



Secretary of State
has seen

Sir J. Graham
Private Secretary

UN SECURITY COUNCIL: ISRAEL/IRAQ

PROBLEM

1. The Iraqis have put forward a draft resolution which Sir A Parsons has reported is likely to represent the considered Arab position at the Security Council. It includes Chapter VII language and asks for mandatory sanctions against Israel. The US would certainly veto and it would cause difficulties for the UK.

RECOMMENDATION

2. We should aim at a condemnation of Israel which the US could vote for, failing that at one on which the US would abstain but which we would vote for. We should continue to try our utmost in New York to avoid both the use of our veto and a sharp split with the Americans. But we should also define our minimum position for avoiding a veto.

ARGUMENT

A 3. The Iraq draft resolution (UKMIS New YORK TelNo. 525) includes operative paragraphs (2 and 3) calling for sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the Americans would certainly veto. Israel's action against the Iraqi nuclear installation was a serious act of unprovoked aggression, but for the UK to vote for the draft as it stands would have significant disadvantages. We should stand distinctly at odds with the United States and be accused of hiding behind her veto; our credibility as potential participants in a Middle East peace process would be damaged; in voting for sanctions against Israel we should be supporting the intention to upset the balance in the Middle East against Israel; and the imposition of even limited sanctions would set back hopes of progress towards a negotiated settlement. At best we should abstain, in the company of the French if possible. A UK veto, as Sir A Parsons argues (UKMIS telno. 531), is likely to have serious implications for our interests in the Middle East.

B
C 4. The French have declared themselves in favour of a resolution which condemns Israel, appeals for Israeli restraint and seeks compensation for the damage caused in the attack (UKMIS telno. 529). Sir A Parsons associated himself with the French approach in his statement yesterday; and it is possible that the Americans would support a resolution with these

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main elements. We should exert ourselves in New York to seek a text of this kind, urging the significance and value for the Arab side of a consensus against Israel. It is unlikely, however, that the Arabs will accept such a moderate line, in which case our aim should be to water down the Iraqi text to a position for which we and the French could vote and on which the US might abstain. This position would contain the following elements:

- (A) Condemnation.
- (B) Censure for a serious violation of the UN Charter in an act which cannot be justified as self-defence.
- (C) Demand the payment of compensation [if the US can abstain on this].
- (D) ~~4~~ (Continue with 4-8 of the Iraqi draft).

5. It will not be easy to convince the Arabs that their best interests lie in allowing a resolution which will attract the maximum support from the West. Some will be as concerned to create difficulties for the US as for Israel. Having made clear our total rejection of Israel's ground for acting as she did, we would wish to vote in favour of a resolution if at all possible. Our general position might therefore be to abstain on a resolution that contains Chapter VII language and to vote for a resolution that avoids it. If the US can avoid a veto in the latter case, so much the better. If she cannot, we shall be compelled to judge the relative weight of our strength and feeling on Israeli action and our relations with the US (including our future position as a possible honest broker in the Middle East dispute).

Oliver Miles


16 June 1981

R O Miles
Near East & North
Africa Department

cc:

PS/Mr Hurd
PS/PUS
PS/LPS
Mr Moberly o.r.
Sir Ian Sinclair

I think that this is right. The Israeli raid is about as clear a violation of international law as you could find. But once embarked on the Chapter VII road, we should find ourselves under increasing pressure to accept full economic sanctions - even if we could live with!



with the limited sanctions proposed by the Iraqi draft. However since the Americans could not accept the Iraqi draft on this point, if we were to abstain on vote for it, we should signal a clear breach with the US, which we wish to avoid.

C 2. Clearly we could go along with the three French points as stated in UKRIS tel. no. 529; but in his submission Mr. Niles adds a point about the Israeli raid not being justified by self-defence. This would be a signal to Israel for the future; it would also raise a point of significance for the US since under US law aircraft supplied to Israel are for self-defence only. The US might nevertheless be able to obtain on such wording, arguing that they did not want to vet but must make their own judgement over arms supplies.

3. Sir A. Parsons would use these arguments in his contacts with the Arabs and others. It is probably best to leave it to him rather than to intervene in capitals, although if Mr. Kirkpatrick reacts very adversely to the point about self-defence, we might need to speak to the Americans here as in Washington.

4. The Secretary of State may wish Nicos to be consulted.

J. W. Bush
16/6.

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FROM U K MISSION NEW YORK 130031Z JUNE 81

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 525 OF 12 JUNE

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BAGHDAD, TEL AVIV AND PARIS.

MIPT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQ.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF IRAQI DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

HAVING CONSIDERED THE AGENDA CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT

HAVING NOTED THE CONTENTS OF THE TELEGRAM DATED 8 JUNE, 1981

FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ.

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS MADE TO THE COUNCIL ON THE SUBJECT
AT MEETINGS NO.....

TAKING NOTE OF THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF IAEA
TO THE AGENCY'S BOARD OF GOVERNORS ON THE SUBJECT ON 9 JUNE 1981,

(AND THE STATEMENT MADE TO THE COUNCIL BY THE AGENCY'S REPRESENTATIVE
ON.....

FULLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IRAQ HAD BEEN A PARTY TO THE NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY SINCE IT CAME INTO FORCE IN 1970, THAT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THAT TREATY IRAQ HAD ACCEPTED IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON
ALL ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, AND THAT THE AGENCY HAS TESTIFIED
THAT THESE SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY APPLIED TO DATE.

NOTING FURTHERMORE THAT ISRAEL HAS REFUSED TO ADHERE TO THE NPT
AND RECALLING IN THIS CONNECTION GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 34/89
AND 35/157 ENTITLED QUOTE ISRAEL NUCLEAR ARMAMENT UNQUOTE.

AWARE OF THE GRAVE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
CREATED BY THE PREMEDITATED ISRAELI AIR ATTACK ON IRAQ NUCLEAR
INSTALLATIONS ON 7 JUNE 1981.

RECALLING ARTICLES 39 AND 41 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

1. STRONGLY CONDEMNS AND CENSURES ISRAEL FOR THIS MILITARY ACTION
IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE NORMS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONDUCT.

2. CONSIDERS THAT THE RECENT ACTS OF AGGRESSION OF ISRAEL
CULMINATING IN THE RAID OF 7 JUNE 1981 CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS THREAT
TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND COULD AT ANY TIME EXPLODE
THE SITUATION IN THE AREA WITH GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE VITAL
INTEREST OF ALL STATES.

3. DECIDES THAT ALL STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHALL,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 41 OF THE CHARTER, REFRAIN FROM
FURNISHING ISRAEL WITH ANY MILITARY ECONOMIC OR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE IT TO PURSUE ITS POLICY OF EXPANSION AND
AGGRESSION.

/4. DEMANDS

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4. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL DESIST FORTHWITH AND REFRAIN IN THE FUTURE FROM ANY SUCH ACTS.
5. FURTHER CONSIDERS THAT THE SAID ATTACK CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE ENTIRE IAEA SAFEGUARDS REGIME WHICH IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE NPT.
6. FULLY RECOGNIZES AND SUPPORTS THE RIGHT OF IRAQ AND ALL OTHER PARTIES TO THE NPT TO DEVELOP THEIR PROGRAMMES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AS A VITAL PART OF THEIR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS.
7. FURTHER DEMANDS THAT ALL ISRAELI NUCLEAR FACILITIES BE PLACED UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS.
8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL REGULARLY INFORMED OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

PARSONS

LIMITED

NENAD

MED

UND

PS

PS/LPS

PS/MR HURD

PS/PUS

SIR J GRAHAM

MR J C MOBERLY