

de Spolt, Jan 80, Moscow Olympics
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S.J. Pike
 19.1.80

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PRIME MINISTER

Afghanistan

1. On 9-18 January I visited Turkey, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India, primarily to discuss with the governments of these countries the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and their reactions to it. I had discussions with the Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government of all these countries. I also had a brief meeting during a stop-over on my return journey with the Foreign Minister of Bahrain. The following are my impressions and conclusions.

A. IMPRESSIONS

General

2. All the countries I visited, except India, agreed broadly with our own analysis of Soviet motives for their invasion and with our estimate of the dangers to the security and integrity of other states in the region, and with the need for a significant and sustained response, both from the West and from those countries which feel threatened. The Western reaction so far has disappointed them. Oman, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan probably underestimate the threat of internal subversion. India's attitude is influenced by her traditional tendency to give the Russians the benefit of the doubt and her distrust of Pakistan.

Individual Countries

3. (a) Turkey: The Turkish economy is in a parlous state and internal security is bad. The Turks are especially concerned about the maintenance of the integrity of Iran. They fear that Khomeini's policies could lead to the country's disintegration, stimulated by Soviet subversion in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. The Turks will require large-scale financial help over the next few years.

(b) Oman: Sultan Qaboos is not a natural leader and receives

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indifferent advice. But Oman is prosperous and Qaboos is likely to survive for some time longer. He remains anxious about the threat from the PDRY. The Omanis are discussing the possible provision of facilities for US forces but do not want Western personnel on Oman's territory. Their initiative for the establishment by the Gulf States of a minesweeper capability in the Straits of Hormuz was mishandled, but this could be rectified.

(c) Saudi Arabia: The Saudis are ready to help Turkey, eg over oil. They are also prepared to offer financial help for strengthening the military capabilities of the countries in the region under threat, though they are opposed to any Western military presence. They are playing a leading role, together with Pakistan, in mobilising Moslem opinion against the Soviet action in Afghanistan. But they regard the Camp David Agreement as an obstacle to full-hearted co-operation between the countries of the region and the United States. They look for a new move on the Middle East problem when, as they expect, the Camp David process runs into the sand in April/May; (this view was shared by the Bahraini Foreign Minister). The Saudis are concerned about Soviet influence in both the PDRY and the YAR and about possible subversion through the many expatriates in their own country. The Mecca incident was a shock to them.

(d) Pakistan: The Pakistanis are deeply concerned at the new threat on their western frontier. They feel squeezed between the Russians in Afghanistan and the Indians on their eastern border. They particularly fear the possibility of Soviet ''retaliatory'' raids from Afghanistan into their own territory. They are painfully aware that their military equipment is out of date. They were affronted by the meagreness of the US offer of credit. In both respects their attitude is justified. Moreover, the refugees from Afghanistan, who they think may number one million by the Spring, are an increasing burden. But their reaction to the Soviet invasion was dominated by their complex over India, who, they are convinced, still wants to establish hegemony over the sub-continent. Nonetheless, they are ready to resume the process of ''normalising'' relations with India as a means of sanitising their eastern frontier. President Zia is in a dilemma over elections: if he holds them, the Bhutto faction will win; and if he does not, popular discontent will grow.

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(e) India: The Indians accept that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan poses a danger to the sub-continent. But they are anxious to find excuses for Soviet behaviour in the policies and activities of Pakistan, China and the United States, by whom they profess to feel surrounded. They resent the possibility of a super-power confrontation so close to India, not only on grounds of national security, but also because of the effect on the Non-Aligned Movement and India's role in it if she had to make a choice. They were somewhat shame-faced and defensive over the Indian statement at the United Nations and apprehensive about the Islamic line-up against the Soviet action. They are also preoccupied with their domestic economic problems and with unrest in their north-east and eastern border areas. They are ready to talk to the Pakistanis but with little enthusiasm or hope of success, given the weakness of Zia's position and above all their congenital distrust of Pakistani promises against the background of three Indo-Pakistani wars, which leads them to express apprehension about any revival of a closer US/Pakistan military relationship.

