

E. R.

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GR 750

31 MAY 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 010008Z JUN 82

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 899 OF 31 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON.



YOUR TELNO 485; FALKLANDS; SECRETARY-GENERAL.

1. I DELIVERED YOUR MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT 1900Z TODAY (31 MAY) ADDING THAT HE WAS FREE TO INCLUDE IT IN HIS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IF HE WISHED.
2. BEFORE THE MAIN MEETING (WHICH WAS A FORMALITY) HE HAD ASKED TO SEE ME ALONE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SEEING ROS AN HOUR LATER. IF HE DETECTED ANY SIGN OF CHANGE IN ROS'S ATTITUDE, HE WAS DISPOSED TO MAKE A FINAL ATTEMPT OVER THE NEXT TWO DAYS TO BRING ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIVE PARAS 1 AND 2 OF SCR 502 (HE ENTIRELY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF PARALLEL BRITISH WITHDRAWAL) IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID WHAT LOOKED LIKE BEING A BLOODY BATTLE FOR STANLEY, WITH HEAVY CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES, FOLLOWING BY TOTAL ARGENTINE HUMILIATION. HE ASKED ME IF I COULD HINT AT ANYTHING BEYOND WHAT WAS IN YOUR MESSAGE E.G. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF UN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SHORT OR LONGER TERM. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT SPECULATE ON THESE LINES. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR HIM TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF THE ARGENTINES ALTERING THEIR POSITION.
3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TELEPHONED ME AFTER SEEING ROS TO ASK IF I WOULD RECEIVE DE SOTO IN MY MISSION; PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK US ON WHICH HE NEEDED CLARIFICATION.
4. DE SOTO TURNED UP ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER. IT EMERGED THAT A FIVE POINT PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502...

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR TELEPHONED ME AFTER SEEING ROS TO ASK IF I WOULD RECEIVE DE SOTO IN MY MISSION: PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK US ON WHICH HE NEEDED CLARIFICATION.

4. DE SOTO TURNED UP ABOUT TWO HOURS LATER. IT EMERGED THAT A FIVE POINT PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 AND 505 (SEE NEXT PARAGRAPH) HAD BEEN PUT TO THE ARGENTINES WHO, AFTER LONG DELIBERATION AMONGST THEMSELVES, HAD AGREED TO FORWARD IT TO BUENOS AIRES. HOWEVER, ROS HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY FRESH INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: HE HAD CALLED ONLY TO HEAR OUR FINAL RESPONSE. HE HAD AGAIN SHOWN INTEREST IN THE SIXTH SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE AND HAD ASKED WHAT WE MEANT BY "THE LONGER TERM" AND "ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS".

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S FIVE POINT PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS:

(1) AT TIME T A CEASEFIRE WOULD COME INTO FORCE AND BE MONITORED BY UN OBSERVERS;

(2) AT TIME T PLUS 24 HOURS, ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502 (I.E. TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL);

(3) AT TIME T PLUS 24 HOURS, TOKEN BRITISH WITHDRAWAL WOULD BEGIN (DE SOTO THOUGHT THAT "TOKEN" MIGHT MEAN THE REMOVAL OF ONE BATTALION).

(4) (2) AND (3) ABOVE WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 'X' DAYS;

(5) NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SCR 505 (REPEAT 505).

6. I FIRST ADDRESSED ROS'S QUESTION ABOUT WHAT WE MEANT BY "THE LONGER TERM" AND "INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS". I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW WHAT PLANS YOU HAD IN MIND. HOWEVER, THINKING ALOUD AND PURELY ON A PERSONAL BASIS, I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT YOU ENVISAGED UN INVOLVEMENT IN THESE PROCESSES. MY PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT, ONCE PASSIONS HAD COOLED, THE PROBLEM WOULD BE BETTER DEALT WITH IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, NAMELY THE US AND OTHER IMPORTANT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. TO BE FRANK, HARKING BACK TO OUR PREVIOUS ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, WE REGARDED THE UN AS HAVING COME CLOSE TO "PRE-JUDGING THE OUTCOME" THROUGH ITS ENDORSEMENT OF THE NAM'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. I WAS NOT SAYING THAT THIS DEALT THE UN OUT OF THE ACT IN ALL RESPECTS, BUT IT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO REGARD IT AS AN IMPARTIAL ACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

7. WE THEN TURNED TO THE POINTS IN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PLAN.

CLOSE TO "PRE-JUDGING THE OUTCOME" THROUGH ITS ENDORSEMENT OF THE NAM'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARGENTINE CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY. I WAS NOT SAYING THAT THIS DEALT THE UN OUT OF THE ACT IN ALL RESPECTS, BUT IT MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO REGARD IT AS AN IMPARTIAL ACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

7. WE THEN TURNED TO THE POINTS IN PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S PLAN. I ASKED DE SOTO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE AGREED TO A CEASEFIRE, THE UN OBSERVERS ARRIVED, AND THE ARGENTINES THEN REFUSED TO WITHDRAW ON TRUMPETED UP ALLEGATIONS THAT WE HAD BEEN IN SOME WAY CHEATING, E.G. THAT WE HAD BEEN REINFORCING, MOVING TROOPS FORWARD BY NIGHT ETC. HE HAD NO ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION.

8. WE THEN SMOKED HIM OUT ON THE REFERENCE TO SCR 505 IN POINT (5). HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS THE ONE ATTRACTIVE POINT FOR ARGENTINE IN THE WHOLE PACKAGE, I.E. THEY COULD USE THE REFERENCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 OF SCR 505 TO ARGUE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ENVISAGED IN POINT (5) WOULD BE ABOUT AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT, UN ADMINISTRATION ETC. WE MADE QUITE CLEAR TO DE SOTO THAT THESE CONCEPTS WERE NO LONGER ON THE TABLE SO FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED.

9. WE THEN MADE THE POINT THAT THERE COULD BE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN POINTS (1) - (4) ON THE ONE HAND AND POINT (5) ON THE OTHER: IF THERE WAS, WE WOULD BE BACK WHERE WE STARTED, I.E. BOGGED DOWN IN INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. DE SOTO ACCEPTED THIS, MAKING THE GLOSS THAT THE ARGENTINES WOULD PROBABLY WANT A CEREMONIAL OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AS A FACE-SAVER AT SOME POINT DURING THE WITHDRAWAL PERIOD.

10. DE SOTO SUMMED UP PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S VIEWS AS FOLLOWS. POINTS (2) AND (4) WOULD GIVE US TOTAL ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL, WHEREAS POINT (3) (TOKEN BRITISH WITHDRAWAL) WOULD AMOUNT TO THE RESTORATION OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. HE BELIEVED THAT, IF THE ARGENTINES ACCEPTED THIS PACKAGE, THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SITUATION MENTIONED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE. HE HOPED THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO CONSIDER "THE LONGER TERM" MORE AS "THE NEAR FUTURE" THAN AS THE PROGRAMME SET OUT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HER ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON 27 MAY.

11. PLEASE SEE MIFT.

PARSONS