



TNF brief  
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PRIME MINISTER

c Sir Robert Armstrong

Cabinet: Foreign Affairs

You will wish to report briefly to your colleagues on today's Anglo-German Summit, covering both Community affairs (on the rest of which Mr Elliott is briefing you separately) and other aspects (including East-West relations in particular).

2. No Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister will be present, because the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has to be in Brussels (as does Mr Hurd) and the Lord Privy Seal in Strasbourg. In their absence you may wish to refer to the one subject they would certainly have raised, viz. Sinai, on the lines of the attached FCO brief. I will let you have a supplementary note if there are significant developments on this overnight.

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3. You may also feel you should mention the speech President Reagan is making today on TNF arms control negotiations, in the light of tomorrow's press reaction and of anything which may have been said on the subject in your talks with Chancellor Schmidt. If so, you could draw on the second FCO brief attached.

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4. No other topics need be covered. There have been no important new developments on Poland. The deadlock over the UN Secretary General is likely to continue for some time and if raised could therefore be left for the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary to deal with next week.

Northern Ireland

5. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland would like to report briefly on the latest situation in the Province, in the aftermath of Mr Bradford's murder and with particular reference to Dr Paisley's intentions. Your colleagues will no doubt be expecting this, although no item is formally on the agenda, and you could conveniently take it after Community Affairs. You will wish to ensure that he covers the decision to send out the Spearhead Battalion, which I gather was taken in your absence very late last night.

R L WADE-GERY

18th November 1981



CABINET: 19 NOVEMBER

Sinai MFO

Points to Make

1. Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels on 17 November were unable to reach final agreement on the texts associated with the announcement of participation by ourselves, the French, the Dutch and the Italians. But points of disagreement are relatively minor and reflect Greek and French inability to agree changes without reference back to Presidents Papandreou and Mitterrand. Mitterrand and Papandreou are now trying to sort the problem out between them.
2. Relations with US over the issue have improved considerably. The Americans accept that we are making a genuine effort to meet their concerns over the possible Israeli reaction. But they continue to be nervous about the Israelis; Mr Haig rates the chances of the Israelis agreeing to our participation as less than 50/50.
3. Continuing disagreement over texts has led to a timing problem. We wish to get the announcement out of the way before the Fez Summit if at all possible in order to prevent further attempts by the Arabs to put pressure on us by threatening retaliation.

Essential Facts

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B/ 1. Strasbourg telno 92 (attached) records the latest position in the Ten. The argument between the Greeks and the French over the text of the statement by the Ten does not appear to us to be one of substance and we hope that the French and Greeks should be able to sort it out between them without too much difficulty. Brussels
- C/ telno 4314 (also attached) records our latest discussions with the Americans. We did not know how Mr Haig will react to our inability to accept three of his four new suggestions but the State Department are aware at official level that continuing attempts by the Americans to change the texts risk being counter productive and unravelling
- D/ the whole package. The latest version of the texts are attached.
2. We had hoped to make the announcement in Parliament on 19 November, having delivered messages to the US, Egypt and Israel and also Arab countries forewarning them of this, but this is no longer possible. We still hope to make the announcement before the Fez Summit, which begins on 25 November, but the next day on which both the Commons and Lords are sitting is Tuesday 24 November. We note that the question of European participation is on the agenda for the Fez Summit and that some countries, notably Syria, are pressing for a decision by the Arabs to retaliate against us if we decide to go ahead.

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 92 OF 17 NOVEMBER  
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EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION: MEETING OF MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS  
17 NOVEMBER : SINAI FORCE.

## SUMMARY

1. FAILURE TO AGREE ON THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE TEN ON THE SINAI FORCE AS A RESULT OF A DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND FRENCH OVER WHETHER THE TEXT SHOULD FINISH WITH THE WORDS QUOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN THE VENICE DECLARATION UNQUOTE (GREEKS) OR QUOTE ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY ADHERE UNQUOTE (FRENCH). CHEYSSON HAS NOW AGREED THAT MITTERRAND SHOULD TELEPHONE PAPANDREOU TO TRY AND SORT THIS OUT.
2. AGREEMENT THAT THE TEXT OF THE FOUR SHOULD BE AMENDED (FROM THE VERSION IN FCO TELNO 494 TO PARIS) AS FOLLOWS: IN FIRST SENTENCE DELETE QUOTE HAVE DECIDED UNQUOTE SHOULD SUBSTITUTE QUOTE ARE PREPARED UNQUOTE. IN SAME SENTENCE FOLLOWING QUOTE LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS UNQUOTE ADD QUOTE TO ACCEDE TO THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES UNQUOTE. IN (1) DELETE QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL UNQUOTE.

