

CONFIDENTIAL

FALKLAND ISLANDS : FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION) :

0700 HRS, 29 MAY 1982

United Nations

1. The Secretary-General saw Sir A Parsons at 1900Z on 28 May. Perez de Cuellar had told the Argentine Deputy Representative of the British view on acceptable terms for a ceasefire. He had been given the Argentine position; this envisaged a total ceasefire with the suspension of operations by ships and aircraft which would remain in position while the modalities of withdrawal and the interim administration of the Islands were negotiated; there would be a UN Monitoring Mission, separation zones (if necessary), no reinforcement and the UN to ensure provision of essential supplies for troops and civilians.

2. Perez de Cuellar requested UK reaction to these ideas: the Argentines might be providing their reaction to our ideas on 29 May. Privately, he said that he would not require us to respond before the morning of 31 May. Sir A Parsons comments that the Secretary-General now has no hope of producing results. The most likely outcome is that his mission will end on 31 May and that the Security Council will reconvene on 1 June after the US holiday weekend. We may then be faced with a vote on an unacceptable draft Resolution by 2 or 3 June.

3. Sir A Parsons also speculates on the implications of the taking of Darwin and Goose Green. If the Argentines feel that a military collapse is imminent, they may try to precipitate matters in the Security Council over the weekend in order to secure a demand for a ceasefire. At present, however, a Council meeting on 31 May or 1 June still seems more likely. If we are faced with unadorned calls for a ceasefire, lobbying of Council Members would be pointless except for France and the US, and even their support is uncertain. In the event of a draft Resolution totally unacceptable to us, a personal message from the Prime Minister to President Burnham of Guyana might be worthwhile.

Initiative by Colombia/Brazil/Peru

4. The Brazilian Ambassador called on the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 28 May on instructions from his President to reiterate Brazilian concern at British insistence on an unconditional Argentine withdrawal which could have serious consequences in Latin America and force Argentina to turn to the Soviet Union. The Brazilians hoped we could find some face-saving way out for Argentina. He was told that while we recognised that Argentina had got itself into a mess, this was not of our doing; the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained our current policy.

5. President Belaunde of Peru has elaborated on the joint Colombian/Brazilian/Peruvian proposals for a settlement but his suggestions do not come anywhere near meeting our requirement for a ceasefire to be linked unequivocally to Argentine withdrawal. We have given our Ambassador this view.

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6. The OAS meeting was due to continue in closed session on 28 May to consider draft Resolutions. We have so far received no reports either by telegram or through the press services.

Comment

7. As expected, the Argentine conditions for a ceasefire are quite unacceptable. Although they come nowhere near meeting the terms of SCR 502, they will command wide support in the context of imminent land hostilities on a large scale. We may shortly have to veto a Resolution that is not as extreme as we should wish.

8. Sir A Parsons will need instructions for Monday morning (assuming that there is no return to the Security Council over the weekend).



29 May 1982

R M Jackson
Emergency Unit