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*File Thatcher Visit  
(with cover to Brax)*

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BACKGROUND -- GENERAL

BOTH U.S. AND SOVIET UNION (WITH THEIR ALLIES) HAVE PUBLICLY EMPHASIZED COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

- NATO'S HIGH-LEVEL CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TASK FORCE (CTF), ESTABLISHED AT MAY 30 MINISTERIAL IN HALIFAX TO GIVE CONTENT TO THIS PLEDGE AND COORDINATE ALLIANCE POLICY, NOW FOCUSING ON CRUX OF ITS STUDY. TOUGH DRAFTING SESSIONS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY AT NATO TO FINALIZE LANGUAGE FOR INTERIM REPORT DUE TO NAC AT END OF MONTH.

HAVING EMBRACED WESTERN CONCEPT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, EAST CONTINUES TO PROMOTE ITS JUNE 11 "BUDAPEST APPEAL" FOR SIGNIFICANT CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS.

"APPEAL" ATTEMPTS TO RECONFIGURE THE TERMS AND STRUCTURE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE TO SUIT SOVIET DESIGNS.

- MEANWHILE, SOVIETS WANT TO ABANDON MBFR, IF POSSIBLE BY CONCLUDING A PATENTLY UNACCEPTABLE TOKEN AGREEMENT THERE AND MOVING REDUCTIONS TALKS TO NEXT CDE PHASE.

AS THE DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE MANDATED BY MINISTERS AT HALIFAX HAVE PROCEEDED, THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE ALSO HAS BEEN UNDER INTENSIVE REVIEW WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL PREPARED AN OPTIONS PAPER FOR NSC CONSIDERATION.

- ON OCTOBER 4, THE WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATED TO THE IG ITS DECISION ON FORUM FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS.

- SINCE THAT TIME, NUMEROUS BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONTACTS HAVE BEEN USED TO CONVEY THE US DECISION AND SUPPORTING RATIONALE.

BACKGROUND -- THE FRENCH CONNECTION

- HALIFAX MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL TASK FORCE (CTF) BASED ON FRENCH INITIATIVE; UK, OTHERS CAME ON BOARD AND HELPED SHAPE IDEA DURING SPRING NAC MINISTERIAL

- CTF SPIRITUAL DESCENDENT OF GISCARD'S 1978 INITIATIVE FOR "ATLANTIC TO THE URALS" CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

- GISCARD'S IDEA LATER BECAME CDE; IRONICALLY, U.S. ARGUMENTS THEN WON OUT OVER FRENCH PREFERENCE FOR CDE TO BE INDEPENDENT FORUM, APART FROM THE CSCE PROCESS. WE WANTED TO TIE SECURITY ISSUES OF CDE INTO BROADER CSCE FRAMEWORK THAT INCLUDED HUMAN RIGHTS.

PERSONALITIES ALSO INVOLVED. WORKING LEVEL ARCHITECT OF ORIGINAL GISCARD INITIATIVE.

[REDACTED]

FRENCH WANT TO USE CTF TO ENHANCE FRENCH POLITICAL STATURE AND FRENCH EQUALITY WITH THE SUPERPOWERS, AND TO JOIN EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IN A WAY THAT LESSENS U.S. INFLUENCE INHERENT IN ANY NATO OPERATION.

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NLS F97-013/2 #117

By LOI, NARA, Date 4/16/00

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- FRENCH SEE FEW DANGERS FROM A DISARMAMENT PHASE OF CDE. WANT THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A SOP TO ANXIOUS EUROPEAN PUBLICS, BUT DON'T WANT ANY AGREEMENT THAT WOULD LIMIT FRENCH, OR INDEED OTHER WESTERN MILITARY CAPABILITIES. BELIEVE INEFFICIENCIES OF CSCE AND COMPLEXITIES OF NEGOTIATING AT 35 WILL GUARANTEE THAT RESULT.

- WE BELIEVE THIS POINT OPEN TO QUESTION. OUR EXPERIENCE POST-MADRID IS THAT THE DESIRE FOR RESULTS AS NEGOTIATING DEADLINES NEAR BECOMES SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.

- FRENCH WILLING TO MAKE REDUCTIONS "TABLE" OF A CDE II EFFECTIVELY ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE AND TO TIGHTEN NATO COORDINATION RELATIVE TO STOCKHOLM CDE. FRENCH ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT NAC "GUIDANCE" BUT RESIST ACCEPTING NAC "INSTRUCTIONS."

- SO FAR, CDE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT INVOLVED OUR FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY INTERESTS' WITH FORCE REDUCTIONS ON THE TABLE THAT WOULD NO LONGER BE THE CASE.

WE BELIEVE THE FRENCH WANT TO SEE THE HALIFAX INITIATIVE SUCCEED, BUT WILL BE TOUGH ON THE POINT OF NATO INSTRUCTIONS. IF A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION IS TO BE FOUND, IT WILL HAVE TO BE AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL IN PARIS.

