MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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December 19, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

NSC Weekly Report #161

1. Fact

Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski Meeting

Ed, Harold and I reached the following decisions at our meeting this week:

-- Moroccan Arms Supply Relationship: (confirmed by you at breakfast on Friday) We will proceed with delivery of the first six OV-10 aircraft. We will hold back on the M-60 tanks pending DOD clarification of just when the contracts need to be signed to coincide with the production schedule.

-- Mining in the Persian Gulf: (confirmed by you at breakfast on Friday) We will increase the frequency of patrols in the Strait of Hormuz. The naval task force commander will have authority to prevent mining of the Strait, but Harold with Ed will clarify the language of the rules-of-engagement instructions and forward them to you for review. We will inform the British and French of our increased patrols and the task force's instructions.

-- F-15's for Saudi Arabia: Ed will ask Haig when the new Administration wants Congressional consultations to start, during which we would indicate their support. Weinberger and Allen have already been briefed. Ed will ask Haig to respond by Tuesday.

Soviet Invasion of Poland Postponed

The same Soviet clandestine source who provided the report detailing Soviet invasion plans now reports that the invasion has been postponed for the "indefinite future." The principal reason for the postponement, according to the sources, was the effectiveness of the Western counter propaganda campagin which convinced the Kremlin the West would retaliate "massively" with political and economic sanctions. Invasion forces, however, remain in a high state of readiness, and can move into Poland at any time. An invasion move would be made under the pretense of Warsaw Pact maneuvers.

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Exercise BRIGHT STAR

As a result of Exercise BRIGHT STAR which was just completed in Egypt, we have some initial technical findings which are interesting. Overall, the exercise was a resounding success, and the Army is systematically reviewing the after-action reports for lessons learned:

- -- The concepts for landing zone (LZ) and drop zone (DZ) selection for helicopter operations were found to be inadequate. We rely upon a sequential landing in a small LZ; the terrain and dust conditions in the desert dictate a linear landing pattern over a wide LZ.
- -- The Egyptians are outstanding in land and air navigation in the desert. We had major problems and can learn much from them.
- -- Although the Egyptian air defense troops are highly skilled, the over-centralization of command severely restricts the effectiveness of forward air defense assets. The Egyptians adopted our weapons-status system which allows greater decentralization of command.
- -- Our electronic countermeasures (ECM) capabilities proved highly effective against SA-2 and 3 missiles. This was particularly true of ECM mounted in the BLACKHAWK helicopters.
- -- Our troops consumed less water than expected but far more than their Egyptian counterparts (8 gallons/day vs. 1.5 gallons/day for the Egyptians).
- -- Helicopters raise surprisingly little dust, unless they hover or follow in single file.
- -- Our principal infantry squad weapons, the M-16 rifle and the M-60 machine gun, showed themselves unsuited for desert warfare. Both heated up excessively if not coated with oil and attracted a debilitating amount of dust, if oil is used. This is a tough problem and one which needs to be addressed soonest.
- -- The color of our uniforms, the design of our boots, and even the shades of our sandbags are all inappropriate for a desert environment.
- 2. National Security Affairs Calendar (attached)

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