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TO IMMEDIATE F C O
TELEGRAM NUMBER 3623 OF 30 NOVEMBER
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, THE HAGUE, ROME, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, UKMLS NEW YORK, PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS.

MIPT: SINAI FORCE

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT JOINT U.S./ISRAEL STATEMENT

QUOTE

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL GOVERNMENTS NOTE THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, ITALY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS TO BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL GOVERNMENTS HAVE REVIEWED THE PARTICIPATION OF THESE FOUR COUNTRIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS WHICH THEY HAVE PROVIDED TO THE U S A ON NOVEMBER 26:

THAT THEY RECOGNISED THAT THE FUNCTION OF THE MFO IS AS DEFINED IN THE RELEVANT EGYPTIAN/ISRAEL AGREEMENTS, AND INCLUDES THAT OF ENSURING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.

THAT THEY HAVE ATTACHED NO POLITICAL CONDITIONS, LINKED TO VENICE OR OTHERWISE, TO THEIR PARTICIPATION.

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL UNDERSTAND THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES AND ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:

THE BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE MFO IS THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ORIGINATED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE PROTOCOL SIGNED BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AND WITNESSED BY THE U S A ON 3 AUGUST 1981, BASED UPON THE LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ON 26 MARCH 1979.

ALL OF THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MFO AND OF ITS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS, INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENTS THAT MAY BE FORMED THROUGH EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION, ARE DEFINED IN THE TREATY OF PEACE AND PROTOCOL AND THERE CAN BE NO DEROGATION OR RESERVATION FROM ANY OF THEM. AS PROVIDED IN THE PROTOCOL, ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE MFO UNDERTAKE TO CONDUCT THEMSELVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE PROTOCOL UNDER



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THE DIRECTION OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL APPOINTED BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL. THE MFO SHALL EMPLOY ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT ANY VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MFO WILL SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY OF PEACE AND THE PROTOCOL:

(A) THE OPERATION OF CHECKPOINTS, RECONNAISANCE PATROLS AND OBSERVATION POSTS ALONG THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND LINE B, AND WITHIN ZONE C.

(B) PERIODIC VERIFICATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF ANNEX I WILL BE CARRIED OUT NOT LESS THAN TWICE A MONTH UNLESS OTHERWISE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES.

(C) ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER RECEIPT OF A REQUEST FROM EITHER PARTY.

(D) ENSURING THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAIT OF TIRAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE TREATY OF PEACE.

THE U S A UNDERSTANDS AND APPRECIATES THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL REGARDING THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE FOUR EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTORS IN EXPLAINING THEIR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO TO THEIR OWN LEGISLATURES AND PUBLICS.

THE U S A RECOGNISES THAT SOME POSITIONS SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENTS ARE AT VARIANCE WITH ITS OWN POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS WELL AS POSITIONS HELD BY ISRAEL AS A PARTY TO THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE U S A AND ISRAEL RECOGNISE THAT THE POSITIONS HELD ON ANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM IN THE AREA BY ANY STATE WHICH AGREES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MFO DO NOT AFFECT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THAT STATE TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE PROTOCOL WHICH WAS NEGOTIATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U S A OF 26TH MARCH 1979, AND WHICH IS DESIGNED TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE TREATY OF PEACE, WHICH WAS CONCLUDED PURSUANT TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

THE TREATY OF PEACE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH THE MFO IS ESTABLISHED, REPRESENTS THE FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS AGREED ON AT CAMP DAVID WHOSE ULTIMATE GOAL IS A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES BASED ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THE U S A AND ISRAEL REITERATE THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AS THE ONLY VIABLE AND ONGOING NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THEY RENEW THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAKE EARLY MEANINGFUL PROGRESS IN THE AUTONOMY TALKS.
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SINAI FORCE

1. VELIOTES HAS SHOWN ME THE DRAFT US/ISRAEL STATEMENT, THE RESULT OF EIGHT HOURS' NEGOTIATION. HAIG HAD NOT AUTHORISED HIM TO GIVE ME THE TEXT BUT ONLY TO SHOW IT TO ME, A FORM OF SOPHISTRY THAT DID NOT PREVENT ME WRITING THE TEXT DOWN AS GIVEN IN MIFT.

2. VELIOTES SAID THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET HAD ACCEPTED THE TEXT EXCEPT FOR A FEW MINOR AND IMPROVING NIT-PICKS. THE PRESENT INTENTION WAS THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE ISSUED AT NOON WASHINGTON TIME TOMORROW, 1 DECEMBER.

