



Prime Minister

ks.

Print 3/11

mb

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT 3 PM ON 28 NOVEMBER 1979

Those Present:

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington	Mr P F Botha
Mr J Leahy	His Excellency Dr D de Villiers
Mr G G H Walden	Mr R Killen

1. Lord Carrington thanked Mr Botha for his helpfulness in recent weeks. We had just overcome a difficult hiccough following the Rhodesian raids in Zambia. He quite understood that infiltration from Zambia to Rhodesia was at a high level. But politically the timing of the raids had made it harder for us to bring the Patriotic Front to the boil in the negotiations. If we had done so prematurely, the blame for a breakdown would have fallen on Salisbury. Now however we had succeeded in getting back to the ceasefire, and had just had a long bilateral meeting with the Patriotic Front. That afternoon he intended to give the PF the definitive UK position. This would attempt to reassure them on some points, but we would make it clear that we were looking for a swift response. He would see them before going to Dublin on 29 November, and again if necessary on his return, making it clear that there was no more negotiating fat on our position. We would then go ahead and appoint a Governor, make the Constitution, and begin putting through an Independence Bill. We would not however break the Conference, and make it clear that the PF were still free to join in if they wished. On Monday 3 December we would have to go ahead on that basis. The negotiations simply could not continue any longer, especially in view of the infiltration which was going on. The Salisbury parties were also fed up, though they themselves had lengthened the negotiations by one week. It was important that we should be in the best international position possible if there were a breakdown. He was grateful for South African forbearance.

2. Mr Botha said he was grateful for Lord Carrington's help over arranging this meeting. He had been worried about the press treatment of his visit, but the Ambassador had rectified this in 20 minutes. Lord Carrington said we had been concerned about charges of collusion, given the timing of Mr Botha's visit. Mr Botha said that he saw the difficulty. On Zambia, General Walls had told him that the Secretary of State had expressed understanding of the reasons for the Rhodesian attacks on Zambian bridges. It was important to realize how "bloody terrible" the position on the ground was, where the guerillas were crossing the border into Rhodesia to murder and rape. In his view, Kaunda was finished (Mr Botha later alleged that Kapepwe was recruiting Katangese, but seemed unsure of his facts.) In Angola Dos Santos was also fighting for his life. South African monitoring of signals in Southern Angola showed that Government forces there, which numbered 13,000, including a Cuban element, had been cornered by Savimbi, and were refusing to obey their commanders

/until



until they were properly fed. Machel was also in trouble, and a new opposition movement (the MRN?) was now active. Nyerere had also got into a mess in Uganda. The whole of Southern Africa was unstable, and South Africa faced very difficult decisions. In Botswana, Russian activity was now very dangerous. The Russians had offered to identify British and American agents there in exchange for closer co-operation. Chief Jonathan was also likely to be toppled within a month in Swaziland. He had asked Mr Botha personally to improve his security, eg by providing him with better personal communications.

3. Against this background, delay at the Rhodesian Conference was unfortunate, though he recognized that this had largely been beyond Lord Carrington's control. He would be grateful if the Conference could be concluded as soon as possible. An ideal solution may not be possible. But a "second-class solution" could bring about stability in time. A number of African countries would come to recognize Muzorewa: eg Senegal, Kenya, Swaziland, Botswana and Zaire. Lord Carrington said that this would only happen as a result of our going through the Lancaster House exercise. Mr Botha said he saw that, and agreed that the acceptance by the Patriotic Front of the Constitution had been an important achievement. But he was still afraid of a general flare-up in the region.

as 4. Lord Carrington said he was well aware of the problems, and again stressed that the Conference could not continue for much longer. But we would need/much international support as possible if we were to go ahead with a second-class solution. The Front Line States would continue to support the Patriotic Front in those circumstances, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm. We were also worried about British citizens in Zambia; Iran was a bad example. We would have economic difficulties with Nigeria. Nor could we expect much support from OAU members at the outset. However we would be able to demonstrate that we had spent 11 weeks trying to get a full settlement. Some Europeans were feebler than others (Mr Botha said that his list might be longer than Lord Carrington's) but we thought that others would come with us in the row over sanctions and the recognition of the Bishop. Even if we achieved the first-class solution, the ceasefire could be messy. The PF were unlikely to assemble their forces properly. If there were a breakdown of the ceasefire, we would also be accused of responsibility for it. But we still thought that we would be in a stronger position by attempting to achieve a ceasefire. Muzorewa had a good chance of getting a majority of seats, together with the Whites. (Mr Botha was clearly not familiar with the important provision in the draft Constitution whereby the Whites could only form a government with the largest political party. It was explained to him that Muzorewa would only need to gain a few seats more than his nearest rival to gain the support of the 20 White seats). Lord Carrington did not think that Mugabe would win the elections, particularly in view of the activities of Mawema. Mr Botha said he was not certain how important Mawema would be, but said that South Africa was helping him, and would help all anti-Marxist parties. He had just had a good talk with Sithole.



