

#4

C

MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NSC REVIEWED 16 MAY 2007 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE

SECRET

January 3, 1980

**SECRET**

TREA has not reviewed. Processed IAW CIA TREA arrangement letter dtd 4/11/08.
--

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Strategic Reaction to the  
Afghanistan Problem

B

*(This was drafted  
before your very  
eloquent statement this  
afternoon. But the recommend.  
still stands.)*

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is the first time since 1945 that the Soviet Union used its military forces directly to expand its power. This took place even though we warned the Soviet Union of adverse consequences. Moreover, Afghanistan is the seventh state since 1975 in which communist parties have come to power with Soviet guns and tanks, with Soviet military power and assistance (Vietnam, Angola, Laos, South Yemen, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and now probably Afghanistan). Four of these takeovers occurred since January 1977.

I think it is clear that the Soviets have discounted our likely reaction and that they have concluded that our previous expressions of concern need not be heeded. In effect, because we did not overreact to their previous acts of assertiveness, they have discounted the likelihood of a genuinely punitive reaction on our part to this extraordinary application of Soviet military power.

In the light of the foregoing, I would like to urge you to consider altering our formula on arms for China from "we will not sell arms to China" to "we will not sell offensive arms to China." This shift in formulation would enable you to provide the Chinese with the over-the-horizon radar and perhaps later with anti-tank weaponry. Given the scale and the boldness of the Soviet move, these reactions are both needed and hardly excessive. Moreover, they would communicate tangibly our willingness to support those who are prepared to stand up to the Soviets, and the Chinese are certainly in that category.

Not referred to DOC. Waiver applies.
---

State Dept. review completed
---------------------------------

SECRET

Review January 3, 1986

SECRET

2

→ More broadly, we have to move deliberately to fashion a wider security arrangement for the region, lest Soviet influence spread rapidly from Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran. I cannot emphasize strongly enough the strategic consequences of such a development. It would place in direct jeopardy our most vital interests in the Middle East.

The recommended subtle change in terminology, initiating a limited defense arrangement with China, could be the point of departure for a wider security effort in the region. You are already moving firmly on Pakistan, and I believe the Congress will support you. We should implement rapidly your decisions on new bases in the Indian Ocean/Gulf of Oman area, and survey teams will now be going out.

Beyond the above, we will need an aid package for Pakistan, and that could be expensive, though it might be shared with Saudi Arabia. Also, if we can stiffen Pakistan's back, we should be in a position to extend some aid to the Afghani rebels, in order to keep the Soviets bogged down.

→ Finally, we need to do something to reassure the Egyptians, the Saudis, and others on the Arabian peninsula that the U.S. is prepared to assert its power, and that requires a visible military presence in the area now. You might consider consulting with Sadat about military deployment to an Egyptian base of a U.S. brigade for joint maneuvers. This would be an impressive demonstration of U.S. determination to contest, if necessary, Soviet military preeminence in the region.

The above recommendations require major decisions by you, but I believe that a major historical turning point has been reached. You have the opportunity to do what President Truman did on Greece and Turkey, and I believe that this is desirable both for domestic and international reasons. The country will respond to a firm call for measured but also sustained action, and I am sure the Congressional leadership will support you.

I would recommend that you raise the above issues at the breakfast, and provide Harold with whatever guidance you think is appropriate for his trip.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ok #494  
JD R A F T

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Instructions for the China Trip

I have reviewed your memorandum of December 29th and approve its contents as guidance for your forthcoming trip. In addition you are instructed to:

- Propose follow-up consultations between U.S. and Chinese senior officials concerning Afghanistan and explore ways to coordinate U.S. and Chinese support for Pakistan, including Chinese agreement to permit overflights of aircraft and equipment being delivered to Pakistan by the U.S. There should be no public discussion of such overflights.
- Indicate that we are undertaking to differentiate in COCOM between the technology that we are prepared to transfer to the USSR on the one hand and China on the other hand, and that LANDSAT D is an example. However, any public linkage of the LANDSAT D decision to Soviet aggression against Afghanistan should be avoided. Inform the Chinese that we are prepared to approve the Western Geophysical Systems case if modifications in the computer technology requested can be mutually agreed upon; in this connection you may initiate discussions with the Chinese concerning appropriate modifications.
- Preserve for now our public position that we have no current plans to sell arms to the PRC. If the Chinese request the U.S. to sell military equipment, you may explore their interest in procuring over-the-horizon radar equipment for purposes of augmenting their surveillance and warning capabilities. If they appear interested, you may offer to undertake a site survey on a no-commitment basis. If the Chinese press for U.S. sale of arms, you should seek additional policy guidance from me.
- In inviting Geng Biao and/or Defense Minister Xu to make a reciprocal visit to the U.S., you may explore PRC interest in regularizing such meetings.
- To the offer of experts' discussions of such defense support activities as communications and military medicine, you may add the fields of transportation and logistics.

D R A F T

SECRET SENSITIVE