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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT TO LONDON

7-9 June 1982

TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, 9 AM WEDNESDAY, 9 JUNE

STEERING BRIEF

Brief by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

INTRODUCTION

1. The Prime Minister gave an informal invitation to President Reagan to visit the United Kingdom during her visit to Washington in February 1981. HM The Queen subsequently invited the President and Mrs Reagan to pay a State visit this summer between the Economic Summit in Versailles and the NATO Summit in Bonn. The invitation was accepted, but in view of the sensitivities of other European countries the White House asked that the visit should not be described as a State visit.
2. In addition to attending the two Summit meetings and coming to Britain, President Reagan is paying a brief visit to Rome on 7 June, during which he will meet the Pope, and he is expected to visit Berlin briefly after the Bonn meeting.
3. The last visit by an American President was that of President Carter in 1977. The British objectives for the present visit and the probable American objectives are set out in Annex A. An outline programme of the visit is at

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Annex B. As this is a quasi-State visit the accent is on public and ceremonial events, for which there is likely to be very extensive press coverage. The President's visit has been criticised by vocal minorities who are proposing to mount demonstrations against it, but no physical danger to the President is foreseen except as is always possible from cranks. He will be accompanied by a suite of whom the principal members are Mr Haig, Mr Clark, Mr Meese, Mr Deaver and Mr Baker. Notes on Personalities are attached at Annex C.

MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

4. The Prime Minister's meeting with the President on 9 June is the only working session of his visit (although Mr Haig will also have talks with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 8 June). Informal discussion with American officials has provided no guidance about subjects which the President will himself raise. He is expected to have at least background briefing on the Alliance, on East-West trade questions and on Ireland, all of which are dealt with below.

5. It is unlikely that there will be much time at Versailles or Bonn for any serious bilateral discussions with the President. Consequently this visit does give us a unique opportunity to engage the President's direct personal attention on two or three of the issues which most concern us. The primary purpose of the

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meeting is not so much to press the British case on contentious issues, although the Falklands may be an exception to this (see paragraph 6 below), as to review a number of international issues of key concern to both countries. Nearer the visit, and in the light of subsequent developments and what happens at Versailles, we may need to take another look at the main themes on which the Prime Minister and the President should concentrate. This brief makes the best judgement we can a fortnight before the event.

THE FALKLANDS

6. Depending on developments, the Falklands may well dominate the discussion. A Brief on the current points of concern, which will also have to include aspects of policy towards Latin America, will be prepared much nearer the time. The United States is in the position of trying to reconcile solidarity with its closest ally in resistance to aggression with the preservation of its hemispheric relationship with Latin America. The Prime Minister may need to urge the President not to weaken in support of the British cause. The President is likely to stress the risk of Argentina developing a close relationship with the Soviet Union. He may press us on our future intentions.

SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE SUMMIT MEETINGS

7. The main topics of joint concern to the United States
/and Britain



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and Britain will be discussed at the Versailles and Bonn Summits and are covered in the Briefs for those meetings. The following seem to be the most likely subjects to merit separate discussion with President Reagan.

(i) The NATO Summit and the Alliance

(a) The Prime Minister might focus on the state of the Western Alliance and the role of the Anglo-American relationship within it. She could explain the special role which we see for ourselves as a member of the European Community with especially close ties with the United States, and seek the President's views on what more could be done to promote the cohesion and strengthening of the Alliance which both countries want. She could remind the President that Britain is maintaining its increased spending on defence. The Prime Minister might also stress the continuing importance we attach to consultation, but could also point out that the interests of the Alliance members do not always coincide exactly.

(b) The Prime Minister can stress the importance we attach to the NATO Summit in Bonn, at which our principal objectives will be to secure a greater unity in the Alliance's handling of East-West relations through a process of thorough discussion and understanding of each other's points of view, and of Western security (both defence and arms control). The Prime Minister might welcome the US initiatives on START and INF. She might explore the thinking underlying the President's

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speech in Illinois on 9 May about East-West relations. And she could discuss the prospects for the United States bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

(ii) Subjects arising from The Economic Summit

(a) At Versailles agreement is probable on two subjects with which President Reagan has been most concerned - effective cooperation on economic policies and a positive commitment to the world open trading system (Versailles Briefs 3 and 5). But the President will have come under pressure to reduce the Federal Budget deficit.

(b) The Americans pressed Summit partners to agree in advance of the meeting on methods of restraining Western official credits for the Soviet Union (Versailles Brief 8). It is not clear whether agreement will be reached on this before or at Versailles. Further briefing will follow if necessary.

(c) The President will also be hoping for some progress on the American initiative on youth exchanges (Versailles Brief 16).

OTHER INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN

8. (i) The Middle East

The Prime Minister could ask how the President sees prospects for the Egypt/Israel autonomy talks and for involving other Arabs, particularly the Palestinians themselves, in the peace process; and could seek the President's views on how to achieve

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Israeli restraint over settlements on the West Bank. She might discuss with the President the tension in Lebanon and the prospects for peace between Iran and Iraq; and whether the West can do anything to help ease these points of conflict.

(ii) Southern Africa

There could be discussion of recent developments, particularly on Namibia, and the Prime Minister might probe the President on the chances of Cuban withdrawal from Angola and on Soviet objectives in the area.

QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE UK

9. We have very few serious problems of a bilateral nature, as distinct from questions which are dealt with in the context of the Community or the Alliance. The Community has various trade problems with the United States, particularly over steel and agriculture. The Commission has recently held exploratory talks with the Americans about steel. The Prime Minister could express our continuing concern to solve such trade matters amicably.

10. A separate brief is attached on the requirement for British subjects visiting the US to obtain visas, a subject in which there is some parliamentary and public interest.

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11. Defence Equipment Co-operation: The Prime Minister may wish to welcome: US agreement to UK industrial participation in the Trident programme on a competitive basis; continuing Administration Support for the selection of the Hawk for the US Navy; and the prospect for the possible extension to other bases of arrangements for Rapier to defend USAF bases in UK. These are good examples of how co-operation can work to mutual advantage.

IRELAND

12. The President's Irish ancestry has not inhibited him from condemning all acts of violence in Northern Ireland and taking a firm line against support for the IRA in the United States. In his recent speech on St Patrick's Day he said that the United States could not chart a course for the people of Northern Ireland and came down firmly against United States involvement, despite Mr Haughey's attempts to draw the United States in. The Prime Minister could emphasise that the Government's aim was to give the people of Northern Ireland more control over their own affairs through the creation of a local Assembly. But there was no question of handing powers over without safeguards. No powers would be devolved unless and until the machinery for their exercise had been agreed by both sides in the province - the minority's position was fully safeguarded.

13. The US administration welcomed the development, until /recently

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recently, of better Anglo-Irish relations. The Prime Minister could point out that, through no wish of HMG, relations between London and Dublin have certainly taken a turn for the worse as a result of some damaging Irish interventions in the EC and the UN over the Falklands of which the President will be aware, and which ran counter to the friendly co-operative relationship we had tried to develop.

14. Finally, the Prime Minister could express her appreciation of the President's own stand against violence, and stress the importance of curbing the illegal activities of NORAID, bringing fugitive terrorists to justice, and reducing support to the IRA from the US (Note:-it would not be appropriate to mention US refusal to license the export of Ruger pistols to the Royal Ulster Constabulary,

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BRITISH OBJECTIVES

1. (a) To reinforce the close ties between the United Kingdom and the United States, bearing in mind the conflicting pressures to which we have both been subject in recent weeks over the Falkland crisis.

(b) To demonstrate to President Reagan the fundamental importance we attach to our relations with the United States within the North Atlantic Alliance; and to maintaining a unified alliance approach to East-West relations.

(c) To counter any impression on the part of the President and American public opinion that Britain is dominated by anti-nuclear and anti-American elements.

PROBABLE UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES:

2. (a) To project the President as a Leader of the Western Alliance and to show to the people of the United States that he is at ease on the international scene and a welcome guest in Britain;

(b) to demonstrate to British public opinion that America has a responsible attitude to the danger of war, and is working to restrain the arms race;

/(c)

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(c) to convince British public opinion that the Americans continue to regard Britain as their closest ally and attach special importance to Anglo-American relations;

(d) to demonstrate the common political purpose which the American Administration believes it shares with HMG.

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OUTLINE PROGRAMME OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT

Monday 7 June:

6.00 p.m. Arrival from Rome;
private dinner at Windsor Castle
with members of the Royal Family.

Tuesday 8 June:

9.30 a.m. Riding with the Queen
12.00 noon Address Members of both Houses of
Parliament in the Royal Gallery
1.00 p.m. Lunch at Number Ten given by
Prime Minister
8.30 p.m. Banquet at Windsor Castle

Wednesday 9 June:

9.00 a.m. Breakfast and talks with the
Prime Minister
10.25 a.m. Joint appearance before the Press
outside Number Ten
11.00 a.m. Departure for Bonn

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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: 9 JUNE 1982

BILATERAL RELATIONS

US VISA POLICY

POINTS TO MAKE

1. Continuing irritation here over the fact that United Kingdom citizens still require visas to visit the United States whereas American citizens require no visa to visit the United Kingdom. Regular flow of questions in Parliament.

2. Understand Bills have been introduced in Senate and House of Representatives which include provision for abolition of tourist visas for certain countries including the United Kingdom. Is there anything that can be done to speed things up?

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PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN; 9 JUNE 1982

BILATERAL RELATIONS

US VISA POLICY

ESSENTIAL FACTS

1. The question was raised during the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in February 1981. Progress has been very slow. Although State Department are strongly supportive, most of the opposition seems to come from the US immigration authorities.

2. Lord Bethell, in his capacity as a member of the European Parliament, has also been pursuing this matter keenly and has been in touch with the FCO and the American Embassy. He intends to raise it with members of Congress on a visit to Washington next month. Soundings in the Ten have suggested that there is not much enthusiasm for joint European action.

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PERSONALITY NOTES

1. The Hon. Ronald Reagan
2. Mrs Nancy Reagan
3. The Hon. Alexander Haig
4. Mrs Patricia Haig
5. The Hon. John J Louis, Jr
6. Mrs Josephine Louis
7. The Hon. Edwin Meese III
8. The Hon. James A Baker III
9. The Hon. Michael K Deaver
10. The Hon. William P Clark
11. The Hon. Richard G Darman
12. The Hon. David R Gergen
13. The Hon. Edward V Hickey, Jr
14. The Hon. Michael A McManus
15. The Hon. Richard R Burt