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OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)  
OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)  
OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)  
OO PARIS (DESKBY 040630Z)  
OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 030700Z)  
OO AMMAN (DESKBY 040700Z)  
OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)  
OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)  
OO WARSAW (DESKBY 040730Z)  
OO UKDEL NATO (DESKBY 040800Z)  
OO DUBLIN (DESKBY 040830Z)

E4 JUN 1972

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040045Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 924 OF 3 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA  
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING  
HAVANA AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TEL NO'S 913 - 917; FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

SUMMARY.

1. IN A DAY OF HECTIC NEGOTIATIONS, SPAIN AND PANAMA FAILED TO LINE UP NINE VOTES FOR THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MY TEL NO 915, IN SPITE OF PROPOSING A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR'S 502 AND 505 SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE. THE AMERICANS, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE FRENCH, MADE FRENZIED EFFORTS TO AVOID A VOTE TODAY, LEST THEY HAD TO VETO WITH US. DE PINIES (SPAIN) FINALLY AGREED (PROBABLY BECAUSE HE REALISED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE VOTES) TO POSTPONE A VOTE UNTIL 2000Z TOMORROW (4 JUNE). MEANWHILE DORR (IRELAND) PRODUCED A NOT UNHELPFUL PERSONAL DRAFT BUT THIS WAS NOT ACTIVELY DISCUSSED.

DETAIL.

FINALLY AGREED (PROBABLY BECAUSE HE REALISED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE VOTES) TO POSTPONE A VOTE UNTIL 2000Z TOMORROW (4 JUNE). MEANWHILE DORR (IRELAND) PRODUCED A NOT UNHELPFUL PERSONAL DRAFT BUT THIS WAS NOT ACTIVELY DISCUSSED.

DETAIL.

2. AS A RESULT OF THE OVERNIGHT LOBBYING (FOR WHICH I AM MOST GRATEFUL), IT WAS CLEAR AT THE START OF PLAY TODAY THAT WE HAD SIX NEGATIVE VOTES OR ABSTENTIONS (FRANCE, GUYANA, JAPAN, JORDAN, UK, US). WE NEEDED TO PERSUADE ONLY ONE OF THE AFRICANS TO ABSTAIN IN ORDER TO DENY THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT NINE VOTES.

3. AS SOON AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL GATHERED AT 1500Z, THE NON-ALIGNED WENT INTO A PRIVATE MEETING. AT THIS GUYANA PRESSED HARD, WITH SOME SUPPORT FROM JORDAN, FOR MAJOR CHANGES TO THE DRAFT IN ORDER TO MAKE THE CEASEFIRE CONDITIONAL UPON THE COMMENCEMENT OF ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. PANAMA WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE AMENDMENTS. HOWEVER IT EMERGED THAT BOTH TOGO AND ZAIRE WERE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THEY WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AS IT STOOD. THIS LED PANAMA TO PROPOSE A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WHICH WOULD HAVE ASKED THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT IMMEDIATELY SCR'S 502 AND 505 IN ALL THEIR PARTS. THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFRICANS AND PANAMA UNDERTOOK TO SELL IT TO SPAIN.

4. MEANWHILE DORR (IRELAND) HAD GIVEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL, ON A STRICTLY PERSONAL BASIS, THE DRAFT RESOLUTION IN MIFT, "AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION". DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) SHOWED IT TO ME (BUT WOULD NOT AT THAT STAGE LET ME TAKE A COPY). I SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT DO AS IT STOOD. IN PARTICULAR PARAGRAPH 4 (WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN SQUARE BRACKETED BY DORR) WOULD HAVE TO COME OUT. BUT IT HAD POSSIBILITIES. BY THE END OF THE MORNING DORR'S SHYNESS ABOUT HIS DRAFT HAD EVAPORATED AND HE MADE IT GENERALLY AVAILABLE TO MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.

5. AS A RESULT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MEETING AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION THAT TOGO HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO ABSTAIN, DE PINIES ACCEPTED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE AN AMENDMENT TO GET THE AFRICANS ON BOARD. THE COUNCIL FINALLY MET IN FORMAL SESSION AT 1730Z AND PANAMA INTRODUCED THE FOLLOWING AMENDMENT TO THE TEXT IN MY TEL NO 195; INSERTION OF A NEW OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH, BETWEEN EXISTING OPERATIVE 1 AND 3, READING:

"REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO INITIATE, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) IN THEIR ENTIRETY." (FOR EASE OF REFERENCE THE TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT IS IN MY SECOND IFT).

