GR 1500 CONFIDENTIAL SKBY Ø621ØØZ FM FCO Ø61855Z AUG 79 TO IMMEDIATE LUSAKA TELEGRAM NUMBER 683 OF 6 AUGUST FOLLOWING FOR DUFF: RHODESIA: TELECON DUFF/WILLIAMS. Overlain FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT CABINET PAPER. BEGINS: RHODESIA 1. MY COLLEAGUES WILL WISH TO HAVE AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION ON RHODESIA AT THE CHGM IN LUSAKA AND TO CONSIDER THE NEXT STEPS IN OUR HANDLING OF THIS QUESTION. CHGM 2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT DURING THE OPENING DISCUSSION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA ON 3 AUGUST CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE LINE TAKEN IN HER SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 25 JULY. THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASISED THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF IGNORING THE SIGNIFIC-ANCE OF THE POLITICAL CHANGE WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RHODESIA. BUT OUR CONSULTATIONS HAD SHOWN THAT THERE WAS STRONG CRITICISM OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE NEW RHODESIAN CONSTITUTION, AND A DESIRE TO INVOLVE THE PRESENT EXTERNAL PARTIES IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION. THERE WAS ALSO A WIDESPREAD VIEW THAT ANY SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM MUST DERIVE ITS AUTHORITY FROM BRITIAN AS THE RESPONSIBLE COLONIAL POWER. WE HAD EVERY INTENTION OF DISCHARGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS RESPECT HONOURABLY AND ON A BASIS COMPARABLE WITH THE ARRANGE-MENTS WE HAD MADE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES. 3. IN KEEPING WITH THE TONE SET BY PRESIDENT NYERERE IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT, THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL, THOUGH SOME INTERVENTIONS (NOTABLY GENERAL ADEFOPE'S) WERE MORE CRITICAL THAN OTHERS. IT WAS EVENTUALLY AGREED TO SET UP A SMALL GROUP (CONSISTING OF PRESIDENTS KAUNDA AND NYERERE, PRIME MINISTERS MANLEY AND FRASER, GENERAL ADEFOPE AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) TO DRAFT A PASSAGE ON RHODESIA FOR THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE AND AGREE IT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF. 4. THE FINAL TEXT OF THIS PASSAGE, AS AGREED UNANIMOUSLY BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, IS AT ANNEX A. WE HAD HOPED TO AVOID MAKING A REFERENCE TO A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE WHILE IN LUSAKA. BUT THERE WAS INTENSE PRESSURE ON THIS QUESTION AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS GENERALLY EXPECTED. WE THEREFORE AGREED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE FORM OF WORDS IN PARAGRAPH H WHICH, BECAUSE IT IS A MATTER FOR CABINET DECISION, FALLS SHORT OF ANNOUNCING IN TERMS THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO CALL A CONFERENCE. FRESH ELECTIONS REFERRED TO IN PARA G ARE ESSENTIAL TO ANY SETTLEMENT IF IT IS TO GAIN SUFFICIENT INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE TO MAKE IT VIABLE AND BRING THE WAR TO AN END. THIS PARAGRAPH DOES NOT COMMIT US TO ADMINISTER THESE ELECTIONS, BUT ONLY TO ARRANGE WHATEVER DEGREE OF SUPERVISION WE MAY THINK NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENABLE US TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT THEY ARE FREE AND FAIR. THE PROVISION FOR COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS SHOULD NOT GIVE TROUBLE. 5. I BELIEVE WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO FEEL SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION. WE HAVE AVOIDED THE IMPOSITION OF A FRESH SET OF CONDITIONS FOR THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO RHODESIA, AND HAVE RESISTED ATTEMPTS TO INVOLVE US IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE COMMONWEALTH A SPECIFIC PROGRAMME OR AN OUTLINE OF OUR PROPOSALS. BISHOP MUZOREWA HAS NOT BEEN CONDEMNED, NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY RECRIMINATION OVER SANCTIONS. THERE IS NO ECHO OF THE OAU LANGUAGE ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS QUOTE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE UNQUOTE. THERE IS NO CALL FOR FURTHER UN INVOLVEMENT. WE HAVE SECURED AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS FOR MINORITIES. THE COMMUNIQUE THROWS A HEAVY ONUS ON THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THEIR FRIENDS TO CO-OPERATE IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IT LEAVES OPEN, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE QUESTION OF HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED IF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SHOW THEMSELVES UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH AND LEAVE THE CONCLUSION OF A SETTLEMENT TO US AND THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT. FURTHER ACTION