POINTS TO MAKE

INTRODUCTION

AS YOU KNOW, IN CONNECTION WITH THE ONGOING HALIFAX STUDY THE USG HAS JUST COMPLETED AN INTERNAL REVIEW OF THE FUTURE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE.

THAT REVIEW HAS AFFIRMED THE VALIDITY OF THE OBJECTIVE SET FORTH BY THE ALLIANCE AT HALIFAX: THE STRENGTHENING OF STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, THROUGH INCREASED OPENNESS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE, AND STABLE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT LOWER LEVELS.

- THE U.S. WILL WORK DILIGENTLY WITH THE REST OF THE ALLIANCE TO COMPLETE THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL TASK FORCE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

WE BELIEVE IT IS IN THE ALLIED INTEREST TO ENGAGE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME IN A NEGOTIATION DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY IMBALANCE WHICH RESULTS FROM WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY. THIS IMBALANCE IS MOST ACUTE IN THE VITAL CENTRAL REGION.

WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET DESIRE TO ESCAPE FROM MBFR COULD PROVIDE US LEVERAGE ON THE FORUM QUESTION.

THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

- IT IS THE U.S. POSITION THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL CAN BE REACHED IF THERE IS UNITY ON THE FOLLOWING KEY PRINCIPLES.

- FIRST, ANY CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH INCLUDE, AS A PART OF THEIR MANDATE, POTENTIAL REDUCTIONS OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ON AN ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE BASIS.

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- SECOND, IN SUCH TALKS, THE WESTERN NEGOTIATORS OR NEGOTIATING GROUP SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED THROUGHOUT BY NATO, ON THE BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS AGREED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

- THE RESULT OF THE TASK FORCE STUDY SHOULD BE A CALL FOR PREPARATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT ON A MANDATE FOR DISCUSSIONS OF SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS.

- THE ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT DEVELOPING A NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL MANDATE TO DISCUSS REDUCTIONS, AS WELL AS THE SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, SHOULD BE CONDUCTED OUTSIDE OF AND SEPARATE FROM THE CSCE.

- THE U.S. WILL NOT SUPPORT A FORCE REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATION WITHIN A CDE MANDATE, EVEN WITHIN A DISTINCT NEGOTIATION CONDUCTED ON AN ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE BASIS.

AT THIS TIME, THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A SATISFACTORY MANDATE FOR NEW CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN AGREED.

CONSIDERATIONS

COLLECTIVE SECURITY

" OUR ABILITY TO PROCEED TOWARD YOUR VISION OF AN ATLANTIC-TO-THEURALS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION IS DEPENDENT UPON PROTECTING U.S. AND NATO SECURITY INTERESTS.

- IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIANCE, WHICH IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY, ACT COLLECTIVELY AND WITH ONE VOICE IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT.

THE DECISION WE AS AN ALLIANCE MAKE ABOUT HOW WE CHOOSE TO CONDUCT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROBABLY DETERMINE OUR COURSE FOR MANY YEARS TO COME. THIS IS WHY WE SO CAREFULLY CONSIDERED OUR OPTIONS BEFORE REACHING OUR OWN CONCLUSIONS.

- WE VERY MUCH WANT TO HAVE FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WE FORESEE THAT IS WHY WE DID NOT SUGGEST AN EXPANDED MBFR.

WHY NOT CSCE

- IT IS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT THE CSCE FORUM CANNOT SAFEGUARD OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

- IF PLACED IN CSCE/CDE, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD VERY LIKELY BE SUBJECT TO THE FREQUENTLY UNHELPFUL TIME PRESSURES CREATED BY DEADLINES. THE DELICATE NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS OF ALLIANCE FORCES SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SUCH PRESSURES.

- WE SEE NOTHING TO GAIN FROM SUBJECTING THE FORCES OF NEUTRAL STATES TO POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS

- WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN ALLIANCE-TO-ALLIANCE FORMAT, EVEN IF CREATED INITIALLY IN CSCE/CDE, COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IN THAT FORUM OVER TIME. PRESSURES WOULD

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GRADUALLY BUILD TO INCLUDE THE NNA. THEY WOULD ARGUE, WITH CONVICTION, THAT THEIR SECURITY IS INTIMATELY BOUND UP IN THE LEVEL OF EAST WEST ARMAMENT AND DEGREE OF CONFRONTATION. CSCE TRADITION WOULD LEND CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR INCLUSION.

IN EVERY CSCE NEGOTIATION THE DESIRE OF THE NNA TO BE BROKERS OF COMPROMISE HAS WEIGHED HEAVILY. IN A REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATION, THERE WOULD BE TOO MUCH AT STAKE TO CREATE A FRAMEWORK WHICH ENCOURAGES THIS ACTIVITY.