6. I IMMEDIATELY INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THE AMENDMENT CERTAINLY IMPROVED THE DRAFT. IT NOW CONTAINED THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, WHICH MEANT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINES FORCES. THOUGH THIS WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY

6. I IMMEDIATELY INTERVENED TO SAY THAT THE AMENDMENT CERTAINLY IMPROVED THE DRAFT. IT NOW CONTAINED THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE AND SIMULTANEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF SCR 502, WHICH MEANT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES, THOUGH THIS WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED. WE WOULD NEED TO CONSIDER THE AMENDED TEXT VERY CAREFULLY AND I WOULD NEED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS OVERNIGHT, AS THE AMENDMENT RADICALLY CHANGED THE DRAFT. DE PINIES INSISTED HOWEVER THAT THE AMENDED DRAFT SHOULD BE VOTED ON THIS AFTERNOON AND PROPOSED A TWO-HOUR SUSPENSION. AN UNEDIFYING PROCEDURAL WRANGLE FOLLOWED. JORDAN PROPOSED SUSPENSION UNTIL 2100Z. THIS WAS PUT TO A VOTE BUT LOST 5 - 0 - 10. EVERYONE ASSUMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD THEN PUT TO THE VOTE THE SPANISH PROPOSAL FOR 2-HOUR SUSPENSION. BUT INEXPLICABLY HE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL HAD DECIDED TO SUSPEND UNTIL 1730Z (IE EXACTLY WHAT SPAIN HAD PROPOSED) AND GAVELLED THE MEETING TO A CLOSE BEFORE ANYONE COULD PROTEST.

7. DURING THE LUNCH BREAK, MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD A LONG MEETING WITH DE PINIES, THE UPSHOT OF WHICH WAS THAT DE PINIES SAID THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO DEFER THE VOTE UNTIL TOMORROW (4 JUNE) IF I COULD GIVE HIM A REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT IT WAS AT LEAST CONCEIVABLE THAT YOU WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE REVISED DRAFT, PERHAPS WITH ONE OR TWO ADDITIONAL CHANGES. WHEN WE RECONVENED, LICHENSTEIN (US - MRS KIRKPATRICK HAD BY NOW LEFT) URGED ME TO GIVE THIS ASSURANCE. I TOLD DE PINIES (AND LICHENSTEIN) THAT AS I HAD ALREADY SAID THE AMENDMENT IMPROVED THE DRAFT. IT NOW PROVIDED A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION WHICH MIGHT (MIGHT) ENABLE THE COUNCIL TO ARRIVE AT A DRAFT WHICH COULD BE ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS. IF IT WAS PUT TO THE VOTE AS IT STOOD, I WOULD HAVE TO VOTE AGAINST. BUT IF MORE TIME WAS ALLOWED I COULD PUT IT TO YOU OVERNIGHT AND ASCERTAIN WHAT AMENDMENTS YOU WOULD REQUIRE. IN ALL HONESTY I HAD TO SAY THAT I EXPECTED THAT THESE AMENDMENTS WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL, INCLUDING AT LEAST A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL AND ITS COMPLETION WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, DELETION OF SOME OF THE REFERENCES TO SCR 505 AND CLEARER LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND ARGENTINE WITHDRAWAL. I COULD NOT THEREFORE GIVE DE PINIES THE ASSURANCE HE WANTED. BUT I THOUGHT THERE WAS A CHANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION AND THAT WE SHOULD TAKE IT. THIS LED TO A SERIES OF INCREASINGLY HARD TEMPERED EXCHANGES BETWEEN ME AND DE PINIES, WITH LICHENSTEIN PLAYING A GENERALLY UNHELPFUL ROLE; HE HAD CLEARLY RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM MRS KIRKPATRICK TO BEND EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT THE AMERICANS FROM HAVING TO VETO WITH US TONIGHT.

8. DE NANTEUIL (FRANCE) WAS EQUALLY DETERMINED TO AVOID A VETO. HE READ ME A LECTURE ABOUT THE UNDESIRABILITY OF A VETO COINCIDING WITH HAVANA AND VERSAILLES AND PROPOSED CERTAIN FURTHER AMENDMENTS OF HIS OWN TO THE REVISED DRAFT, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH WAS

THE RUNNING TOGETHER OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THE TEXT IN MY SECOND IFT. I TOOK WITH HIM THE SAME LINE AS I WAS TAKING WITH DE PINIES AND THE AMERICANS.