## DETAIL

3. TEXTS WERE DISCUSSED FIRST BY POLITICAL DIRECTORS AND THEN BY MINISTERS. IT QUICKLY EMERGED THAT ALL EXCEPT FRANCE WERE RELUCTANTLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE CHANGES TO STATEMENT BY THE TEN PROPOSED BY THE GREEKS ( IE OMIT ALL LANGUAGE AFTER QUOTE VENICE DECLARATION UNQUOTE- OPTION A IN ATHENS TELNO 359). CHEYSSON (FRANCE) HOWEVER INSISTED EITHER THAT THE TEXT SHOULD CONTINUE AS FAR AS THE WORDS QUOTE SELF DETERMINATION UNQUOTE OR THAT IT SHOULD NOT MENTION THE VENICE DECLARATION BY NAME BUT SHOULD INSTEAD READ QUOTE THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH THEY ADHERE UNQUOTE FULL STOP HARALAMBOPOLOUS (GREECE) MAINTAINED THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MEETING BRIEFED ON THE BASIS THAT THE TEN COULD ACCEPT THE GREEK PROPOSAL FOR THE SHORTENED TEXT AND WAS UNABLE TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER DRAFTING. AN ATTEMPT BY THE GREEK POLITICAL DIRECTOR TO CONSULT PAPANDREOU FAILED AND HARALAMBOPOLOUS REFUSED TO CONSIDER SEEKING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATHENS. OTHERS APPEALED TO THE GREEKS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY POINTING OUT THAT THE REMAINING GAP BETWEEN THEIR POSITION AND WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH WAS TINY AND THAT

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THE TEN LOOKED INCREASINGLY RIDICULOUS BY THEIR FAILURE TO AGREE SEMI COLON BUT WITH NO SUCCESS. THESE ARGUMENTS WERE REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES AND BY THE END TEMPER'S WERE FRAYED. AT THE END OF LUNCH NOTHOMB (BELGIUM) WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER, IF THE TEN COULD NOT AGREE ON A STATEMENT, THE FIVE NON-PARTICIPANTS (WITHOUT THE GREEKS) MIGHT MAKE NATIONAL STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT. DOOGE (IRELAND) AND OLESEN ( DENMARK) INDICATED THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THIS AN ACCEPTABLE APPROACH.

4. DURING LUNCH YOU TOLD OTHER MINISTERS THAT WE HAD KEPT THE UNITED STATES INFORMED ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE TEXTS AND GAVE THEM THE GIST OF HAIG'S LATEST MESSAGE AND PROPOSALS. NOONE WAS IN FAVOUR OF ISSUING THE TEXT FROM BRUSSELS RATHER THAN LONDON SEMI COLON NOR WAS THERE ANY SUPPORT FOR MAKING THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN LATER THAN NATIONAL STATEMENTS BY THE FOUR. AT GREEK INSISTENCE OTHERS RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO DROP THE REFERENCE TO THE PEACE TREATY FROM THE LETTER BY THE FOUR.

FCO PSE PASS ALL

CAPE

( Repetition to .....SAMA.....  
referred to .....decision,  
repeated at : .....to other posts. )

## STANDARD

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 4314 OF 17 NOVEMBER

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON.

1. WHEN YOU SAW EAGLEBURGER HERE THIS EVENING YOU TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW HIM MR HAIG'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELNO 916) AND TO EXPLAIN TODAY'S EVENTS IN THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE TEN. YOU EMPHASISED THE CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS TAKEN UP BY GREECE AND FRANCE. YOU WERE HOPING TO GET THE FRENCH PRESIDENT TO SPEAK TO THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER. BUT IT MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE A POSITION AMONG THE TEN, AND WE MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER GOING AHEAD WITHOUT GREECE, OR OTHER POSSIBILITIES. THE PROSPECTS WERE UNCERTAIN AND THE DIFFICULTIES WITHIN THE TEN WERE AT LEAST AS GREAT AS THOSE WITH THE UNITED STATES.

2. ON MR HAIG'S FOUR SUGGESTIONS, YOU SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH SOME COMPROMISE INCLUDING USE OF THE WORD "DECIDED". THE SECOND SUGGESTION WAS NOT GOING TO BE FEASIBLE; GREECE WOULD IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES ACCEPT ANY REFERENCE TO THE EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY, EVEN IN THE COMMUNICATION BY THE FOUR WHICH GREECE WAS ONLY BEING ASKED TO SUPPORT, NOT TO SIGN. THE THIRD AND FOURTH SUGGESTIONS WERE NOT FEASIBLE EITHER; THE FOUR WERE AGREED THAT THEIR NATIONAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED SIMULTANEOUSLY BY THE COVERING STATEMENT BY THE TEN, AND THE LATTER MUST BE ISSUED IN THE PRESIDENCY CAPITAL, NOT THE COMMUNITY CAPITAL. BUT IF THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE WAS LESS PUBLICITY FOR THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN, THIS WAS MORE LIKELY TO BE ACHIEVED BY PUTTING IT OUT IN LONDON AS A FOOTNOTE TO THE FOUR NATIONAL ANNOUNCEMENTS, RATHER THAN PUBLISHING IT ON ITS OWN IN BRUSSELS SOME DAYS LATER.