CONTINGENCY PLANS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE TO START IN LONDON ON 4 SEPTEMBER: WE NEED NOW TO BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THIS, IN TERMS WHICH WILL GIVE THE MAXIMUM REASSURANCE TO THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND ITS SUPPORTERS (AND IN PARTICULAR TO WHITE RHODESIANS), WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WE DEMONSTRATE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT WE ARE MAKING, IN GOOD FAITH, A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT ON A BASIS WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED TO US IN OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM. BISHOP MUZOREWA'S INITIAL PRIVATE REACTION TO THE CHGM COMMUNIQUE WAS CAUTIOUS, THOUGH HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT PREDICTABLY EXPRESSED RESENTMENT AT THE CALL FOR NEW ELECTIONS. HE WILL NEED MUCH CAREFUL ENCOURAGEMENT FROM US. IN PARALLEL WITH THIS, WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO IMPRESS ON PRESIDENT NYERERE AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE OHOTE FRONT LINE STATES UNDUCTE THE PART WE EXPECT THEM. THE QUOTE FRONT LINE STATES UNQUOTE THE PART WE EXPECT THEM TO PLAY IN GETTING THE EXTERNAL PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE, AND TO ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICANS TO BE HELPFUL. 7. OUR FIRST OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO PUBLISH, BY MID-AUGUST, A STATEMENT OF OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. SUCH A STATEMENT SHOULD MEET THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA: A. IT SHOULD SKETCH THE OUTLINE OF AN EVENTUAL INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION WHICH WOULD BE COMPARABLE WITH THE TERMS ON WHICH INDEPENDENCE WAS GRANTED TO OTHER COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN AFRICA: B. IT SHOULD ENABLE BISHOP MUZOREWA TO MAKE CLEAR TO WHITE OPINION IN RHODESIA THAT HE CAN DISCUSS OUR PROPOSALS WITHOUT COMPROMISING ESSENTIAL MINORITY INTERESTS. C. IT SHOULD BE IN SUCH TERMS THAT WE CAN CLAIM TO THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS AND OTHERS THAT A REFUSAL BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ATTEND A CONSITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON THIS BASIS WOULD BE UNREASON-ABLE AND A PROOF OF BAD FAITH ON THEIR PART.
WE SHOULD BE READY TO MAKE A SEPARATE STATEMENT AT THE TIME THE PROPOSALS ARE PUBLISHED, EMPHASISING THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO ENABLING THE WHITE COMMUNITY TO PLAY A FULL PART IN THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY AND HOLDING OUT A FIRM PROMISE OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS ONCE THE PROPOSALS ARE IMPLEMENTED. 8. IT WILL BE DESIRABLE TO CONFINE OUR INITIAL PRESENTATION TO THE BARE OUTLINE OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION. IF WE EXPOSED THE FULL EXTENT TO WHICH WE WERE PREPARED TO INCORPORATE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION INTO OUR OWN PROPOSALS, WE SHOULD GIVE THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IN AFRICA A CHANCE TO CLAIM THAT WE WERE CLEARLY AIMING FOR A SOLUTION BASED ON THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS VERY LIKELY THAT, ONCE THEY GET TO A CONFERENCE, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT WILL REJECT OUR PROPOSALS. BUT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE IT EASY FOR THEM TO CLAIM THAT IT IS NOT WORTH THEIR WHILE ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE AT ALL. THIS WOULD ONLY MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT IS THEIR INTRANSI-GENCE WHICH IS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A WIDER AGREEMENT. 9. A DRAFT FOR SUCH A STATEMENT OF OUR OUTLINE PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTION IS ATTACHED AT ANNEX B. THIS IS LARGELY COMPATIBLE PASSAGES INDICATE THE POINTS ON WHICH CHANGES WILL HAVE TO BE MADE.

I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SECURE BISHOP MUZOREWA'S

ACQUIESCENCE IN SUCH CHANGES, WITHOUT SERIOUS DAMAGE TO WHITE CONFIDENCE. THE LIMITED CHANGES WE HAVE IN MIND ARE SET OUT IN

10. I ENVISAGE THAT THE PROPOSALS WOULD BE ISSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AN INVITATION TO THE BISHOP'S GOVERNMENT AND THE EXTERNAL PARTIES TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. THE TERMS OF THE INVITATION WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT: (A) OUR OBJECTIVE IS AGREEMENT ON AN INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION TO GRANTED BY BRITAIN: (B) OUR PROPOSALS OUTLINE THE SORT OF CONSTITUTION WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO ENACT. AND WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD COMMEND ITSELF TO THE PARTIES AND TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION AS A BASIS FOR LEGAL INDEPENDENCE (THOUGH IF ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WERE AGREED BY ALL PARTIES, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT A SOLUTION ON THAT BASIS). 11. WE SHOULD NOW START DISCUSSING IN DETAIL, WITH THE BISHOP AND HIS OFFICIALS, THE CHANGES SET OUT IN ANNEX C SO AS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TABLE FULLY WORKED OUT PROPOSALS AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THE DETAILED PROPOSALS WE WOULD TABLE AT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE WORKED OUT IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RHODESIANS AND CIRCULATED TO MY COLLEAGUES LATER IN AUGUST. WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE A PARALLEL OFFER TO CONSULT WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT BEFORE THE CONFERENCE, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THIS WILL REVEAL ANY WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON THEIR PART. 12. MEANWHILE, WE HAVE BEEN KEEPING OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES OUTSIDE THE COMMONWEALTH, ESPECIALLY THE AMERICANS, INFORMED OF PROGRESS. WE MAY NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER FURTHER HIGH-LEVEL ACTION - EG A VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY LORD HARLECH - IS NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE OR TO KEEP BOTH THE SALISBURY GOVERNMENT AND THE EXTERNAL PARTIES ON COURSE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE. THE OUTLINE TIMETABLE AT ANNED D SETS OUT A PROGRAMME FOR THESE AND OTHER STEPS. 13. I INVITE MY COLLEAGUES TO TAKE NOTE OF THE UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AT LUSAKA AND TO APPROVE THE PROPOSALS FOR FURTTHER ACTION IN PARAGRAPHS 6 TO 12 ABOVE 14. ANNEXES B AND C ARE THE SAME AS THE ANNEXES TO THE OD PAPER. TEXT OF ANNEX D IS IN MIFT. 22115/6 ENDS CARRINGTON NNNN