B. CONCLUSIONS

4. My talks in the capitals I visited confirmed my view that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a most serious challenge and unless the West reacts with vigour, any repetition of it eg, in Yugoslavia, could be disastrous. We must urgently pursue our discussions with the Americans and with our principal European allies. The following are among the actions we might undertake:-

(a) We should pursue the political and economic measures directed at the Soviet Union which we have been discussing in NATO, even though for the most part, apart from a boycott or the removal of the Olympic Games (See Annex), these are unlikely to cause the Russians major difficulties or embarrassment.

(b) We should encourage the non-aligned countries, and particularly the Moslem countries, to continue their denunciation of the Soviet action and, if possible, to take measures against the Afghan regime. We should continue to urge the Americans to handle the Iran crisis in

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On reflection I am a ^{SECRET} ~~little~~ ^{more} ~~intending~~ ^{about} ~~such~~ ^{guarantee}, it would look as if we were ~~guaranteeing~~ ^{guaranteeing} Pakistan's ~~rights~~ ^{rights} rather than the territory. *one*

such a way as not to hinder this.

(c) We should encourage the United States formally to guarantee Pakistan against aggression from Afghanistan and to meet Pakistan's legitimate military requirements up to a level which would give the Indians no justifiable grounds for concern. We should also support the Americans in their search for suitable defence facilities in the region.

(d) We should conclude as rapidly as possible negotiations over our own sales of defence equipment to Oman, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Gulf and to Pakistan.

(e) We should prepare a European initiative amending Resolution 242 to provide for the acknowledgement of the Palestinians' rights in return for their recognition of Israel. This proposal could be put forward when, as seems likely, the Camp David process comes to an end in April/May.

(f) We should provide friendly states in the Gulf and Pakistan with more information about our assessments of Soviet activities and intentions in the area.

(g) We should also provide these states with assistance in counter-subversion.

(h) We should encourage closer co-operation among the Gulf States, eg over the security of the Straits of Hormuz.

(i) We should work carefully for an EEC/Gulf dialogue.

(j) We should increase Western and Saudi/Omani influence in the YAR.

(k) We should consider the practicability of promoting insurgency in Soviet-dominated areas such as the PDRY, Ethiopia and Afghanistan itself.

(l) We should participate to the extent possible in further financial help for Turkey.

(m) We should encourage the Indians and Pakistanis, despite their pathological distrust of one another, to normalize their relationship.

(n) We should review with others our policy towards China including arms sales.

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(o) We should review with the others concerned possible support for Yugoslavia.

5. I am copying this minute to the members of OD and to Sir R Armstrong.



(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19 January 1980

OLYMPIC GAMES

1. Following the meeting of Ministers on 16 January, we have asked the Germans and Italians whether they would join us in a formal approach to the International Olympic Committee to suggest moving the Games. The Germans are very cautious but Dr Genscher is expected to discuss the Olympics with Mr Vance when they meet on 21 January. The Italians have yet to react. Sir N Henderson will put the matter to Mr Vance on 19 January.
2. The Canadian Prime Minister said on 18 January that Canada would approach the IOC about moving the Games and that the practical difficulties at Montreal might be less than the city authorities have said. The Japanese would probably be extremely reluctant to accept part of the Games. The Mexicans and the Germans would also be likely to see political objections to using their Olympic facilities. The Australian Government is reviewing the subject and the difficulties at Melbourne might be less than elsewhere.
3. The chances of getting the Olympic Games moved are very slight. On the other hand the Russians might be glad to have Britain excluded from the Games on the grounds of our sporting contacts with South Africa.
4. The Winter Olympics begin next month in New York State, but the United States Government do not intend to take any action on this front, such as denying visas to the Soviet team.
5. Another idea, not yet discussed with our Allies, would be a Western proposal to the International Olympic Committee that the Olympic sailing events should be moved from Tallinn in the Baltic States to another country. This would have political attractions. Summer 1980 is the 40th anniversary of another Soviet act of aggression, the annexation of the Baltic States. A number of Western countries, including the UK, France, Germany and the US, do not recognise the annexation de jure. Moreover, the relocation of the sailing alone would present far fewer practical difficulties than moving the entire Games. On the other hand, the response of the International Olympic Committee would probably be negative.

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6. Yet other options include a Western boycott of the Moscow Games, or a boycott by the Western contingents of ceremonial events such as the opening and closing parades and official Soviet receptions. The British Olympic Committee would resist the first and probably the second. One thing in the Government's power is to decide that the Duke of Edinburgh and the Minister for Sport should not go to Moscow.

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