

PS

SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR. LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
SIR L ALLWSON
~~MR ASTEN~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

SIR R ARMSTRONG)
MR R L WADE GERY)
MR P M MAXEY) CABINET
MR GOULTY) OFFICE
MR W N WENBAN SMITH)
DIO)

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HD/RHOD DEPT (4)

HD/C AF D

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~~HD/UND~~

HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

HD/WAD

PS/SIR I SINCLAIR

MR FREELAND LEGAL ADVISER RMK200A

MR FIFOOT

RESIDENT CLERK

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

FM SALISBURY 021615Z MAR 80

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 906 OF 2 MARCH 1980

INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

MY TELNO 905 : RHODESIA: FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

1. CHAMBATI TOLD US THIS EVENING THAT NKOMO'S PARTY LEADERSHIP AGREED TODAY THAT, IN VIEW OF INTIMIDATION AND THE MURDER OF PF PARTY WORKERS BY ZANLA DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, THEY WOULD NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN A COALITION ON ANY TERMS PROPOSED BY ZANU(PF). THEY WOULD SEEK A COALITION WITH MUZOREWA AND THE WHITES, AND WOULD OFFER PLACES IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT TO ZANU(PF).

IT WAS AGREED THAT NKOMO SHOULD MEET MUZOREWA TOMORROW.

2. THEY ARE PROCEEDING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NKOMO WOULD BE PRIME MINISTER (AND THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE UANC ARE NOW MORE RESIGNED TO THIS). THEY WILL BE CONSIDERING TOMORROW WHETHER TO GIVE ANY INDICATIONS OF THEIR INTENTIONS BEFORE THE ELECTION RESULTS ARE KNOWN. THEIR MAIN WORRY IS THAT, OWING TO THE EXTENT OF INTIMIDATION IN VICTORIA AND MANICALAND (ABOUT WHICH OUR OWN ELECTION SUPERVISORS HAVE GIVEN DISQUIETING REPORTS), MUGABE COULD WIN OVER FORTY SEATS. EVEN IN THAT EVENT THEY MIGHT TRY TO PROCEED WITH THE KIND OF ARRANGEMENT OUTLINED ABOVE. BUT THERE WOULD THEN BE A GREATER DISPOSITION TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF THE ELECTION ITSELF.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT NKOMO HAD ALREADY SENT MILNER TO LUSAKA TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION TO KAUNDA. THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED UP WITH A VISIT BY CHIRAMANO TO LUSAKA TOMORROW.

FCO PASS CAPE TOWN

SOAMES

IMMEDIATE

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/SIR I GILMOUR
PS/MR LUCE
PS/PUS
SIR D MAITLAND
MR DAY
SIR L ALANSON
~~MR ASPEN~~

PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 905 OF 2 MARCH 1980
INFO IMMEDIATE CAPE TOWN (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)

MY TELNO 890 : RHODESIA: FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

1. WALLS, FLOWER AND YOUNG WENT TO SEE MUZOREWA YESTERDAY. THEY EXPLAINED THAT THE PRELIMINARY REPORTS SUGGESTED THAT MUGABE, PARTLY DUE TO INTIMIDATION, WAS GOING TO GET A LARGE NUMBER OF SEATS. THEY SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A COALITION BETWEEN MUZOREWA, NKOMO AND THE WHITES. MUZOREWA SAID THAT HE ENTIRELY ACCEPTED THE NECESSITY FOR A COALITION INVOLVING NKOMO AND WOULD BE WORKING TO THAT END.
2. WALLS THEN SAID THAT, WHILE IT DISTRESSED THEM GREATLY TO HAVE TO SAY THIS, THEY THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT NKOMO WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A COALITION EXCEPT AS PRIME MINISTER. IN THE EVENT OF MUGABE EMERGING IN A STRONG POSITION AND THE UANC DOING LESS WELL THAN THEY HAD HOPED, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO ACCEPT A SOLUTION ON THAT BASIS. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS FLOWER AND OTHERS HAD INDICATED TO MUZOREWA AND HIS ADVISERS THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE (WITHOUT NECESSARILY ENVISAGING ANY AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION) TO ENHANCE THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENCY, IN PARTICULAR BY PLACING MORE EMPHASIS ON THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF.
3. IN THE ENSUING DISCUSSION IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT, IF MUZOREWA IN EFFECT STOOD DOWN IN FAVOUR OF NKOMO, THE REACTIONS AMONG THE SHONA IN GENERAL AND THE UANC IN PARTICULAR WOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE. THEY WOULD FIND GREAT DIFFICULTY IN ACCEPTING AN NDEBELE AS PRIME MINISTER. THIS COULD RESULT IN DEFECTIONS FROM THE UANC, OR IN A MORE GENERAL SHIFT OF SHONA SUPPORT TOWARDS MUGABE. THIS FACTOR IS EXTREMELY WORRYING TO MUZOREWA'S ADVISERS AND TO SOME OF THE WHITES.
4. NEVERTHELESS, KAMUSIKIRI SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED TO SEE US TO ASK ABOUT THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY AND ANY WAYS IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE ENHANCED. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO THINK IN TERMS OF ANY AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A CONVENTION WHEREBY THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF WAS CONSULTED ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY AND HAD A PARTICULAR ROLE TO PLAY IN OVERSEEING THE

CRIF WAS CONSULTED ON ALL MATTERS CONCERNING NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY AND HAD A PARTICULAR ROLE TO PLAY IN OVERSEEING THE FORMATION OF THE FUTURE NATIONAL ARMY. KAMUSIKIRI REGARDED THE POLITICAL PRESENTATION OF ANY DECISION BY MUZOREWA TO ACCEPT THE PRESIDENCY AS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO REASSURING HIS SHONA SUPPORTERS.

5. THE POSITION, THEREFORE, IS THAT MUZOREWA (NATURALLY ENOUGH) HAS NOT AT THIS STAGE AGREED TO ABANDON HIS AMBITIONS OF BECOMING PRIME MINISTER AND TO ACCEPT THE PRESIDENCY (OR TO BECOME DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER). BUT THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN BROACHED WITH HIM, AND IF THE POLITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THIS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WALLS, FLOWER AND THE OTHER WHITE LEADERS WOULD PUT VERY STRONG PRESSURE ON HIM TO AGREE TO ACCEPT NKOMO AS PRIME MINISTER.

6. MEANWHILE, FLOWER ON MUZOREWA'S INSTRUCTIONS WENT TO SEE NKOMO LAST NIGHT. HE TOLD NKOMO THAT MUGABE WAS LIKELY TO GET THE LARGEST NUMBER OF SEATS (AND MIGHT GET OVER FORTY); AND TRIED TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN NKOMO AND MUZOREWA FOR TODAY. NKOMO AGREED BUT SUBSEQUENTLY CONTACTED HIM TO SAY THAT HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH HIS OWN SUPPORTERS. HE WOULD BE HOLDING A MEETING OF HIS NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TODAY. HE WOULD SEEK TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH MUZOREWA TOMORROW.

7. RENWICK SAW NKOMO THIS MORNING. HE WAS IN A SOMEWHAT DESPONDENT AND RECRIMINATORY MOOD. HIS PARTY HAD BEEN COMPLETELY UNABLE TO CAMPAIGN IN MANICALAND AND MOST OF VICTORIA PROVINCE. THERE HAD BEEN SEVERE INTIMIDATION IN THOSE AREAS. THIS HAD CONTINUED DURING THE POLLING AS WELL AS BEFORE IT. WE HAD TAKEN NO ACTION TO DEAL WITH THIS. HE CONSIDERED THAT WE SHOULD INVALIDATE THE POLLING BEFORE THE VOTES WERE COUNTED IN SOME OF THE AREAS CONCERNED.

