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FROM RIYADH 041910Z NOV 81

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 4 OF 4 NOVEMBER

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, JEDDA, PARIS, BONN. PRIORITY TEL AVIV, DAMASCUS, BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, ROUTINE OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS AND OTHER EC POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MIPT

SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO RIYADH: SINAI FORCE

1. IN DISCUSSION OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS, PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT IF THE EGYPTIANS WERE FORCED BY THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT AN INADEQUATE AUTONOMY AGREEMENT, THIS WOULD PRECLUDE ANY RECONCILIATION WITH THE ARABS. THIS WAS PRECISELY WHY THE ISRAELIS WERE TRYING TO LINK AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT WITH A SINAI WITHDRAWAL. SIR J GRAHAM SAID THAT SOME IN THE US ADMINISTRATION TENDED TO ACCEPT THAT ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY EXTENDED TO THE WEST BANK. THERE WAS A RISK THAT THEY WOULD MAKE AN AUTONOMY AGREEMENT THE END OBJECTIVE OF THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, RATHER THAN MERELY A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT ON THE WAY TO INDEPENDANCE, AND WOULD GIVE IT PRIORITY OVER SECURING WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI.

2. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WAS GOOD THING IN ITSELF, PROVIDED THAT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS STOPPED THERE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THIS WAS WHY WE HAD DECIDED TO ACCEDE TO THE AMERICAN REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SINAI FORCE. IT WAS A REQUEST WHICH, FRANKLY, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MADE. BUT GREAT PRESSURE HAD BEEN APPLIED TO US, AND WE FEARED THAT IF WE DID NOT CONTRIBUTE THE AMERICANS WOULD HOLD US RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ISRAELI FAILURE TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI. THE TEN HAD AGREED THAT THEY COULD ONLY SUPPORT PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS THAT ITS PURPOSE WAS TO ENSURE THAT ARAB LAND WAS HANDED BACK TO AN ARAB COUNTRY, AND THAT PARTICIPATION WAS EXPLICITLY DISSOCIATED FROM THE REST OF CAMP DAVID. HE EXPLAINED HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE, AND SAID THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON 6 NOVEMBER. IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT ISRAEL WOULD REJECT EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT.

3. PRINCE SAUD ASKED WHY FRANCE AND BRITAIN, AS SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, FELT IT RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE EXPLAINED THAT AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND CANADA HAD FOUND IT CONVENIENT TO HIDE BEHIND BRITAIN, AND THAT THIS HAD CONCENTRATED ENORMOUS U S PRESSURE ON US. THE FRENCH AND ITALIANS HAD ALSO

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MADE THEIR PARTICIPATION CONDITIONAL ON OURS, THERE WERE PRECEDENTS (UNFICYP, UNIFIL) FOR PARTICIPATION IN UN FORCES BY SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS: UNTAG WOULD BE A FURTHER EXAMPLE, IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT ON NAMIBIA. PRINCE SAUD SAID THAT THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAD NO WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO PREVENT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. BUT, THE POSITION THE ARABS HAD ADOPTED AT THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT DEAL WITH CAMP DAVID OR WITH ANYTHING EMERGING FROM IT. EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION WOULD CREATE TENSION BETWEEN THE EUROPEANS AND THE ARABS, WHICH COULD BE ALLEVIATED BY A CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE EUROPEAN POSITION REMAINED DISTINCT FROM CAMP DAVID, AND THAT PARTICIPATION INVOLVED NO MOVE TOWARDS IT. THE AMERICANS' PURPOSE WAS TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WEST WAS UNITED BEHIND CAMP DAVID; IF THE EUROPEANS COULD SHOW THAT BY PARTICIPATING THEY INCREASED THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE U S, THIS TOO WOULD HELP. LORD CARRINGTON POINTED OUT THAT THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD PUT PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S PERSONAL POSITION AT RISK.

4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALSO EXPLAINED THE EUROPEAN DECISION TO PRINCE FAHD ON THE LINES OF PARA 2. PRINCE FAHD SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PLEASE EVERYBODY, AND THE STATEMENT SEEMED TO HIM A VERY REASONABLE IDEA. THOSE WHO OBJECTED WOULD HAVE DONE SO IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT ACCESSIBLE TO REASON. THE STATEMENT SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED BEYOND 6 NOVEMBER: HE FEARED THAT THE TEN WOULD COME UNDER PRESSURE TO ALTER IT.

FCO PASS ALL.

MJIR

(REPEATED AS REQUESTED)

Repetition to SANA'A
referred for departmental decision,
repeated as requested to other posts.

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2

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