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Subject file  
Afghanistan - Sit - Pt 5

T 102/80

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TO PRIORITY FCO  
TELNO 528 OF 4/5/80.

**PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 102/80**

MIPT: AFGHANISTAN: REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ZIA:

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENT ZIA'S REPLY TO MRS THATCHER:

QUOTE I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGE IN REGARD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL STATUS OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE APPROACHES YOU HAVE MADE TO THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT MADE BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, SOME OF WHICH HAVE FOUND MENTION IN YOUR MESSAGE.

YOU WOULD BE AWARE THAT THE MOST RECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM MOSCOW AND KABUL AS WELL AS OTHER INTERESTED QUARTERS HAVE SHARPLY MODIFIED THE EARLIER STATEMENTS REFERRED TO IN YOUR MESSAGE AND DIMINISHED THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE GENUINELY RESPONSIVE TO A PROPOSAL FOR A NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN. IN THESE STATEMENTS BOTH MOSCOW AND KABUL HAVE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED SUCH A STATUS FOR AFGHANISTAN.

THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO SPEAK IN MANY VOICES WITH THE MANIFEST PURPOSE OF ALLOWING ITSELF THE MAXIMUM ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. ITS OBJECTIVE IS TO ENSURE THAT ANY WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS WILL TAKE PLACE ONLY ON ITS OWN TERMS, THE PRINCIPAL AIM BEING TO PRESERVE THE PUPPET REGIME IN KABUL AND PREVENT THE EROSION OF THE STRATEGIC AND IDEOLOGICAL GAINS ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE AGREEING THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ADOPT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH AND CONTINUE TO EXPLORE OPENINGS WE REGARD THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES WHICH HAVE SO FAR BEEN TAKEN AS UNPROMISING.

YOUR MESSAGE CONTAINS A REFERENCE TO MR. BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 1963 IN WHICH HE PRAISED AFGHANISTAN'S POLICY OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY BLOCS.

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WE FIND THAT THE 1931 TREATY OF NEUTRALITY AND MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND THE SOVIET UNION GOES EVEN A STEP FURTHER AND BINDS BOTH PARTIES " TO REFRAIN FROM ALL ARMED OR UNARMED INTERVENTION" IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EACH OTHER. OF COURSE THE 1931 TREATY HAS NOW BEEN OVERTAKEN BY THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP OF DECEMBER 1978 WHICH PERMITS THE SOVIET UNION, TO INTERVENE AT THE REQUEST OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. THE SOVIET UNION HAS INDUCTED TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE COVER OF THIS TREATY. THE AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS SURROUNDING THE INITIAL SOVIET MILITARY MOVE INTO AFGHANISTAN HAVE NOW BEEN IRONED OUT BY THE FORMAL AGREEMENT SIGNED IN MOSCOW DURING THE VISIT OF SHAH MOHAMMAD DOST.

MINDFUL OF THE GRIM IMPLICATIONS WHICH THE AFGHAN SITUATION HAS FOR PAKISTAN I HAVE PUBLICLY MADE CERTAIN SUGGESTIONS INDICATING PAKISTAN'S READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN GUARANTEES SAFEGUARDING THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN AND PREVENTING INTERVENTION IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE PRIMARY AIM OF ENSURING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. IN DOING SO, I HAVE ONLY REAFFIRMED PAKISTAN'S EXISTING POSITION.

I HAVE OFFERED THE INSPECTION OF REFUGEE CAMPS ON OUR SOIL BY ANY IMPARTIAL AGENCY TO VERIFY THE FACT THAT NO INTERVENTION IS TAKING PLACE FROM OUR SIDE AND HAVE EVEN SUGGESTED THE INDUCTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE CONSISTING OF ISLAMIC OR NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES UNDER THE U.N. AUSPICES TO BE POSTED INSIDE AFGHANISTAN IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT ACCORDS ARRIVED AT ARE IMPLEMENTED. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT PARTICIPATION BY PAKISTAN IN GUARANTEES WOULD REQUIRE RECIPROCAL GUARANTEES FROM AFGHANISTAN THAT IT WILL NOT INTERFERE IN PAKISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND WILL ACKNOWLEDGE AND RESPECT THE ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING US TODAY IS THE PRESENCE OF MORE THAN 700,000 AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN AND THE CREATION OF CONDITIONS ENABLING THEM TO RETURN TO THEIR HEARTHES AND HOMES IN SAFETY AND HONOUR. THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN CONDITIONS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN IMPROVE TO A POINT AS WOULD PERSUADE THE REFUGEES THAT THEY CAN DO SO.

MORE RECENTLY I HAVE HAD A VISIT FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF CUBA WHO BROUGHT A LETTER FROM DR. CASTRO SUGGESTING DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ME AND BABRAK KARMEL IN HAVANA UNDER HIS AUSPICES. I HAVE INFORMED DR. CASTRO THAT THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE IN VIEW OF OUR ADHERENCE TO THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE WHICH EMBARGOES ANY CONTACT WITH THE BABRAK KARMEL REGIME TILL SUCH TIME AS SOVIET TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN FROM AFGHANISTAN. I HAVE ALSO ADVISED DR. CASTRO THAT IF HE WISHES

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TO PLAY A ROLE IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO RESOLVE THE AFGHAN CRISIS WE WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE WHICH SHOULD SPECIFICALLY ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMELAND.

THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION REMAINS THE ATTITUDE OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE TO THE REGIME IMPOSED UPON THEM BY FORCE OF SOVIET ARMS. THEIR SUSTAINED OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE FACE OF HEAVY ODDS AND THEIR REFUSAL TO BECOME SUBSERVANT TO ANY OUTSIDE FORCE MAY BE THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN BRINGING THE SOVIET UNION, SOONER OR LATER, TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

UNQUOTE

ENDS.

FORSTER

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