3. EAGLEBURGER WAS NOT INFORMED IN DETAIL ON THE SUBJECT AND HAD NOT SEEN HAIG'S MESSAGE, BUT PROMISED TO PASS YOU POINTS TO HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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SIR J GRAHAM  
MR MOBERLY

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## LETTER FROM THE FOUR TO THE US, EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS

The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, have decided, subject to their partners in the Ten, to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, accede to the request of the governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States and to contribute to the Multinational Force and observers in Sinai. The four governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

(i) The force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role.

(ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.

(iii) Participation by the four governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region.

(iv) Participation in the MFO by the four governments is without prejudice to their well-known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area.

TEXT OF THE STATEMENT BY THE TEN

'The Ten consider that the decision of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to participate in the multinational force in Sinai meets the wish frequently expressed by the members of the community to facilitate any progress in the direction of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the principles [set out in the Venice Declaration] [to which they adhere].'



DRAFT BASIC TEXT FOR USE IN NATIONAL STATEMENTS [GIVEN ONLY TO THE OTHER THREE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS]

'We have agreed to participate in the proposed Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai. We and the governments of France, Italy and the Netherlands have notified the United States, Egyptian and Israeli Governments of this in the following terms:

'The Governments of France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, after consulting their partners in the Ten, are ready, subject to their constitutional procedures and to agreement on the practical and legal arrangements, to contribute to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai, at the request of the Governments of Egypt, Israel and the United States. The Four Governments state that their participation in the MFO is based on the understanding that:

- (i) The Force exists solely for the purpose of maintaining peace in Sinai following Israeli withdrawal. It has no other role.
- (ii) The Force is being established in its present form in the absence of a UN decision on an international force and its position will be reviewed should such a decision become possible.
- (iii) Participation by the Four Governments in the Force will not be taken either as committing them to or excluding them from participation in such other international peacekeeping arrangements as have been or may be established in the region: and
- (iv) Participation in the MFO by the Four Governments is without prejudice to their well known policies on other aspects of the problems of the area.'

This decision is a symbol of our determination to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement following negotiations between the parties which would bring justice for all the peoples and security for all the states of the area. We welcomed the achievement of peace between Israel and Egypt as a first step towards that goal. Similarly we welcome the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as the first step towards the realisation of the call for withdrawal contained in Security Council resolution 242, which specifically declared

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inadmissible the acquisition of territory by war, and we believe that the international community has a duty to play its part, as necessary and with the agreement of the parties concerned, in peace arrangements in the Middle East. We are ready to participate also in such arrangements in the other territories currently occupied in the context of Israeli withdrawal. We regard our support for the arrangements associated with the implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty as quite distinct from and independent of the rest of the Camp David process.

In addition, we wish to express our firm support for the Egyptian Government and people and our belief in the need for stability and continuity in Egypt. Our decision to participate in the MFO follows from the policy, as stated in the declaration issued at Venice in June 1980 and in subsequent statements. This policy, while insisting on guarantees for the security of the State of Israel, places equal emphasis on justice for the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. It also holds that the PLO must be involved in the process leading to a comprehensive peace.

We pledge ourselves to support the MFO. We also repeat that, together with our partners in the Ten, we will continue to work for the achievement of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East in all ways consistent with the principles to which we hold.'

TNF NEGOTIATIONS: NOTE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S USE IN  
THE CABINET ON 19 NOVEMBER 1981

1. Mr Haig has outlined the main elements in the proposed US negotiating position for talks due to start with the Russians in Geneva on 30 November in a letter to Lord Carrington.
2. The main feature of the position outlined in Mr Haig's letter is the adoption of the 'zero level outcome' as a central component in the American position. 'Zero' is defined as the dismantling of all SS20s and the retirement of SS4s and 5s in exchange for cancellation of the NATO modernisation programme.
3. In a major foreign policy speech delivered today President Reagan described the American negotiating position in similar terms. He also proposed that negotiations on strategic weapons, with the objective of securing substantial reductions, should start as soon as possible next year. In addition, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union should work for equality at lower levels on conventional forces in Europe and urged the Soviet Union to agree to the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe to negotiate confidence building measures.
4. The final meeting of NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG) to concert the American TNF negotiating position will be held on 20 November. FCO officials envisage that, thereafter, Lord Carrington will write to the Prime Minister to inform her of the situation.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

18 November 1981

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