

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

DOE 11TH MEETING/82

Copy No .67 of 78 copies

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

DEFENCE OPERATIONS EXECUTIVE

MINUTES of a Meeting held in
Room 5301, Ministry of Defence,
Main Building, Whitehall, on
SATURDAY 5 JUNE 1982 at 10.00 am

OPERATION CORPORATEITEM 1. INTELLIGENCE

1. DS(Int) reviewed the intelligence published in the intelligence summary (1), and assessed Argentine dispositions and intentions.

ITEM 2. OWN FORCES

2. D of D(Ops) outlined the deployment and planned operations of the Task Force.

3. The FCO intended to summon the Brazilian Ambassador that day to protest strongly about the Brazilian failure to release the Vulcan aircraft, which contrasted with their allowing regular arms supplies to be flown to Argentina via Recife. News about the latter had now appeared in the foreign press.

4. Following the transfer of mail from the QUEEN ELIZABETH 2 at Ascension Island, the Naval Department now intended to inform relatives (2) of survivors on board on 6 June of their impending return, and the same day to inform Cunard of the ship's return. The Chairman invited the News Release Group to advance their action accordingly.

5. The Committee noted that MV NORLAND was now due to leave San Carlos Water on 6 June (3) carrying prisoners of war. Argentina had not yet acknowledged the notification given to her, nor had diplomatic clearance been received from Uruguay.

Note:

1. INTSUM No 124,050600Z June 1982.
2. COS 68th Meeting/82, Item 2.
3. COS 68th Meeting/82, Item 5.

Page 1 of 4 pages

COS S30(8)

SECRET

ALQ 050/1		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY		
DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

DOE 11th Meeting/82
5 June 1982ITEM 3. PUBLIC RELATIONS

6. CPR reported on press coverage.

7. The Executive then discussed a minute (4) which CPR had circulated following the Chiefs of Staff discussion (5) about the need to provide press facilities for foreign correspondents in the South Atlantic. It was known that some of the world's press had already made private arrangements to charter boats and aircraft, and it was essential that proper control arrangements were set up. It would be important to select carefully those to whom facilities would be offered, and to make it clear that no facilities at all would be offered to journalists arriving unofficially. The Task Force could give only limited assistance in communications, food, accommodation, transport, fuel, servicing and maintenance; furthermore there would be limited parking space for aircraft, and Task Force operations must not be impeded. Nevertheless it was inevitable that the Services would be closely involved in whatever arrangements were set up. It was therefore essential that the Service Departments and the Task Force Commander should be consulted in the preparation of plans.

8. Summing up, the Chairman invited the Service Departments and Central Staffs to forward their views on the provision of press facilities to CPR that day for inclusion in his paper, and invited D of D Ops to obtain the views of the Task Force Commander. He also invited DS 11 to ensure that military views were made known to the FCO in the drafting of the paper for OD(SA). Finally he invited CPR to report about the subject to the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on Monday 7 June 1982.

ITEM 4. BAHIA PARAISO

9. The Executive were informed that the Argentines had ordered the BAHIA PARAISO, having taken Argentine casualties off the SS UGANDA, to pick up casualties from Fox Bay and Port Howard. The Task Force Commander had instructed that her route should be to the East of East Falkland and to enter Falkland Sound from the South. It was intended to transfer to her a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from HMS HECLA on about 6 June when that ship reached the TEZ. The Executive

Notes:

4. D/DPR/14/26 dated 3 June 1982.
5. COS 66th Meeting/82, Item 3.

DOE 11th Meeting/82
5 June 1982

noted that if the BAHIA PARAISO attempted to transit the Northern end of Falkland Sound, or to make coded transmissions, the Task Force Commander could exercise his right under the Geneva Convention to put a representative on board, until the ICRC representative arrived; the FCO should also be invited in that event to make a strong diplomatic protest.

DOE 11th Meeting/82
5 June 1982

Those attending the meeting:

ACNS (OP)	Chairman
DNOT	(Representing ACNS (O))
MO2	(Representing DMO)
D of Ops (S)(RAF)	(Representing ACAS (Ops))
D of D (Ops)	(Representing ACDS (Ops))
<hr/>	
Col Ops/Plans CGRM	(Representing COS CGRM)
DORS 1 (Air)	(Representing D of DORS)
AD of DP(C)	(Representing ACDS (Pol))
DS Int	
ACDS (S)	
SCPL 7	(Representing ACDS (P&L))
DS 11	(Representing AUS (D Staff))
CPR	
D Ops (ROW)	
DDOMS	
FCO (Def Dept)	(Mr Gillmore)
A Sec 4 COSSEC	(Secretary)

Also present:

DS 5
 DS 8
 PS/S of S
 MA/CDS