

MIDDLE EAST: ADVANCE COPIES 17

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 260808Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1063 DATED 26 JUNE 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, PARIS,

INFO PRIORITY DAMASCUS, AMMAN

MY TELNO 1054 AND MY TELECON WITH MILES: ISRAEL/LEBANON

SUMMARY

1. AFTER 17 HOURS OF SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS, UNDER STARTINGLY INCOMPETENT AND ARROGANT FRENCH CHAIRMANSHIP, THE AMERICANS VETOED AN AMENDED VERSION OF THE FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION. I CONSIDERED TABLING A SIMPLE CEASEFIRE-PLUS-UN-OBSERVERS RESOLUTION AFTER THE VETO, BUT MY PREPARATIONS FOR THIS OFFENDED DE NANTEUIL WHO TOLD ME THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHEYSSON TO VETO ANY BRITISH DRAFT, I DID NOT THEREFORE PERSIST. ANY COMPLAINT FROM CHEYSSON SHOULD BE VERY FIRMLY DEALT WITH (SEE PARA 11 BELOW).

FROM CHEYSSON TO TELNO 1055
PERSIST. ANY COMPLAINT FROM CHEYSSON SHOULD BE VERY FIRMLY DEALT WITH (SEE PARA 11 BELOW).

DETAIL

2. LATE LAST NIGHT (24 JUNE) THE FRENCH TABLED THE DRAFT IN MY TELNO 1055. I SAW DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) FIRST THING THIS MORNING AND TOLD HIM FIRMLY OF THE AMENDMENTS WE WOULD NEED IF WE WERE TO SUPPORT HIS DRAFT. DE NANTEUIL INDICATED THAT THE DRAFT HAD BEEN FOISTED ON HIM BY PARIS AND SAID THAT HE REALISED THAT MANY DELEGATIONS, NOT ONLY THE AMERICANS, WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH IT. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A LONG ARGUMENT ABOUT IT BEFORE IT WOULD BECOME POSSIBLE (IE VIS-A-VIS PARIS) FOR THE COUNCIL TO AGREE A MUCH SIMPLER DRAFT. WHEN THE COUNCIL GATHERED FOR INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS LATER IN THE MORNING: IT WAS CLEAR THAT DE NANTEUIL'S JUDGEMENT WAS RIGHT. EVERY DELEGATION I SPOKE TO HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH THE DRAFT, WHICH WAS VIEWED WITH A MIXTURE OF AMUSEMENT AND CONTEMPT. THIS (PACE PARIS TELNO 668) INCLUDED TERZI (PLO) WHO WAS VERY UNHAPPY WITH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1, 2 AND 4.

3. DE NANTEUIL FINALLY CONVENED US IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE COUNCIL AT 1630Z. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DESCRIBED HIS MESSAGES OF YESTERDAY (PARAGRAPH 2 OF MY TELNO 1051): THE ONLY RESPONSE HAD COME FROM THE PLO WHO HAD REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR SCRS 508 AND 509 AND THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. DE NANTEUIL THEN INTRODUCED HIS DRAFT RESOLUTION, WITHOUT APOLOGY AND INDEED WITH SOME ARROGANCE. HE HAD ENCOUNTERED SOME CRITICISM OF THE TEXT: BUT HE URGED THE COUNCIL NOT TO BE PERFECTIONIST: IF IT TRIED TO DO TOO MUCH IT WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING: FRANCE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY BUT MARGINAL AMENDMENTS: HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF COMMENTS COULD BE BRIEF. GUYANA, SPAIN, CHINA, JORDAN, USSR AND TOGO THEN SPOKE. ALL CRITICISED THE DRAFT FOR BEING UNCLEAR, FOR NOT ADDRESSING THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS (A CEASEFIRE AND COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL) AND FOR PURPORTING TO LEGALISE ISRAEL'S PRESENCE IN LEBANON. DE NANTEUIL THEN ADJOURNED THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS FOR THE MONTHLY SECURITY COUNCIL LUNCH.

