

ALQ 50/1

- 6 MAY 1982

SECRET

Mr. Weston
Defence Dept.

CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING: 13 APRIL

See (34)

Apart from the question of Rules of Engagement (on which I have minuted separately) the following points of interest to the FCO arose at this morning's Chiefs of Staff meeting.

(a) Gibraltar

The Chief of General Staff raised the question of the supply of MILAN to Gibraltar, and ACDS(POL) claimed that FCO agreement had already been given. Neither Mr. Moray Stewart nor I were at all clear what items or personnel are involved, and Mr. Stewart has undertaken to check this urgently and to refer to you. The CGS mentioned that transport to Gibraltar would go ahead today.

(b) Public relations on Engagement

There was some discussion about the publicity to be given as soon as any engagement had taken place, during which the Chief of the Naval Staff argued strongly (and with some justification) that it was wrong to assume that we would immediately wish to admit damage to one of our own ships. This is a matter for the MOD public relations, and I doubt whether we need become involved in it.

(c) Prisoners of War

*Mr. Hambro
with
prisoners
CGS's attention
P. 12/4*

The CNS raised the question of instructions to the Task Force on taking prisoners of war, on which I told the meeting that we were awaiting further guidance from the Ministry of Defence before giving advice. This was accepted.

(d) Exclusion Zones

There was some discussion on Exclusion Zones, and DS 11 were asked to consider what the military requirements were likely to be. I said that we were ready to consult with the Ministry of Defence on this as soon as they were.

(P.R.H. Wright)
13 April, 1982.

cc PS/PUS
Sir I. Sinclair
Mr. Giffard
Mr. Gillmore

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Mr. Gilmore

CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING: 13 APRIL

Rules of Engagement for Falkland Islands Task Force

As you know, the Chiefs of Staff meeting this morning discussed the attached draft (not copied to other recipients) on Rules of Engagement for surface ships and aircraft in Operation Corporate.


2. The Chief of Naval Staff introduced the discussion by explaining that the draft and its annexes were designed to set out the widest possible options for Rules of Engagement. In particular, Annex B (proposed suffixes to Rules to specify types of targets which may be engaged) represented the fullest possible catalogue of targets, on which appropriate action would only be taken after appropriate approval. CNS also said that it would be "prudent but not essential" to have general approval for the paper before the Flight Commander was due to fly to Ascension on 16 or 17 April.
3. The Vice Chief of the Air Staff raised a point which I had intended to raise about the definition of "hostile intent" and there was agreement that this should be suitably amended to make the definition clearer (probably by including a reference to identification by acoustic means). It was also proposed that the Rules of Engagement should specify where and how they relate to an Exclusion Zone.
4. I argued that it was undesirable, in view of Ministerial hesitations over the Rules of Engagement for SSNs, to include in Annex B a series of targets for which Ministerial approval was inconceivable. I pointed in particular to the reference to "all submarines detected may be presumed to be Argentinian", and argued strongly that this and similar definitions should be removed from the paper. I also pointed out, in connection with the last two items in the catalogue, that it was unthinkable that Ministers would agree to a Rule of Engagement allowing the Task Force to take aggressive action against all vessels or aircraft, without discrimination.
5. I received some support from Sir Frank Cooper, but the Chiefs were adamant that as full a catalogue as possible should be retained. I supported a suggestion by Sir F. Cooper that, in this case, a suitable passage should be included in the Introduction to make it clear that the Rules of Engagement represent an exhaustive catalogue, without commitment to any subsequent approval.

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6. This is an unsatisfactory outcome. But the paper itself does not in any way commit Ministers, and I doubt whether we need intervene at Ministerial level at this stage. Specific Rules of Engagement for the Task Force will of course be submitted to OD(SA) at the appropriate time.



(P.R.H. Wright)
13 April, 1982.

cc PS
PS/PUS
Sir I. Sinclair
Mr. Giffard
Mr. Weston, Defence Dept.

SECRET

pa (Defense Dept.)

Mr Darwin, Legal Advisers

w 21/4

CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING 13 APRIL: OPERATION PARAQUET

1. We spoke this morning about the draft rules of engagement for the Task Force. I mentioned to you that there was an ancillary problem over the rules of engagement for Operation Paraquet, which is the plan for retaking South Georgia.
2. I attach a copy of the paper on this taken at the Chiefs of Staff meeting yesterday afternoon. Also attached is a copy of my minute of 13 April to Mr Wright in which I refer to the question of rules of engagement for the SSN (page 8 paragraph d. (2) of the MOD paper).
3. I would be grateful for any comments you may have.

D H Gillmore

ALQ050/1	
23 APR 1982	

D H Gillmore

14 April 1982

P.S. Operation Paraquet and the related operational notes is, for obvious reasons, extremely sensitive and papers are being distributed on a strict need-to-know basis.

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w 21/4

Mr Gillmore

It is not easy to convert this into what will actually happen on the spot. Para 3(d)(2) which envisages attacks on all kinds of shipping needs watching. But perhaps this depends on later ROEs. And at least it is limited to Argentinian shipping

shipping