OTHER SOURCES OF DRIFT

- THE NNA ARE NOT THE ONLY POTENTIAL SOURCE OF UNHELPFUL, EVEN DANGEROUS, INPUT TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS NEGOTIATIONS.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ALLIANCE INTERESTS, A MORE FAVORABLE CONSTELLATION OF GOVERNMENTS THAN WE HAVE IN WESTERN EUROPE TODAY COULD HARDLY BE IMAGINED. THIS WILL NOT ALWAYS BE THE CASE; POLITICAL CHANGES AMONG NATO MEMBER NATIONS' ESPECIALLY THOSE CENTRAL TO THE NATO EFFORT, COULD HAVE FARREACHING IMPLICATIONS, INCLUDING FOR SENSITIVE SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS.

" RECOGNIZE THAT FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS RELATIVELY FREE OF THIS RISK. NEVERTHELESS, OTHER ALLIES AND THEIR PUBLICS ARE VULNERABLE TO THE SIREN SONG OF THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE.

- AN SPD GOVERNMENT IN BONN MIGHT FEEL CONSTRAINED IN A NEGOTIATION AT 35 TO PUSH ITS IDEAS ON "DEFENSIVE DEFENSE." OTHER SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENTS IN NORTHERN EUROPE MIGHT BE PRONE TO SIMILAR TENDENCIES'

- AS LEADERS OF TODAY, WE MUST HAVE THE FORESIGHT TO SAFEGUARD THE ALLIANCE INTO THE FUTURE'

INSTRUCTIONS FROM NATO

- FRANCE AND THE U.S. SHARE A COMMON OBJECTIVE IN KEEPING THE ALLIANCE FOCUSED ON THE THREAT FROM THE EAST. WE BELIEVE THAT OUR INTEREST IS BEST SERVED BY ENSURING THAT DELEGATIONS AT EXPANDED CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS ARE INSTRUCTED, NOT JUST GUIDED, BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

WE BELIEVE YOU MAY OVERESTIMATE OF FRANCE'S ABILITY TO CONTROL THE COURSE OF FUTURE CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL TALKS IN CSCE; THIS MAY BE UNDERSTANDABLE GIVEN YOUR RELATIVELY SOLID NATIONAL SECURITY CONSENSUS. NOT ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE SO FORTUNATE.

THE NAC, GUIDED BY NATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS, IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO CONSIDER OVERALL ALLIANCE INTERESTS THAN NATIONAL NEGOTIATORS DIRECTLY ENGAGED WITH WARSAW PACT COUNTERPARTS.

- THE STOCKHOLM EXPERIENCE, THOUGH ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL, ALSO PROMPTS US TO QUESTION WHETHER A SUFFICIENTLY UNITED ALLIANCE FRONT COULD BE MAINTAINED IN A CDE CONCERNED WITH CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

- OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES WORKED OUT FOR CDE WOULD NOT BE ADEQUATE IN ANY NEGOTIATION INVOLVING REDUCTIONS, WHERE SIGNIFICANTLY TIGHTER

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PROCEDURES WOULD BE NECESSARY'

- OUR OBJECT IS NOT TO STIFLE DISCUSSION OR THE EXPRESSION OF NATIONAL VIEWPOINTS; THE ALLIANCE WOULD SUFFER FOR THIS. RATHER, WE SEEK TO CONTAIN OUR DISAGREEMENTS IN-HOUSE AT NATO AND NOT ALLOW THEM TO PLAY OUT AT THE NEGOTIATING SITE IN FULL VIEW OF THE EAST.

BALANCE IN CSCE

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THE U.S. INTENDS TO REMAIN AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE CSCE PROCESS. OUR OBJECTIVE IN CSCE IS PROGRESS TOWARD FULL AND BALANCED IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL THE COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, AND THE STOCKHOLM CDE DOCUMENT.

PLACING REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS IN CSCE/CDE WOULD RISK UNBALANCING THE ENTIRE CSCE PROCESS, TO THE DETRIMENT OF PROGRESS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. THIS IS A SPECIAL CONCERN TO OUR CONGRESS.

GIVEN THE EXTREMELY DISAPPOINTING RECORD OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR AGREED STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO SECURITY QUESTIONS IN CSCE REMAINS VALID AND IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE POLICY FOR THE WEST.

- WE DO NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE VIEW THAT PURSUIT OF ATLANTIC-TO-URALS CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF CSCE WILL PRODUCE AN ATROPHIED CSCE PROCESS.

- WE SHOULD, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO PURSUE THE SECURITY ELEMENT IN CSCE WITH ADDITIONAL CSBM'S.

THERE IS MUCH WORK LEFT OVER FROM STOCKHOLM THAT REQUIRES RECONSIDERATION IN THE NEXT MEETING OF CDE: AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE MAKEUP OF FORCES, LOWER THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AND ENHANCED PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION ARE JUST A FEW.

THESE TASKS, PLUS ONGOING EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, SHOULD BE CDE'S JOB POST-VIENNA. SHULTZ  
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