5. Mr Botha said that General Walls was nervous. His main fear was that some of our more junior officials (Walls had specifically exempted the Secretary of State and Mr Renwick) tended to give interpretations of our positions favourable to the Patriotic Front. Walls also feared that the Governor might interpret the provisions of any agreement in a sense favourable to the Patriotic Front. If there was no agreement he was afraid that the Governor might go out of his way to get the Patriotic Front in. Lord Carrington said that General Walls had clearly not understood the position. If the Patriotic Front did not answer our latest move, we would not break up the Conference. We would simply go ahead with the Governor, the Constitution and the Independence Bill, explaining that the Patriotic Front could come in within a period of x days, provided they accepted our ceasefire proposals. If they did not, the Government would fix the date of elections at the end of that period. Mr Botha said that it would be useful if Lord Carrington could explain this to General Walls, who felt that he had been left out of things recently. Lord Carrington said he would probably see the General on Saturday morning.

6. Mr Botha said that Ian Smith was already making overtures to Nkomo. Lord Carrington pointed out that he would only be able to make a coalition of the largest party. Mr Botha commented that many Rhodesians had no idea what was going on in London. In his view the situation still looked quite good, providing we could conclude the negotiations early. Lord Carrington said that he agreed with Mr Botha on time, but hoped no more bridges would be bombed. We had to understand President Kaunda's position to some extent. He had returned from London a hero, and had then been humiliated by Rhodesian attack. Mr Botha said that Kaunda was emotional and histrionic. A number of members of the Zambian Government were in touch with the South Africans. Some of them favoured the Bishop, but Kaunda was personally committed to Nkomo, whom he wanted to see enthroned. The South Africans too had favoured Nkomo in 1974, but Smith had turned down Nkomo's terms. He thought that Nkomo would get more than 20% of the vote. There was a danger of splitting all the parties, and of gangsterism. There were also problems in Malawi. As for Mozambique, he intended to stop helping Machel in Beira if the war in Rhodesia continued. If we could conclude the Conference soon, he knew from personal contact that there would be massive investment from the private sector for Muzorewa. The economic benefits would begin to flow in a matter of months. In a year, Lord Carrington would be seen as the man who had achieved a turn-around in the area. Lord Carrington said that we must achieve either a first or second class solution soon. In the latter case, we would appoint a different Governor and go for very quick elections. Mr Botha stressed that the South Africans wanted sanctions lifted very quickly.

7. Lord Carrington said that the Patriotic Front constantly alleged that the South Africans would invade Rhodesia if the Front won the elections. He had been taking the line that the South Africans would not interfere in an Administration run by a British Governor. Mr Botha said that this was an important issue which he wanted to get clear. The South Africans already had a presence in Rhodesia. He wanted to be frank. They had to help Muzorewa, otherwise there was no hope. The South Africans had to ensure the security of trains passing through their

/Rhodesia



Rhodesia in remote areas. They also protected the Rhodesian end of the Beit bridge, which would otherwise be blown. Lord Carrington emphasised that he was not talking about South African equipment in Rhodesia, or about volunteers. But there must be no formed South African units which would attract the attention of observers and the press. If there were, this would put us in an impossible position. The South Africans must remember that we were talking about a cease-fire. If they had personnel in Rhodesia, they must be dressed in Rhodesian uniforms, and not come to notice in formations. He urged Mr Botha to discuss this with General Walls.

Distribution:

PS
PS/LPS
PS/Mr Luce
PS/PUS
Mr Day
Mr Aspin
Mr Fifoot
Mr Barder)
Mr Renwick) Personal for
Mr Fenn)
Mr Powell)
PUSD

Private Secretary, 10 Downing St.