3. ACCORDING TO VELIOTES, HAIG HAD TAKEN A VERY TOUGH LINE WITH SHAMIR. HE HAD EMPHASISED THAT ISRAEL MUST UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHED TO HAVING THE FOUR EUROPEAN POWERS TAKING PART IN THE FORCE. HE HAD ALSO STRESSED THE POSITIVE ROLE THAT YOU HAD BEEN PLAYING IN THIS BUSINESS. SHAMIR HAD STARTED OUT WITH AN EXTREME POSITION, SAYING THAT THOSE TAKING PART IN THE FORCE MUST QUOTE RENOUNCE VENICE UNQUOTE. THE WORDING EVENTUALLY AGREED TO WAS, IN VELIOTES'S VIEW, SATISFACTORY FROM THE EUROPEAN STANDPOINT. (VELIOTES SAID PRIVATELY THAT HE HIMSELF COULD NOT SEE IN WHAT WAY THE DRAFT STATEMENT EASED THE ISRAELI POSITION, BUT IT WAS NO GOOD TRYING TO UNDERSTAND.) AFTER IT HAS BEEN FINALLY APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET, SHAMIR APPARENTLY INTENDS TO CONVEY IT TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT UNDER COVER OF A MESSAGE REFERRING TO YOUR MESSAGE TO HIM TRANSMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE FOUR ETC.

4. I ASKED WHAT THIS COVERING MESSAGE WOULD SAY. COULD I BE SURE THAT IT WOULD NOT ASK US TO CONCUR IN THE JOINT STATEMENT? VELIOTES SAID THAT THIS WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING. THE COVERING MESSAGE WOULD BE PURELY DECLARATORY. HOWEVER, HE RANG UP THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING.

5. I EMPHASISED THAT WE COULD NOT ENDORSE SOME OF THE LANGUAGE IN THE STATEMENT AND IT WOULD GREATLY COMPLICATE THINGS IF WE WERE ASKED TO DO SO. VELIOTES INSISTED THAT THE TEXT CONTAINED NO SNAGS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AND NO PROVOCATIONS. IT HAD ALSO TAKEN ACCOUNT OF EGYPTIAN SENSITIVITIES. HE TOLD ME THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS: THEIR ATTITUDE WAS THAT THEY DID NOT GIVE A DAMN ABOUT THE TEXT PROVIDED IT DID NOT PRECLUDE THE FOUR EUROPEAN POWERS FROM TAKING PART IN THE FORCE.

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6. THE TEXT DID NOT SAY, SO VELIOTES EXPLAINED, THAT THE US SHARED ISRAEL'S CONCERN ABOUT THE EUROPEAN STATEMENTS. IT MERELY SAID THAT IT UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATES ISRAELI CONCERN. I SAID THAT THIS WORD QUOTE APPRECIATES UNQUOTE WAS NOT VERY SATISFACTORY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, PARTICULARLY BEARING IN MIND THE PUBLIC QUOTE WARM WELCOME UNQUOTE GIVEN BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE FOUR'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE. THERE WERE OTHER PHRASES IN THE DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT TO WHICH WE COULD NOT SUBSCRIBE. VELIOTES SAID THAT IT WAS A POLITICAL STATEMENT AND HE IMPLORED US TO STOP LAWYERS GETTING ANYWHERE NEAR IT.

7. REFERRING TO VELIOTES'S ACCOUNT OF THE GREAT DISTANCE THE ISRAELIS HAD COME DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, I ASKED HIM TO WHAT HE ATTRIBUTED THIS. DID HE THINK THAT FEZ HAD PLAYED A PART? HE SAID THAT HAIG'S VIEW AND HIS WAS THAT YOUR LETTER HAD QUOTE TURNED THE WHOLE ATMOSPHERE AROUND UNQUOTE. THE ISRAELIS WERE DELIGHTED WITH IT. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HERE HAD TOLD VELIOTES THAT IT WAS YOUR LETTER THAT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT THE CHANGE FROM THE VERY HARD LINE ORIGINALLY ADOPTED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET.

8. IN CONCLUSION, I REITERATED THE DIFFICULTY THAT IT WOULD PRESENT TO US, AND FOR THAT MATTER TO THE OTHER EUROPEANS, IF WE WERE ASKED TO REACT TO THIS STATEMENT. VELIOTES EMPHASISED THAT NOTHING FROM US WOULD BE NECESSARY. WHAT HE HOPED FOR WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REACTION FROM THE EUROPEANS.

9. IN LETTING ME HAVE A SIGHT OF THIS TEXT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE CERTAINLY NOT OPENING THE WAY TO ANY AMENDMENTS FROM US. INDEED I THINK THEY ARE ASSUMING THAT THE TEXT WILL BE PUBLISHED BEFORE ANY SUCH PROPOSALS CAN BE FORTHCOMING. HAIG IS EVIDENTLY VERY PLEASED WITH WHAT HE HAS ACHIEVED AND BELIEVES THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE EUROPEANS TO LIVE WITH THIS FORM OF WORDS WITHOUT THIS IMPLYING ANY RENUNCIATION OF THEIR OWN EXPLANATIONS FOR PARTICIPATING.

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