THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET 1

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 9, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

DAVID AARON

SUBJECT:

NSC Weekly Report #140

1. Opinion

Relations with Our Allies

The meetings between the Vice President and Schmidt and Francois-Poncet revealed a number of aspects to our current difficulties with our Allies that are worth reporting.


-- The Europeans believe we have different objectives.

Both the Germans and French said their goal is to get the
Soviets out of Afghanistan through diplomacy, while ours is
to deter another Afghan-type invasion by punishing the Soviets.

In probing Schmidt on this, we found that he has in mind going
back to his original "face-saving" approach for the Soviets
and I believe we will increasingly find the Europeans favoring
a negotiation that in essence will permit Babrak Karmal's regime (or
something like that) to remain in power in exchange for Soviet
troop withdrawals.

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NAPLS GATE 12-1148



-- We found that we have a surprising amount in common with the French in their analysis of the Afghanistan situation and in

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their position that the Soviet approach is totally unacceptable.

(S)

-- After talking with Schmidt and Francois-Poncet, I believe that there is a possibility of discussions on political and strategic issues at Venice among more than just the Four and that there is a prospect that we can get a statement on political issues in the Communique. But this will be a grinding and difficult step by step enterprise and it is important that we not build up expectations. Given French hesitations, whatever we get on this score will be a great accomplishment, but it will look like a defeat if we have pumped it up in advance. I do not expect much support from the British or the Germans: Schmidt because he is wary of antagonizing the Soviets with what he terms "rhetoric" and the British because they need both German and French agreement to reallocate the Common Market budget. (S)

British Public Opinion on Your Performance

Despite the press you get in Great Britain a majority of the British public continues to approve your performance in office, despite the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran. However, the percentage of Britons who disapprove has risen. Surveys conducted before and immediately after the rescue attempt show that just over half of the public consider you to be a "good" president, but the proportion of those who disagree has risen.

In each poll the question was:

"Do you think Mr. Carter is or is not proving to be a good president of the United States?"

	After Camp David		Lowest since taking office		Just before and just after rescue attempt	
	<u>Sep 77</u>	Oct 78	Oct 79	Jan 80	Apr 18-21 1980	Apr 26 1980
Is	56%	48%	32%	49%	53%	52%
Is not	14	32	49	37	28 .	39
Don't know	30	20	18	14	19	9