

**IMMEDIATE**

PS  
PS/LPS  
PS/MR BLAKER  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/MR HURD  
PS/PUS  
SIR D MAITLAND  
SIR A ACLAND  
~~MR CORTAZZI~~  
MR FERGUSSON  
MR MURRAY  
MR BULLARD

NO 10 DOWNING ST

ASSESSMENT STAFF  
CABINET OFFICE

*Afghanistan*

MR P H MOBERLY  
MR AUST (LEGAL ADVISER)  
HD/FED  
HD/PUSD (2)  
HD/UND  
HD/SEAD  
HD/SAD (4)  
HD/EESD  
HD/N AM D  
HD/DEF DEPT  
HD/MED  
HD/NENAD  
HD/NEWS DEPT  
RC

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CONFIDENTIAL

FM ANKARA 261400Z JUNE 80

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 297 OF 26 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY UKDEL NATO WASHINGTON BONN PARIS BRUSSELS HAGUE

ROUTINE ROME LISBON ATHENS COPENHAGEN OSLO OTTAWA MOSCOW

SAVING TO LUXEMBOURG REYKJAVIK UKMIS NEW YORK PRAGUE EAST BERLIN

WARSAW BUDAPEST SOFIA BUCHAREST BLGRADE STOCKHOLM VIENNA

HELSINKI UKDEL VIENNA..

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING .

MIPT : EAST/WEST RELATIONS: AFGHANISTAN

1. IN HIS INTERVENTION IN THE RESTRICTED SESSION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE SPOKE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS, ARMS CONTROL AND CSCE/CDE.
2. THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY OUTLOOK WAS SUCH THAT THE EVENTS OF THE PAST SIX MONTHS WERE PROBABLY ONLY A FORETASTE OF A DIFFICULT TIME AHEAD FOR THE ALLIANCE. DESPITE NATURAL DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH, REFLECTING DIFFERING INTERESTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL EXIGENCIES, THE ALLIANCE'S UNDERLYING UNITY WAS AS STRONG



DIFFERENCE OF APPROACH, REFLECTING DIFFERING INTERESTS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL EXIGENCIES, THE ALLIANCE'S UNDERLYING UNITY WAS AS STRONG AS EVER. THE WEST SHOULD MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT MUST SHOW ITS CONTINUING RESERVE AND MINIMISE OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET WEDGEDRIVING. THE THREE PERCENT GOAL AND T N F D DECISIONS WERE FIXED POINTS IN THE ALLIANCE RESPONSE.

HE AGREED WITH FIRSDON THAT THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON T N F UNLESS THE ALLIANCE PERSEVERED WITH ITS MODERNIZATION PLANS. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE VIEWS IN THE STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL PUT OUT AT VENICE HAD EXPRESSED THE FEELINGS OF OTHER ALLIES.

3. COPING WITH THE SOVIET THREAT IN THE THIRD WORLD WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE MANAGEMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. WHILE NATO BOUNDARIES COULD NOT BE EXTENDED, THE WEST MUST RECOGNISE THAT ITS COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS WERE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY EVENTS BEYOND EUROPE. IMPROVING THE NORTH/SOUTH ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WAS ONE WAY TO REDUCE THE SCOPE FOR SOVIET MEDDLING. THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER THEY WERE DOING ENOUGH TO REINFORCE STABILITY OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA, WHETHER BY MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE OR BY MAINTAINING A CAPABILITY FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CASE OF NEED. WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS RESOURCES, THE U K WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD.

#### ARMS CONTROL

4. ARMS CONTROL SHOULD NOT BE SEEN EITHER AS A FAILURE OR PRIMARILY AS A MEANS TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. IT HAD TO BE BASED ON THE RECOGNITION OF AREAS WHERE MUTUAL RESTRAINT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH EAST AND WEST. THIS LED TO THREE CONCLUSIONS. FIRST, ARMS CONTROL WAS NOT DEAD: THE SEARCH FOR AREAS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT MUST GO ON. SECOND, THE ALLIANCE'S POLICIES MUST BE GUIDED MAINLY BY A HARD-HEADED ASSESSMENT OF ITS SECURITY INTERESTS. THIRD, WESTERN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD FOSTER MORE REALISTIC, IF LIMITED, PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL. DIFFERENCES IN THIS VITAL AREA WOULD BE RUTHLESSLY EXPLOITED BY THE EAST, WHILE GREATER REALISM ABOUT ARMS CONTROL IN THE WEST AND A MORE DELIBERATE EFFORT TO EXPOSE SOVIET PROPOSALS AS PROPAGANDA COULD INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE EAST TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. ARMS CONTROL WAS MUCH MORE ABOUT SECURITY THAN ABOUT DETENTE.

#### CSCE/CDE

5. WESTERN SOLIDARITY WOULD BE ESSENTIAL AT MADRID IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT TO HAVE A FIELD DAY FOR WEDGEDRIVING. EASTERN PROPOSALS WOULD BE TIGHTLY CO-ORDINATED BY THE SOVIET UNION. WESTERN INTERESTS LAY IN THE PURSUIT OF GENUINE DETENTE. THIS REQUIRED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. BUT THE



UNION. WESTERN INTERESTS LAY IN THE PURSUIT OF GENUINE DETENTE. THIS REQUIRED A THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION. BUT THE WEST SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD DO BUSINESS ON A REALISTIC BASIS PROVIDED THAT THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOUR WERE RESPECTED.

6. ON THE FRENCH CDE PROPOSALS, THE WEST HAD AN INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING CBMS WHICH GENUINELY CONTRIBUTED TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND WOULD APPLY TO ALL OF EUROPE. PROGRESS IN THE VARIOUS BASKETS SHOULD BE KEPT IN BALANCE, BUT THE WEST HAD REAL INTERESTS TO PURSUE IN THE MILITARY FIELD AND MUST PRESS AHEAD WITH WORKING OUT AN AGREED POLICY IN TIME FOR MADRID.

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FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO LUXEMBOURG REYKJAVIK UKMIS NEW YORK PRAGUE EAST BERLIN WARSAW BUDAPEST SOFIA BUCHAREST BELGRADE STOCKHOLM VIENNA HELSINKI UKDEL VIENNA .

LAURANCE

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