9. AT ABOUT 2130Z, DE PINIES SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF THE ARGENTINES AND THE PANAMANIAN'S ACCEPTING THE KIND OF AMENDMENTS I WAS TALKING ABOUT. HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO VOTING STRAIGHT AWAY. THIS LED TO FRENZIED EFFORTS BY THE AMERICANS TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO DISCOURAGE DE PINIES FROM PRESSING FOR A VOTE (I DREAD TO THINK WHAT PROMISES WERE MADE TO PERSUADE THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT THIS). AT THE SAME TIME IT BECAME CLEAR THAT BOTH ZAIRE, AND TOGO, IN SPITE OF THEIR POSITION IN THE MORNING, WERE INCLINED TO ABSTAIN ON THE REVISED DRAFT. SO DE PINIES STILL HAD NOT GOT HIS NINE VOTES AND AMERICAN AND FRENCH EFFORTS TO POSTPONE THE VOTE THEREFORE MET WITH SUCCESS. THE COUNCIL MET FORMALLY AND VERY BRIEFLY AT 2230Z FOR THE PRESIDENT TO ANNOUNCE THAT, FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS, ALL CONCERNED HAD AGREED TO DEFER THE MEETING UNTIL 2000Z TOMORROW (4 JUNE).

10. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN MY THIRD IFT.

PARSONS

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OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)  
OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)  
OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)  
OO PARIS (DESKBY 040630Z)  
OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 030700Z)  
OO AMMAN (DESKBY 040700Z)  
OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)  
OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)  
OO WARSAW (DESKBY 040730Z)  
OO UKDEL NATO (DESKBY 040800Z)  
OO MIPT (DESKBY 040800Z)

4 JUN 1982

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FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 040046Z JUN 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 925 DATED 3 JUNE 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, MADRID, PARIS, KAMPALA,  
KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN,  
TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING, HAVANA, UKDEL NATO

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION PRODUCED ON A  
PERSONAL BASIS TODAY (3 JUNE) BY DORR (IRELAND):

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982)

NOTING WITH APPRECIATION THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-

GENERAL (S/15151) SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 5 OF RES 052

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE REGION OF

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS

1. CALLS THE URGENT ATTENTION OF THE PARTIES TO THEIR OBLIGATION  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER, TO IMPLEMENT FULLY AND WITHOUT  
DELAY, ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF RES. 502 UNDER WHICH THE  
COUNCIL:

- (I) DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
- (II) DEMANDED AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARGENTINE FORCES  
FROM THE FALKLAND ISLANDS/ISLAS MALVINAS
- (III) CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED  
KINGDOM TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR  
DIFFERENCES AND TO RESPECT FULLY THE PURPOSES AND  
PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

(III) CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES AND TO RESPECT FULLY THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

2. TO THAT END

(I) REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARGENTINA AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM TO ORDER AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE FORCES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 1 OF RES. 502

(II) REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA IMMEDIATELY TO BEGIN WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES FROM THE ISLANDS IN COMPLIANCE PAR. 2 OF RES. 502

(III) REQUESTS BOTH GOVERNMENTS, WITHIN 10 DAYS FROM THE ADOPTION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, WITH A VIEW TO THE WORKING OUT, WITHIN ONE YEAR, OF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THEIR DIFFERENCES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR. 3 OF RES. 502

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAINTAIN THE MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES WHICH HE WAS ASKED TO UNDERTAKE UNDER THE TERMS OF PAR. 2 OF RES. 505, AND THE CONTACTS HE WAS ASKED TO MAKE UNDER PAR. 4 OF THAT SAME RESOLUTION, SO THAT HIS SERVICES MAY BE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST THE PARTIES IN THE URGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN

4. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT TO THE COUNCIL, WITHIN X HOURS, A SHORT REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING, SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN BY AGREEMENT SQUARE BRACKETS END A UN PRESENCE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE LOCAL COUNCIL, FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION REFERRED TO IN PAR. 3 OF RES. 502 AND IN PAR. 2 (III) OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. SQUARE BRACKETS END

