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1) ee / DS II (Mc Kibb)  
Cabinet Office (Capt)  
PUSD  
Res. Dept  
2) Mr Fealy 19/4  
Mr Squire 20/10  
Mr A. [unclear] 11/11  
at [unclear]  
14

EMBASSY TRANSLATION

ARTICLE IN CAMBIO, BUENOS AIRES, 7 OCTOBER 1981

WE MUST OCCUPY THE MALVINAS

Only military action will ensure the recovery of the usurped Islands.

Foreign Minister Oscar Camili6n said at the UN Assembly on 22 September that the Malvinas cannot continue as a colony, and the following day he announced that he and his British colleague had agreed that the status quo had to be overcome.

We fully agree with the Minister's statement at the meeting, but in view of the chronic stagnation of the negotiations we are not confident about Lord Carrington's apparent intention to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands, even hypothetically.

In the sixteen years since UN Resolution 2065 recognising the existence of a dispute between Argentina and Britain over the sovereignty of the Islands, the negotiations have served exclusively to secure an international climate favourable to our position. Although in itself this is no mean achievement it shows the inability of the diplomatic approach to convince the UK that she should renounce her claims based as they are on the military usurpation of 1833.

In brief, we believe that the recovery of that strategically and economically valuable part of Argentine territory must be effected by military occupation. Apart from being technically simple, the military alternative has a much bigger advantage: it would speed up the diplomatic negotiations in an international climate whose consensus is plainly highly favourable to our cause.

This was Admiral Emilio Massera's feeling in 1978 when, as Commander of the Navy, he proposed that steps of this kind should be taken.

The occupation of the Malvinas would modify the status quo and effect the recovery of the Islands by the same method as was used for their usurpation. Sceptical readers should remember that such an operation would have an up-to-date political and strategic content.

Military action would thwart Britain's distracting manoeuvres - her attempt to apply the theory of self-determination in deciding the future of the Islands.

It should be recalled that the philosophy applicable to this dispute is that of territorial integrity, based on unquestionable geographical and historical principles. Furthermore, the opinion of the native population is highly conditioned by their economic dependence on the Falkland Islands Company. Consequently, their opinion could veer round in the event of economic, social and cultural integration with Argentina, which would objectively improve the quality of life of the Islanders who are currently but poor and distant members of the Empire, submerged in boredom, alcoholism and family disintegration.

Of course, we would like to anticipate comic remarks by admitting that almost anybody in the world would rather stay as he is than be plunged into the serious Argentine crisis.

In effect, the really important aspect in the act of implementing our claim over the Malvinas is that it should be just one highlight in a programme of national accomplishments.

We do not want the Malvinas to be a smoke screen to prevent us from thinking of the country we deserve. We want the Malvinas not as a fleeting anecdote in this prostrated Argentina but as a victory of the new Argentina capable of adding territorial sovereignty to the political sovereignty of a country that is master of its own destiny.