be necessary to come to terms with Nkomo; and we may be able to push them into arrangements which amount to some integration of ZIPRA and Rhodesian forces before elections take place.
5. Our relations are further complicated by the question of the South African forces. In immediate terms, there is no need for the South African company at Beitbridge or the three other South African companies to remain. The Rhodesian military commanders, however, regard themselves as responsible for the security of the country. With 21,000 armed guerrillas in the camps - and no guarantee whatever that they will not break out of them before or after the elections - they do not consider they can afford to lose forces which would be essential to helping to contain such a situation. Walls does not believe that if we secured the withdrawal of the South African forces and there was a breakdown of the cease-fire, we would permit them to return (and he is of course right in this).
6. Despite the intense international difficulties, we are working against a very short time-scale (and must seek to remind the Kenyans and others of this). If we go bald-headed for the immediate withdrawal of the South African units, we may bring about a situation in which the Rhodesian military commanders declared a second UDI or precipitated a break-down of the cease-fire. The withdrawal of the monitoring force would lead to an immediate full-scale

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conflict between the Patriotic Front forces in the camps and the Rhodesian forces. It would, furthermore, be strongly argued that the Patriotic Front forces were under our protection and that we were therefore under some obligation to protect them militarily in the event of a show-down with the Rhodesian forces. If, as is likely, the Patriotic Front forces suffered heavy casualties, the international out-cry would be enormous.

7. This would have to be faced if the Rhodesian military commanders were so stupid as to force such a confrontation on us. But we should avoid so far as possible imperilling what has already been achieved - a pretty effective cease-fire and the return of Nkomo - by ourselves precipitating a confrontation with them. The alternative course is to seek:

- a. to promote an accommodation with Nkomo;
- b. to devote all our efforts to getting as many of the Patriotic Front forces out of the camps before or as soon as possible after the elections;
- c. to contain and reduce the problem of the South African elements in such a way as to enable Ministers to state in Parliament that no South African units are involved (except, for a very limited period, at Beitbridge).

8. An accommodation between Walls and Nkomo is the only way to achieve our objectives of:

- a. a de-escalation of the war; and
- b. a fair measure of international acceptance of the outcome.

9. The immediate withdrawal of the South African contingent at Beitbridge and the three South African companies is not likely to be negotiable. We must, however, aim to achieve:

- a. a clear understanding that the contingent at Beitbridge is there with the Governor's agreement for a very limited period only (up to the elections but not beyond, unless there is a clear demand by the independence government for it to be re-introduced);
- b. the three other companies must be "Rhodesianized" so that Ministers are in a position to state, if asked about them, that this is a Rhodesian battalion and includes South African personnel.

10. In order to secure Rhodesian co-operation over 8. and 9. above, we shall have to convince Walls that we are not prepared to allow ZANU (Mugabe) to get away with cross-border movement, intimidation etc without doing anything about it. To enable us to put pressure on ZANU to comply, but also to resist

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demands for their exclusion from the elections, the Governor will need to promulgate the ordinance giving him the power to take selective action against a party in breach of the Lancaster House agreements.

11. We shall also need to pursue vigorously the question of the ZANU detainees. Since the detainees have made repeated appeals to the Secretary of State personally to secure their release, and all other political leaders have been released, we are in a good position on this "human rights" issue. Tough bargaining over the release of the detainees will get support from all the internal parties - and probably also from ZAPU. We should therefore begin to make it clear that following the arrival of virtually all the ZANU leadership except Mugabe in Salisbury today and tomorrow, the arrival of further ZANU elements will be related to the release of the detainees.

12. At the same time we must increase our efforts to tie Machel into the settlement by exploiting the difference of interest between him and Mugabe, in particular by encouraging the re-establishment of communications (to which Machel attaches great importance) between Rhodesia and Mozambique.

R W Renwick  
Rhodesia Department

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cc: Mr Lyne  
PS/LPS  
PS/Mr Luce  
PS/PUS