5. REQUESTS BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN WITHIN X HOURS SQUARE BRACKETS END OR SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN AS A MATTER OF URGENCY SQUARE BRACKETS END THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION. SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN SO THAT THERE MAY BE AN IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE END OF FURTHER BLOODSHED SQUARE BRACKETS END

5. REQUESTS BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SECRETARY-  
GENERAL SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN WITHIN X HOURS SQUARE BRACKETS  
END OR SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN AS A MATTER OF URGENCY SQUARE  
BRACKETS END THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THE  
PRESENT RESOLUTION. SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN SO THAT THERE MAY BE  
AN IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE END OF FURTHER BLOODSHED SQUARE  
BRACKETS END

6. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE QUESTION SQUARE BRACKETS BEGIN  
AND TO RESUME ITS CONSIDERATION ON RECEIPT OF THE REPORTS  
FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ENVISAGED IN PARS. 4 AND 5 ABOVE  
SQUARE BRACKETS END

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- OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)
- OO PARIS (DESKBY 040630Z)
- OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 030700Z)
- OO AMMAN (DESKBY 040700Z)
- OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO WARSAW (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO UKDEL NATO (DESKBY 040800Z)
- OO DUBLIN (DESKBY 040830Z)
- OO ACCRA (DESKBY 040830Z)
- OO HAVANA (DESKBY 041230Z)
- OO PANAMA CITY (DESKBY 041300Z)
- OO GEORGETOWN (DESKBY 041300Z)

-4 JUN '82



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- DESKBY 040130Z (PEKING, TOKYO)
- DESKBY 040500Z (MOSCOW)
- DESKBY 040630Z (PARIS)
- DESKBY 040700Z (KAMPALA, AMMAN)
- DESKBY 040730Z (MADRID, KINSHASA, WARSAW)
- DESKBY 040800Z (UKDEL NATO)
- DESKBY 040830Z (DUBLIN, ACCRA)
- DESKBY 041230Z (HAVANA)
- DESKBY 041300Z (PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN)
- DESKBY 041400Z (WASHINGTON)

FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040047Z JUNE 82

TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 926 OF 3 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA  
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING  
HAVANA AND UKDEL NATO.



TO PERSON FCC

TELEGRAM NUMBER 926 OF 3 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA  
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING  
HAYANA AND UKDEL NATO.

MY TWO IPTS: FALKLANDS; SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED TEXT OF THE PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT  
RESOLUTION (S/15156/REV.1):

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) AND THE NEED  
FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PARTS THEREOF,

1. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE TO CEASE FIRE IMMEDIATELY  
IN THE REGION OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS);
2. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO INITIATE, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-  
FIRE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTIONS 502 (1982) AND 505 (1982) IN  
THEIR ENTIRETY;
3. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY  
DEEM NECESSARY TO VERIFY THE CEASE-FIRE;
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
ON COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION WITHIN 72 HOURS.

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-4 JUN 1982

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OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)  
OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)  
OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z),  
DESKBY 041400Z (WASHINGTON),  
FROM UKMIS NEW YORK 040048Z JUN 82  
TO FLASH F C O  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 927 DATED 3 JUNE 82

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN, MADRID, PARIS, KAMPALA,  
KINSHASA, ACCRA, PANAMA CITY, GEORGETOWN, WARSAW, AMMAN,  
TOKYO, MOSCOW, PEKING, HAVANA, UKDEL NATO

MIPT: FALKLANDS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. IN SOME WAYS I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HAVE VOTED TODAY  
ON THE SPANISH DRAFT WITH ITS FIRST AMENDMENT. DE PINIES' MODUS  
OPERANDI AND OBVIOUS RELISH AT THE PROSPECT OF EXTRACTING WESTERN  
VEToes HAD UPSET MANY MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL AND I DOUBT  
WHETHER HE WOULD HAVE GOT NINE VOTES.

2. HOWEVER, DE PINIES HIMSELF REALISED THIS AND IT BECAME CLEAR  
TO ME THAT HIS THREATS TO CALL AN IMMEDIATE VOTE WERE BLUSTER.  
MOREOVER, THE AMERICANS TIED THEMSELVES IN KNOTS IN  
ORDER TO GET ANOTHER TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. THEY WERE BUSY THROUGHOUT  
THE CHAMBER BEGGING AND PLEADING WITH THE ARGENTINES, PANAMANIAN,  
SPANISH AND OTHER LATIN AMERICANS TO GET A POSTPONEMENT. THEY

