

CONFIDENTIAL

File
Rm

34704 - 1

GRS 761

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 301700Z OCT 81

TO PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 289 OF 30 OCTOBER

AND TO PRIORITY ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN,
THE HAGUE, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME DUBLIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, ADEN,
BAGHDAD, BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, DUBAI, JEDDA, KUWAIT, MUSCAT,
TEL AVIV, JERUSALEM, ALGIERS, CAIRO, KHARTOUM, RABAT, TRIPOLI,
TUNIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKDEL NATO.

TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN ON 28 OCTOBER.

1. GREENSTOCK GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING ON 30 OCTOBER. HE SAID
THE KING'S VISIT WAS A PRIVATE ONE. HE HAD HAD TALKS WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCH HOSTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE. THERE WERE SOME BILATERAL ISSUES, BUT ALSO
SEVERAL POINTS OF GENERAL INTEREST.

SINAI/MFO

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD GIVEN A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF
THE REASONS WHY THE UK AND OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS WERE APPROACHING
A FINAL DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO. THE KING INDICATED
THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ARGUMENTS BUT THAT HE REGARDED IT AS
ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LINK BETWEEN THIS LIMITED
ACTION AND THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. LORD CARRINGTON TOLD THE
KING THAT OUR STATEMENT WOULD BE EXPLICIT ON THIS POINT.

US POLICIES

4. THE KING REGARDED HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO WASHINGTON AS THE
MOST IMPORTANT HE HAD EVER MADE. HE WAS GOING TO SEE WHETHER
THERE WAS ANY BASIS FOR PROGRESS. HE SPOKE OF SADAT'S DEATH AND
RELATED IT TO HIS INABILITY TO SECURE HIS ORIGINAL POLICY AIMS,
BECAUSE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE. SINCE CAMP DAVID IT HAD BEEN
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THOSE IN THE REGION TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES.
HENCE THE VALUE OF EUROPEAN ACTION. HE INTENDED TO FIND OUT
WHETHER THE US WAS INTERESTED IN THE HELP OF OTHERS. WE HAD
URGED THE KING TO PUT THE ARAB CASE STRONGLY TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN: THE ARAB CASE HAD NOT YET MADE SUFFICIENT IMPACT ON THE

1

CONFIDENTIAL

/us

CONFIDENTIAL

34704 - 1

US ADMINISTRATION.

EGYPT

5. THE KING SAID HE HAD URGED MUBARAK NOT TO SIGN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH DENIED PALESTINIAN RIGHTS: IF THEY DID THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF RAPPROCHMENT WITH OTHER ARAB STATES, WHICH JORDAN DESIRED. THERE WERE OTHER DIFFICULTIES EG THE PRESENCE OF AN ISRAELI EMBASSY IN CAIRO. THE KING ALSO MENTIONED THE DANGER OF THE AMERICANS.

6. THE KING HAD SAID HE DID NOT THINK THERE WAS NOW ANY REASON WHY THE AMERICANS COULD NOT TALK OPENLY WITH THE PLO. THE DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES THIS WOULD CAUSE PRESIDENT REAGAN IN THE US WERE POINTED OUT BY OUR SIDE. LORD CARRINGTON HAD WONDERED WHETHER THE ARABS AS A WHOLE COULD ISSUE A STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES OF PRINCE FAHD'S 7TH PRINCIPLE: IF THE PLO COULD ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THIS STATEMENT THIS MIGHT ALLOW THE US TO TALK OPENLY WITH THEM. THE FORTHCOMING ARAB SUMMIT IN FEZ MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL ON THIS. THE KING SAID NO ONE KNEW WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN THERE. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE AUTONOMY TALKS WOULD ULTIMATELY FAIL AND THERE WAS SOME TALK ABOUT HOW LONG THIS MIGHT TAKE. IT WAS SUGGESTED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT HIS VISIT MIGHT PROVE AN OPPORTUNE TIME TO GIVE PRESIDENT REAGAN SOME NEW IDEAS FOR USE WHEN THE TALKS FAILED.

SUDAN

7. WE HAD BRIEFED THE KING ON OUR VIEW OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS NOW FACED BY SUDAN HAD FORCED THE SUDAN INTO THE EGYPTIAN CAMP. AS A RESULT OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS WERE KEEPING THEIR DISTANCE. THIS POLICY WAS SHORT SIGHTED AND WE SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO BRING OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO BE MORE GENEROUS WITH THEIR AID. BASICALLY THE SUDAN'S ECONOMY WAS SOUND BUT THEY NEEDED FINANCE TO TIDE THEM OVER THIS CRITICAL PERIOD. THERE WAS TALK OF ASSISTING THE SUDAN FROM THE COMMUNITY'S FOOD AID PACKAGE.

LEBANON

8. THE KING THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS. SYRIA DID NOT WISH TO ANNEX LEBANON BUT WISHED TO ENSURE A CONTINUATION OF HER INFLUENCE THERE. HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL

34704 - 1

WAY SAUDI DIPLOMACY WAS BASED ON MASSIVE SUBSIDIES, EG TO THE SYRIANS.

OMAN

9. WE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE RISKS TO THE SULTAN OF BEING SEEN TO BE TOO CLOSE TO THE US.

THE KING SAID THE SULTAN WAS AWARE OF THESE DANGERS.

LIBYA

10. THE KING SAW LITTLE OR NO MILITARY THREAT TO EGYPT AND NOTED THAT THE SUDANESE WERE ALREADY PLAYING DOWN THE THREAT. HE REFERRED TO THE ENORMOUS WASTE OCCURRING TO RUSSIAN ARMS IN LIBYA CAUSED BY INCORRECT STORAGE AND USE.

MOROCCO AND WEST SAHARA

11. THE KING THOUGHT THAT KING HASSAN HAD MANAGED THINGS CLEVERLY AT THE OAU MEETING IN NAIROBI. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS RELATED WITH A REFERENDUM HE THOUGHT THE KING WOULD FIND A SOLUTION ON THESE LINES.

DEAD SEA CANAL

12. THE JORDANIANS BELIEVED THAT IF THE PROJECT WENT AHEAD, IT WOULD FLOOD THEIR POTASH WORKS ON THE DEAD SEA. DISCUSSION CENTRED ON WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WERE SERIOUS ABOUT THE PROJECT AND THE DIFFICULTY IN PREVENTING PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN THE UK FROM SUBSCRIBING EVEN THOUGH HMG'S ATTITUDE WAS THAT THE PROJECT WAS ILLEGAL.

CARRINGTON

STANDARD

NENAD
MED
NAD
UND
EESD
ECD
WED
RID

MAED
ES & SD
ERD
ESID
CONS D
CONS EM UNIT
CABINET OFFICE

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE