

Original on  
Commonwealth ~~Sp~~ Friday 79  
CHGM Bilaterals.

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF  
NEW ZEALAND, MR. ROBERT MULDOON, AT HORIZON HOUSE, LUSAKA, ON 1 AUGUST  
1979 AT 1800

Present

The Prime Minister  
Mr. B.G. Cartledge

The Rt. Hon. Robert Muldoon  
Mr. A.M. Bisley (Prime  
Minister's Department)

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The Southern Pacific

~~Mr. Muldoon told the Prime Minister that he was very concerned about the total withdrawal of the UK's diplomatic presence from the South Pacific islands. The leaders of the new micro-states were totally inexperienced and vulnerable. The Prime Minister of Tuvalu, for example, had put the whole of his country's reserves on deposit with a real estate speculator in Texas, Greenacres Real Estate. The same Prime Minister had just made a down-payment of \$50,000 for a leadership course in the United States. Kiribati was in a similar predicament. In both islands, the local leadership relied heavily on New Zealand's High Commissioners for advice but they could do with a great deal more.~~

~~The Prime Minister expressed considerable concern at what Mr. Muldoon had told her and said that she would ask for a report.~~

Rhodesia

The Prime Minister said that some of the speeches made during the CHGM opening ceremony that morning had not been very helpful, but this was not unexpected. She told Mr. Muldoon that three main points had emerged from Lord Harlech's consultations during his mission to Southern Africa as the British Government's envoy. Firstly, there was general agreement that the April elections in Rhodesia had changed the situation and that a 65 per cent turn-out could not be ignored. Secondly, all were agreed that only the UK could give Rhodesia legal independence. Finally, it was generally agreed that there were shortcomings in the present constitution: criticism had centred on the reserved powers

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for the white Members of Parliament and on the way in which the Commissions operated. The Prime Minister said that no decisions had yet been put to the Cabinet for endorsement but the Government would be sticking to the position that the UK had given other countries in Africa honourable independence constitutions and would do the same for Rhodesia. Time, however, was running out and it was more than ever essential to stop the war. The British Government would tell the Front Line States that if the UK could secure reasonable changes in Rhodesia's existing constitution (but without losing the confidence of the white population) and produce what would be seen by the world to be a reasonable constitution they, the Front Line States, should be prepared to say that they would not continue their support for the Patriotic Front, if the leaders of the Patriotic Front still criticised the situation. The Prime Minister told Mr. Muldoon that her private discussions so far indicated that some, at any rate, of the Front Line Presidents would accept this approach while expressing some doubts as to whether they could actually succeed in persuading the Patriotic Front to stop the war.

The Prime Minister went on to say that Rhodesia had come an enormously long way during the past two years. There was no point in other African countries supporting an armed struggle against a constitution which was in many respects so similar to those which they had themselves been given on independence. Mr. Muldoon said that he would expect President Kaunda and President Nyerere to create difficulties during the CHGM discussions on Rhodesia, although Sir Seretse Khama might be easier. President Kaunda's popularity had suffered a significant decline and he was experiencing great problems with his own Party. Mr. Muldoon said that he had been impressed, during the previous twenty-four hours, by the extent to which President Kaunda seemed to be the prisoner of his Party and to which he acted merely as its mouthpiece. The young Turks were moving up behind him and, in the meantime, he was faced by immense economic problems. It might make a great deal of sense for both Zambia and Tanzania to go hard for a solution on Rhodesia which would put an end to the fighting and enable them to rebuild their shattered economies. The Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Peacock, had apparently found that Nyerere was taking a very different line in private to that which he still adopted in public.

/Mr. Muldoon



Mr. Muldoon agreed with the Prime Minister that the April elections had been a major triumph for Bishop Muzorewa: the vote, however, had been above all a vote for peace. The Prime Minister commented that it had equally been a vote against terrorism. Mr. Muldoon expressed the view that similar votes in Zambia and Tanzania, if they could be held, would produce the same result.

Mr. Muldoon went on to say that he thought that a solution might lie in getting some of the key figures at present in Lusaka who were concerned with the Rhodesia problem to meet privately together on the margins of the Conference, and particularly during the coming weekend at State House, to hammer out the terms of a CHGM declaration or statement with which they could live. When the Prime Minister said that the British Government would have to move very fast as soon as the Conference was over, Mr. Muldoon replied that it was equally important to make progress during the CHGM itself. From this point of view, it was essential that the Prime Minister should not take too hard a line in the CHGM debate on Rhodesia on 3 August.

The Prime Minister said that it would be equally important not to seem to be taking part in an onslaught on Bishop Muzorewa. The Bishop was understandably frightened of losing the confidence of his white population or, alternatively, if he acquiesced in too drastic changes in the constitution, losing his own credibility.

Mr. Muldoon said that, in his view, the white Rhodesians were already resigned to black majority rule. Ideally, one would wish to see Bishop Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe working together in the Cabinet of an independent Rhodesia. <sup>But</sup> / life was not like that and any such outcome would evoke cries of betrayal from the Patriotic Front. Mr. Muldoon said that he nevertheless believed that if, in Lusaka, an agreed statement or declaration could be worked out, to the effect that given certain specified changes in the constitution the CHGM accepted that hostilities should end, this would be a major step forward. Such a statement would, of course, have to be supported both by President Nyerere and President Kaunda. Nigeria would probably prove to be the most awkward customer in discussing such a proposal.

/The Prime Minister



The Prime Minister told Mr. Muldoon about Nigeria's nationalisation of BP. Mr. Muldoon mentioned that Commissioner Adefope, who was leading the Nigerian delegation in Lusaka, was a difficult man and given to sudden snap decisions, such as that which had pulled the Nigerian team out of the Commonwealth Games at Edmonton. Mr. Muldoon said that he thought that Kenya would be helpful, since the Kenyans would like to see Nyerere back down. There were many other countries which would acquiesce in such an arrangement and the West Indians, for example, would always back the winning side. Mr. Muldoon commented that Mr. Michael Manley had calmed down a great deal during the past two years: he had foregone his ambition to lead the Third World and was now concentrating on remaining the leader of Jamaica. Mr. Muldoon repeated that if Nyerere and Kaunda could be persuaded to adopt a softer public line, the whole Rhodesia problem could quite possibly be settled in Lusaka. The Prime Minister said that she saw little sign of this so far.

When Mr. Muldoon reverted to his idea of asking Mr. Ramphal to coordinate private discussions on the margin of the Conference, the Prime Minister said that she would not want a Commonwealth committee or any body of that kind. She accepted that the UK had to consult as widely as possible in order to achieve the maximum acceptance for Rhodesia's return to legality. It was important to stress that Bishop Muzorewa had demonstrated the possibility of achieving one's objectives by peaceful and democratic means.

Mr. Muldoon said that politicians often had to settle for second best and Bishop Muzorewa was clearly willing to do so. The Prime Minister said that she admired him for it; she recognised the importance of retaining the confidence of the whites. Mr. Muldoon said that Tanzania was faced by serious problems as a result of its action in Uganda; President Nyerere was clearly ready to look for a peaceful way out, and so was President Kaunda. Their governments, unlike the governments of New Zealand or the United Kingdom, could easily survive a drastic U-turn in their policies towards Rhodesia. After a week, the Zambian press would be hailing President Kaunda as the great peacemaker. Mr. Muldoon expressed his conviction that it should be possible to work along the lines of the Gleneagles weekend, by bringing together a limited number (five or six) of the countries directly interested in the Rhodesia problem, during the

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coming weekend, and to entrust Mr. Ramphal with the orchestration. An agreed text could be arrived at and then presented to the full Conference on the morning of Monday, 6 August. The other countries could then simply be asked to endorse the text, which could consist of a fairly lengthy preamble followed by a short list of the specific constitutional proposals which the UK would put forward. These might include the condition that Ian Smith should retire from government. A declaration or statement on these lines would give the British Government something to build on. He thought it likely that neither Nkomo nor Mugabe any longer believed that following the elections that time was on their side. They were getting older and there were rivals for their positions. Mr. Muldoon commented, in passing, that he thought that Mr. Fraser was on the wrong tack and that his current statements on Southern Africa contained an excessive element of appeasement.

Mr. Muldoon agreed with the Prime Minister that the battle in Rhodesia was no longer between black and white but between black and black; racialism was no longer the dominant issue - tribalism was now the greater danger.

The conversation ended at 1845.

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1 August 1979