HOWEVER, DE PINIES HIMSELF REALISED THIS AND IT BECAME CLEAR TO ME THAT HIS THREATS TO CALL AN IMMEDIATE VOTE WERE BLUSTER. MOREOVER, THE AMERICANS TIED THEMSELVES IN KNOTS IN ORDER TO GET ANOTHER TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. THEY WERE BUSY THROUGHOUT THE CHAMBER BEGGING AND PLEADING WITH THE ARGENTINES, PANAMANIAN, SPANISH AND OTHER LATIN AMERICANS TO GET A POSTPONEMENT. THEY EXPRESSED NAIVE PLEASURE WHEN DE PINIES GRACEFULLY GAVE IN: THEY DID NOT SEEM TO REALISE THAT THE TRUE REASON FOR HIS ACCOMMODATING ATTITUDE.

3. MRS KIRKPATRICK AND HER STAFF (OBVIOUSLY DESPERATELY ANXIOUS TO AVOID HAVING TO VETO) CONTINUED TO ASSURE ME THAT THE ARGENTINES ONLY WANT A RESPECTABLE FIG-LEAF IN ORDER TO WITHDRAW. THEY TALK ABOUT THEIR CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE ARGENTINE MILITARY, AND SECRET CHANNELS DIRECT TO THE JUNTA IN BUENOS AIRES. I HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN ONE SHRED OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTION. IF THE ARGENTINES REALLY WANTED A FIG-LEAF AND GENUINELY INTENDED TO WITHDRAW, THEY WOULD HAVE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN SENDING US A SIGNAL EITHER THROUGH THE AMERICANS OR THROUGH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OR EVEN BETWEEN THE COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD. NOTHING OF THIS KIND HAD EMERGED AND WE WERE OBLIGED TO CONCLUDE THAT THEIR APPARENT SHOW OF FLEXIBILITY OVER THE SPANISH DRAFT WAS YET ANOTHER DEVICE DESIGNED TO DRAW US INTO INTERMINABLE NEGOTIATIONS WHILE THEY STAYED ON THE ISLANDS FOR AS LONG AS THEY COULD. ROS, IN TALKING TO THE SPANIARDS, MADE NO BONES ABOUT THE FACT THAT HIS INSISTENCE ON RETAINING THE REFERENCE TO SCR 505 IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE DRAFT IN MY I.P.T. WAS IN ORDER TO RESUSCITATE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ENDED ON 21 MAY - INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS AND ALL THAT.

4. THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN SHOWING THE SAME DESPERATION AS THE AMERICANS TO BUY TIME IN ORDER TO FIND LANGUAGE ACCEPTABLE TO THE CO-SPONSORS AND ARGENTINA, WHICH THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO VETO.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT IS GOOD THAT WE HAVE GAINED ANOTHER TWENTY FOUR HOURS (FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE FALKLANDS-PASSAGE IN THE NAM COMMUNIQUE IN HAVANA), BUT WE MAY FIND THAT THIS HAS BEEN AT THE COST OF SERIOUS ISOLATION. IF THE SPANISH DRAFT WITH ALL THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED WAS PUT TO THE VOTE, IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY GET MORE THAN NINE VOTES; AND A MAJOR EFFORT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS (PERHAPS IN VERSAILLES) TO PREVENT THEM FROM RATTING ON US AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF ABSTENTION.

6. I BELIEVE THAT OUR BEST TACTIC IS FIRMLY TO PUT FORWARD

AND A MAJOR EFFORT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS (PERHAPS IN VERSAILLES) TO PREVENT THEM FROM RATTING ON US AT LEAST TO THE POINT OF ABSTENTION.

6. I BELIEVE THAT OUR BEST TACTIC IS FIRMLY TO PUT FORWARD ALL THE AMENDMENTS WE NEED TO MAKE THE LATEST DRAFT ACCEPTABLE TO US, AS RECOMMENDED IN MIFT. SPAIN, PANAMA AND THEIR ARGENTINE FRIENDS WILL EXPLODE, AND MAY INSIST ON AN IMMEDIATE VOTE ON A TEXT DESIGNED TO LEAVE US IN MAXIMUM ISOLATION. IF THEY SUCCEED, WE WILL HAVE TO FACE IT AS SOMETHING WE ALWAYS ANTICIPATED, IN THE NOT UNSATISFACTORY KNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAVE NOW HELD OUT FOR OVER SIXTY DAYS.