4. DURING LUNCH NEWS WAS RECEIVED OF HAIG'S RESIGNATION AND OF DISCUSSIONS THE AMERICANS WERE HAVING WITH THE LEBANESE HERE TO PREPARE A NEW TEXT WHICH THEY WOULD LAUNCH DURING THE AFTERNOON (WASHINGTON TELNO 2252). IN THE AFTERNOON, THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WENT INTO AN INTERMINABLE MEETING. THIS IS NORMAL PRACTICE HERE BUT DE NANTEUIL WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE DELAY AND RUDELY INSISTED THAT THE COUNCIL RESUME INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE. THIS INFURIATED THE NON-

INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS OF THE WHOLE. THIS INFURIATED THE NON-ALIGNED, WHO WERE ALREADY PEEVED THAT DE NANTEUIL SHOULD HAVE TABLED HIS DRAFT WITHOUT ANY CONSULTATION WITH ANY OF THEM. WE DULY MET AT 2200Z. THE REMAINING MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SPOKE. ALL WERE CRITICAL OF THE FRENCH DRAFT, EXCEPT LICHENSTEIN (USA) WHO DID NOT SPEAK DIRECTLY TO IT BUT SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WERE WORKING WITH TUENI (LEBANON), IN THE CONTEXT OF HABIB'S NEGOTIATIONS, TO PREPARE A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT A CEASEFIRE AND HELP THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO "SHARE THESE IDEAS" SHORTLY.

5. IN SUMMING UP DE NANTEUIL MADE NO REFERENCE TO LICHENSTEIN'S INTERVENTION BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE CRITICISMS HE HAD HEARD AND WOULD REVISE THE FRENCH DRAFT. HE REJECTED SUGGESTIONS FROM VARIOUS DELEGATIONS THAT RE-DRAFTING SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY A WORKING GROUP OR BY THE COUNCIL AS A WHOLE; IT WAS UP TO FRANCE TO REVISE ITS OWN DRAFT. HE REPEATED THAT THERE HAD TO BE A VOTE TONIGHT. IT WAS AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AGAIN AT 0030Z.

6. WHEN WE RECONVENED, THE FRENCH DISTRIBUTED A REVISED TEXT WHICH MET OUR MAIN CONCERNS AND THOSE OF THE OTHERS WHO HAD SPOKEN AT THE EARLIER SESSION. THERE FOLLOVED THREE HOURS OF INCREASINGLY BAD-TEMPERED DISCUSSION. THE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PRODUCED A HOST OF AMENDMENTS (PARTLY IT SEEMED OUT OF PIQUE AT DE NANTEUIL'S BEHAVIOUR EARLIER IN THE DAY), NUSEIBEH (JORDAN) RAMBLED ON ENDLESSLY AND DE NANTEUIL TRIED REPEATEDLY BUT UNSUCCESSFULLY TO RAILROAD THE COUNCIL THROUGH TO A QUICK VOTE ON HIS TEXT.

7. AT ONE POINT, I PROPOSED A SIMPLE, SHORT RESOLUTION CALLING AS A FIRST STEP, FOR A CEASEFIRE AND STANDSTILL OF FORCES, WITH UNTSO MONITORING. I HAD TRIED THIS OUT IN OUTLINE BEFOREHAND WITH TUENI, URQUHART, DORR (IRELAND) AND TROYANOVSKY (USSR), ALL OF WHO WERE MORE OR LESS ENTHUSIASTIC. BUT LICHENSTEIN (USA) IMMEDIATELY WELCOMED IT, THUS GIVING IT THE KISS OF DEATH: NUSEIBEH SAID SOME ELEMENT OF ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT OR WITHDRAWAL WAS A SINE QUA NON; TROYANOVSKY CHANGED SIDES; AND WE WERE BACK TO CRAWLING OVER THE FRENCH TEXT. LICHENSTEIN'S ONLY OTHER INTERVENTION, RIGHT AT THE END, WAS TO REMIND THE COUNCIL THAT THERE WERE SYRIAN TROOPS IN LEBANON TOO AND THAT FOR THE U.S. THE CENTRAL QUESTION WAS THE "DEMILITARIZATION" OF THE PALESTINIANS. AT 0330Z THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WERE SUSPENDED FOR DE NANTEUIL TO PREPARE A FURTHER REVISED TEXT.

8. WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND URQUHART

8. WHILE THIS WAS GOING ON, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND URQUHART ENCOURAGED ME TO FLOAT MY DRAFT AGAIN AS SOMETHING WHICH COULD BE PUT TO A VOTE IMMEDIATELY AFTER A VETO. I DID SO. MY TEXT IS IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. FIRST I GOT THE RUSSIANS ON BOARD, THEN THE ARABS, THEN THE NON-ALIGNED AND THEN THE AMERICANS. FINALLY I SPOKE TO DE NANTEUIL. BEFORE I COULD EXPLAIN MY PURPOSE, HE ACCUSED ME ANGRILY OF HAVING CONCOCTED A MANOEUVRE WITH THE AMERICANS: THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN TOLD 3 HOURS BEFORE THAT THE AMERICANS FELT THEY COULD SAFELY VETO THE FRENCH DRAFT BECAUSE A SATISFACTORY BRITISH DRAFT, FOR WHICH THEY COULD VOTE, WOULD BE TABLED IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. (THIS SIMPLY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN TRUE). THIS HAD BEEN REPORTED TO CHEYSSON, WHO HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO VETO ANY BRITISH DRAFT. I RESPONDED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS AND HE WITHDREW HIS REMARK WITH PROFUSE APOLOGIES. I WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT I HAD KNOWN BEIRUT FOR 40 YEARS: I WAS SICKENED BY THE CONTINUING DESTRUCTION AND LOSS OF LIFE. THIS WAS MY ONLY MOTIVE IN FLOATING THE DRAFT AND I DEEPLY RESENTED HIS SUGGESTION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO CHOICE BECAUSE OF CHEYSSON'S INSTRUCTIONS AND FORMALLY ASKED ME NOT TO TABLE THE DRAFT. I SAID THAT I WOULD NOT CONTEMPLATE PUTTING ANYTHING TO THE VOTE WHICH WOULD BE VETOED BY AN ALLY AND PARTNER. THERE WAS A LONG SILENCE.

9. MEANWHILE THE EGYPTIANS AND THE LEBANESE HAD BEEN TRYING UNSUCCESSFULLY EITHER TO PERSUADE DE NANTEUIL TO POSTPONE THE VOTE TO ALLOW MORE TIME OR TO PERSUADE THE AMERICANS TO LET THE FRENCH DRAFT BE ADOPTED. BUT BOTH WERE ADAMANT. DE NANTEUIL INSISTED ON A VOTE TONIGHT AND THE AMERICANS INSISTED THAT THEY WOULD VETO UNLESS THE RESOLUTION PROVIDED EXPLICITLY FOR THE DISARMING OF THE PLO.

10. AFTER ANOTHER ROUND OF INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS WE FINALLY VOTED AT 3 AM LOCAL (0700Z) ON THE TEXT IN MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM. THE RESULT WAS 14-1(USA)-0. LICHENSTEIN BRIEFLY EXPLAINED HIS VOTE: BLUM (ISRAEL) ANNOUNCED THAT THE IDF HAD CEASED FIRE AT 2000 LOCAL ON 25 JUNE AND THE CEASEFIRE WAS HOLDING: AND TUENI THANKED FRANCE FOR ITS INITIATIVE. AND SO A DREADFUL DAY ENDED.

COMMENT

11. THE FRENCH PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT WAS STAGGERING. I BELIEVE THAT DE NANTEUIL WAS UNDER FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHEYSSON BUT HE MADE A BAD SITUATION WORSE BY HIS ARROGANT INCOMPETENCE. ~~NOTHING~~ INCLUDING THE ARABS WHO PLEADED WITH DE NANTEUIL TO

BUT HE MADE A BAD SITUATION WORSE BY HIS ARROGANT INCOMPETENCE. NOONE, INCLUDING THE ARABS WHO PLEADED WITH DE NANTEUIL TO ACCOMMODATE THE AMERICANS, COULD UNDERSTAND HIS IMPLACABLE DETERMINATION TO PRESS ON TO AN INEVITABLE AMERICAN VETO. HIS INSINUATIONS TO ME WERE OUTRAGEOUS AND I LEFT HIM IN NO DOUBT AS TO MY REACTION TO THEM. AFTER THE DEBATE ADJOURNED HE APOLOGISED AGAIN AND ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPORT TO PARIS THAT HE COMPLETELY ACCEPTED MY GOOD FAITH. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE WOULD, AS I HAD PROFOUNDLY RESENTED WHAT HE HAD SAID EARLIER. IF CHEYSSON COMPLAINS TO YOU I HOPE YOU WILL DEAL WITH HIM VERY FIRMLY. THE STORY WILL PROBABLY APPEAR IN THE PRESS. I DID NOT VOLUNTEER ANYTHING BUT, ON BEING QUESTIONED, I WAS NOT PREPARED TO LET THE IMPRESSION GET AROUND THAT IT HAD BEEN THE AMERICANS WHO HAD BLOCKED MY DRAFT. AT THE END EVERYONE SEEMED TO KNOW - IN THE WAY THEY DO IN THE COUNCIL - THAT IT WAS THE FRENCH.

PARSONS

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