8. THE CONVERSATION THEN TOOK A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE. NKOMO SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT SERVE IN A GOVERNMENT UNDER MUGABE. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO TURN THE COUNTRY OVER TO "MUJIBA RULE". HIS INTENTION WAS TO FORM A GOVERNMENT HIMSELF AND HE WOULD TELL ME SO WHEN I SUMMONED HIM ON TUESDAY. HE WOULD HOWEVER BE PLACED IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION IF, BY INTIMIDATION, MUGABE WON TEN MORE SEATS THAN HE DID. HE HAD TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REACTIONS IF HE APPEARED SIMPLY TO BE GANGING UP WITH MUZOREWA AND THE WHITES AGAINST MUGABE. HE WOULD INCLUDE MUZOREWA IN HIS GOVERNMENT; AND THE WHITES. IT WOULD ALSO BE ESSENTIAL TO MAKE AN OFFER TO ZANU(PF), WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS ACCEPTED. HE SAID THAT, HAVING DECLINED TO GO TO LUSAKA TO MEET THE NIGERIANS, HE HAD BEEN TELEPHONED BY KAUNDA AND WAS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM HIM, AND FROM THE OAU GENERALLY, TO FORM A COALITION WITH MUGABE.

9. DESPITE THESE INHIBITIONS, NKOMO'S OVERRIDING CONCERN IS TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER. HE GENUINELY BELIEVES THAT HE ALONE CAN PROVIDE SOME MEASURE OF UNITY AND WORK FOR RECONCILIATION (AND HE IS PROBABLY RIGHT IN THIS). AN OFFER WILL INDEED HAVE TO BE MADE TO MUGABE, BUT THIS WILL REQUIRE VERY CAREFUL HANDLING IN VIEW OF WALLS' EXTREME CONCERN AND THAT OF THE WHITES GENERALLY ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCE OF MUGABE BEING IN A PROMINENT POSITION IN A FUTURE GOVERNMENT.

10. WALLS MEANWHILE HAS TOLD US (AS WE HAVE WARNED YOU BY TELEPHONE) THAT HE HAS SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE IS LOOKING FOR REASSURANCE THAT OUR OVERALL OBJECTIVE REMAINS TO AVOID A MARXIST-DOMINATED GOVERNMENT HERE. HE HAS BEEN TOLD FORMALLY BY THREE OF THE JOINT OPERATIONS COMMANDS (HURRICANE, THRASHER AND REPULSE) THAT THEY DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE ELECTIONS IN THOSE AREAS WERE FREE AND FAIR, OWING TO EXTENSIVE INTIMIDATION. HE IS TRYING TO HOLD THE ARMY IN LINE AND, WITH SUPPORT FROM US AND IF HE BELIEVES THAT WE ARE WORKING IN THE SAME DIRECTION, SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO.

11. IN THEIR REPORTS TO WALLS, THE JOCS HAVE RECOMMENDED THAT IF THE ELECTION PRODUCES A MUGABE LANDSLIDE, AND THIS RESULT IS NOT ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER PARTIES, THERE SHOULD BE AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WITH A COUNCIL OF STATE REPRESENTING THE FOUR MAJOR PARTIES UNDER ME. THERE IS INDEED A RISK THAT, IN THE EVENT OF A MASSIVE MUGABE VOTE, NKOMO AND MUZOREWA WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT THE OUTCOME; AND THE RHODESIAN FORCES AND ZIPRA WILL REFUSE TO SERVE UNDER A MUGABE GOVERNMENT. IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN, WE WILL HAVE A HARD JOB ON OUR HANDS TO TALK ALL PARTIES

REFUSE TO SERVE UNDER A MUGABE GOVERNMENT. IF THAT WERE TO HAPPEN, WE WILL HAVE A HARD JOB ON OUR HANDS TO TALK ALL PARTIES BACK INTO THE GAME AGAIN.

12. MEANWHILE, WE MUST GO ON WORKING STEADILY TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN BRINGING MUZOREWA, NKOMO AND THE WHITES TOGETHER BEFORE THE RESULTS ARE ANNOUNCED ON TUESDAY. BUT SEEK ALSO TO ENSURE THAT, AT THE END OF THE DAY, AN OFFER IS MADE TO ZANU(PF). THE REST WILL DEPEND ON THE ELECTORAL ARITHMETIC, BUT EVEN IN THE EVENT OF MUGABE WINNING 40-PLUS SEATS, WE MIGHT STILL HAVE TO THINK IN TERMS OF A "GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION". AND IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO SEEK TO PERSUADE MUGABE TO ACCEPT AT ANY RATE FOR THE TIME BEING A GOVERNMENT LED BY NKOMO.

FCO PASS CAPE TOWN

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