7. BUT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE THAT THE DO-GOODERS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WHO ARE GENUINELY SYMPATHETIC TO US WILL TAKE UP OUR AMENDMENTS, PUT A BRAKE ON DE PINIES AND CO, THUS STARTING A GENUINE NEGOTIATION WHICH COULD GO ON INTO THE WEEKEND.

8. I HAVE MADE BRUTALLY CLEAR TO DE PINIES AND MANY OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT, IF THE SPANISH INTENTION, AS CLAIMED IN DE PINIES' STATEMENTS, IS TO SAVE FURTHER BLOODSHED, HE WILL ONLY ACHIEVE THIS BY GETTING A RESOLUTION ADOPTED, NOT BY GETTING VETOES. THIS HAS HAD SOME EFFECT.

PARSONS

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- OO PEKING (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO TOKYO (DESKBY 040130Z)
- OO MOSCOW (DESKBY 040500Z)
- OO PARIS (DESKBY 040630Z)
- OO KAMPALA (DESKBY 030700Z)
- OO AMMAN (DESKBY 040700Z)
- OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO KINSHASA (DESKBY 040730Z)
- OO MADRID (DESKBY 040730Z)

-4 JUN 1982



FM UKMIS NEW YORK 040049Z JUNE 82  
TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 928 OF 3 JUNE

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, DUBLIN MADRID PARIS KAMPALA KINSHASA  
ACCRA PANAMA CITY GEORGETOWN WARSAW AMMAN TOKYO MOSCOW PEKING  
HAVANA AND UKDEL NATO.

MIPT: FALKLANDS: SECURITY COUNCIL.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED PANAMANIAN/  
SPANISH DRAFT WHICH I RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD PUT FORWARD TOMORROW  
(4 JUNE):

- (1) REPLACE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 WITH THE FOLLOWING:  
"1. REQUESTS THE PARTIES TO CEASE FIRING IN THE REGION OF THE  
FALKLAND ISLANDS (ISLAS MALVINAS) AS SOON AS A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE  
TIME HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW  
AND TO INITIATE, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASEFIRE, THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 14 DAYS".
- (2) REPLACE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 WITH THE FOLLOWING:  
"2. AUTHORISES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY  
DEEM NECESSARY AND ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES TO VERIFY THE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION".

PARAGRAPH AT THE END IS FOLLOWS.

IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 502 (1982) IN ITS ENTIRETY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 14 DAYS''.

(2) REPLACE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3 WITH THE FOLLOWING:

''2. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO USE SUCH MEANS AS HE MAY DEEM NECESSARY AND ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES TO VERIFY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION''.

(3) INSERT A NEW PARAGRAPH AT THE END, AS FOLLOWS:

''4. REQUESTS BOTH PARTIES TO COMMUNICATE IN WRITING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL WITHIN 72 HOURS THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE TERMS OF THIS RESOLUTION AND TO SPECIFY A TIME FOR THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES.''

FOOTNOTE: OPERATIVE 4 OF S/15156/REV.1 WOULD BECOME OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3.

2. THESE AMENDMENTS TAKEN TOGETHER ESTABLISH A FIRM LINK BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARGENTINE FORCES AND PROVIDE A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE LATTER. THERE IS NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE DETAILS BEING WORKED OUT BY THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT BUT I ENVISAGE THAT, IN THE VERY UNLIKELY EVENT OF OUR AMENDMENTS BEING ACCEPTED AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN THESE TERMS, OUR LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL UNDER OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4 WOULD SPECIFY THAT THE TIME FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. THE AMENDMENTS ALSO ELIMINATE ANY REFERENCE IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS TO SCR 505. BUT I THINK THAT, HAVING VOTED FOR IT SO RECENTLY, WE CANNOT AVOID THE PREAMBULAR REAFFIRMATION OF IT. I REALISE THAT YOU WILL NOT LIKE THE ROLE ASSIGNED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN OUR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2. BUT WE WOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE REQUIREMENT THAT ANY MEANS HE USES MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PARTIES; AND FOR US TO EXCLUDE THE SECRETARY GENERAL ALTOGETHER WOULD LAY US OPEN TO THE CHARGE HERE THAT WE HAD NEVER SERIOUSLY INTENDED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF THE REVISED PANAMANIAN/SPANISH DRAFT AND THAT WE HAD ONLY BEEN PLAYING CYNICALLY FOR TIME TODAY.

PARSONS

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