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Taken from Foreign Policy  
PM's Visit to Greece - *Tyrolaris*  
Aug 80.

RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE LEADER OF  
THE GREEK OPPOSITION AT THE MAXIMOS RESIDENCE IN ATHENS ON TUESDAY  
23 SEPTEMBER 1980 AT 1200

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Present: Prime Minister Mr. Papandreou  
Mr. I.J.M. Sutherland Mr. A. Papadopoulos  
Mr. M.O'D.B. Alexander Mr. Haralambopoulos  
Mr. T.L.A. Daunt

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After discussion of the Prime Minister's initial impressions of Greece, Mr. Papandreou said that he was much perturbed by the military coup in Turkey. The policies of the new regime would emerge gradually but his own feeling was that the outlook for relations between Greece and Turkey was even more sombre than in recent months. He was interested to find that President Karamanlis agreed with his assessment, even though Mr. Rallis' Government did not. In any case, the establishment of another dictatorship in the area was something to be deplored. The effect on confidence in a number of countries, including Greece, would be adverse; military opinion too might be influenced.

The Prime Minister said that she remained much concerned by the general instability in countries to the east of Turkey and more widely in the world. In these circumstances the cohesion of the European Community and of NATO was essential. The overriding need was to reinforce areas of stability. Mr. Papandreou might not agree but the Prime Minister saw the question of Greek reintegration into NATO in that context: it was in the interests both of Greece and of western democracy.

Mr. Papandreou said that he much welcomed the frankness with which the Prime Minister had put her views. His party was not against the closest contacts with western countries but its views were coloured by the unhappy history of Greek participation in NATO. The seven years of dictatorship had resulted from what was to all intents and purposes a NATO plan. Plan Prometheus, ostensibly drawn up to cope with fifth column activity in the event of war, had been used to carry out and support a coup against the legitimate

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Government of Greece. Its purport had been concealed from the then Greek Prime Minister. And NATO had been associated with events in Cyprus in 1974. There was evidence that the coup against President Makarios and the two phases of the Turkish invasion had been co-ordinated in NATO. The Prime Minister interrupted to ask whether Mr. Papandreou was suggesting that the United Kingdom was implicated in the coup against Archbishop Makarios. Mr. Papandreou said that he was not suggesting that the United Kingdom had had any direct involvement. But it was clear that Messrs. Kissinger and Sisco were deeply implicated. Against this general background NATO obviously did not mean the same to Greeks as it did to the British. Moreover, Greece had been a member of the NATO military structure from 1952 until she came close to war with Turkey in 1974. At that juncture it became evident that the Greek armed forces were equipped and trained only for short-term action against overwhelming odds in the event of war between the super powers. Since 1974, Greece had achieved a well integrated national military force with a national defence plan and a capability for local warfare. The Prime Minister said that the two roles were not mutually exclusive. She instanced the possible uses of Britain's nuclear deterrent which, in normal circumstances, was assigned to NATO. She regarded Mr. Papandreou's approach as misguided. NATO provided the only credible defence against Soviet military domination.

Mr. Papandreou, answering a question, agreed that recent events in Poland were deeply significant. The fundamental question was whether the Party was to be the sole source of political power. If an alternative source was tolerated, the whole basis on which the communist state was organised would be undermined. In the Polish case, however, any attempt to reverse the process now in train would result in major bloodshed. Mr. Papandreou expected Hungary to be the first communist country to emulate the Polish example; he regarded Czechoslovakia as too subdued following the events of 1968. The Prime Minister said that she agreed generally with Mr. Papandreou's analysis. She wondered about the implications for the Soviet Union itself. Mr. Papandreou said that he thought that the Soviet Union would be immune for some time. The process would be a very long one, even if a major effort was not made to arrest it. He agreed with the Prime Minister that the movement for greater freedom in Poland came from a combination of intellectuals

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
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and workers, and that there was in addition a religious dimension. It was this amalgam which gave the movement its strength.

Reverting to the question of NATO, Mr. Papandreou said that he did not regard the Alliance as giving Greece any guarantee of support in the event of aggression. Were Bulgaria, for example, to attack Greece, there was no guarantee that NATO would come to her assistance. The Treaty provided only for consultation. His view was that, if it was really true that Greece was important to the west, the west would come to Greece's defence whether or not Greece was a member of NATO. He wished to develop very close relations with the West but did not wish these to be on lines followed hitherto. With regard to the European Community, he favoured a relationship similar to that enjoyed by Yugoslavia. Indicating that she did not agree, the Prime Minister said that she thought that Mr. Papandreou misrepresented the commitment which the NATO allies undertook towards each other. It was the clear assumption that an attack on one was to be regarded as an attack on all.

The discussion ended at 1230.



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