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Rhodesia (Sit'n)
Middle East (Sit'n)
Iran (Sit'n)
Turkey (Economic Sit'n)

NOTE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSION WITH THE US SECRETARY OF STATE, MR. CYRUS VANCE, AT 10 DOWNING STREET on 23 MAY 1979 AT 1000 HOURS

Present:

The Prime Minister	Mr. Cyrus Vance
The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary	H.E. The U.S. Ambassador
The Lord Privy Seal	
Mr. B.G. Cartledge	

Rhodesia

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary explained the respective roles of the three emissaries whom the Government were sending to Southern Africa in the near future - Mr. Luce for discussions on Namibia, a political emissary to have discussions with the Front Line Presidents and others and a senior FCO official to maintain contact with Bishop Muzorewa in Salisbury. Lord Carrington explained that it might be necessary for the political emissary to have discussions with Mr. Mugabe and Mr. Nkomo as well as with some of the Front Line Presidents and that he might pay subsequent visits to Salisbury and South Africa. The emissary would be leaving on this mission as soon as possible. The Prime Minister commented that if these discussions did not succeed in moderating African positions, some alternative approach would have to be devised in advance of the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Lusaka: her concern was that African attitudes might freeze if the momentum were not sustained. It was essential to secure the maximum possible recognition for a Rhodesian regime since that country held the key to the whole Southern African region. The Prime Minister thought that Mozambique would welcome a settlement but acknowledged that President Nyerere would be difficult. Lord Carrington commented that President Kaunda would almost certainly be difficult as well.

/s/ Mr. Vance

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Mr. Vance told the Prime Minister that the United States Ambassador in Dar Es Salaam had called on President Nyerere on 22 May. President Nyerere had expressed the view that it would be possible for some kind of negotiation to be arranged; but he remained very fearful of recognition of the Muzorewa regime. President Nyerere had not excluded the possibility of playing a helpful role in negotiations and had mentioned the need for some revision of the new Rhodesian constitution. President Nyerere had acknowledged that Bishop Muzorewa did have a Government. The American Ambassador's impression had been that there was now slightly more flexibility in the Tanzanian approach. Lord Carrington said that the deputation of Commonwealth High Commissioners who had called on him earlier in the morning had dismissed the Rhodesian elections as irrelevant and had criticised the constitution. He had taken the line that the elections had in fact transformed the situation. His own view, however, was that there was some force in the criticisms which had been made of the constitution, which did entrench white control in a number of important areas. Lord Carrington went on to say that if the provisions of the constitution posed a real problem, the Commonwealth African leaders should go to see Bishop Muzorewa themselves and take the matter up with him in order to persuade him to make the necessary changes. The Prime Minister asked whether Bishop Muzorewa was talking to Mugabe. Lord Carrington said that he was; they were both from the Shona tribe.

Mr. Vance said that he had been disturbed by the report in that morning's Daily Telegraph to the effect that the United States were opposed to the UK official presence in Salisbury which Lord Carrington had mentioned. It was fully appreciated in the State Department that this did not amount to recognition and he would take an opportunity later in the day to make it clear that the Daily Telegraph report was wholly incorrect.

[The ensuing discussion on SALT and CTB has been recorded separately.]

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The Middle East

The Prime Minister asked Mr. Vance what line she could most helpfully take with Mr. Begin when he lunched at No. 10 later in the day. Mr. Vance said that the emphasis should be on persuading Mr. Begin to freeze the number of settlements on the West Bank. The Prime Minister said that she regarded this as a very modest requirement. She was concerned by the way in which Mr. Begin thought in terms of biblical Israel: this was quite illogical, since the original inhabitants of the region had all come from the Russian Steppes - it depended how far back one wished to go for one's argument. Mr. Vance said that, although some of Mr. Begin's colleagues, including Mr. Weizmann, disagreed with his approach to the West Bank issue, his position was deeply rooted in religious and philosophical conviction. If Mr. Begin continued to insist on Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, there could be no solution. It was essential to make him change his view during the course of the five-year transitional period. Mr. Vance explained that two sets of parallel negotiations would be set in train on the future of the West Bank, one on the establishment of the self-governing authority, in which the Palestinians and perhaps the Jordanians would participate, and one on a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. Mr. Begin had assured the United States at the time of Camp David that he would not assert Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank during the five-year transitional period; but he had now gone back on his word and this had produced a very damaging reaction. The Prime Minister commented that those who asserted sovereignty over land which had been acquired through hostilities had no leg to stand on when that land was regained by the same means. Mr. Vance agreed.

Mr. Vance went on to say that the essential objective was self-determination for the West Bank in a form agreed by its neighbours and endorsed by the popular vote of the inhabitants. It was clear that Israel would not agree to full self-determination now; but he thought that the objective might be obtained by leading up to it gradually during the transitional period. The Prime Minister said that it was clear that the West Bank could not be a viable entity by itself and, also, that it could become a nest of subversion. Could a solution be devised which was

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acceptable to Syria, Jordan and Israel? Mr. Vance said that he thought this was possible and that the process of negotiation would inevitably produce a limited range of options, falling short of full self-determination. The two most obvious were that the people of the West Bank would choose to keep the status quo resulting from the establishment of the self-governing authority; or that they would enter a Federation or Confederation with Jordan (or, theoretically, with Israel although this was not a practical possibility). These options would, however, be recognised as such only as a result of the process of hard discussion and argument. The negotiations on the self-governing authority would take at least a year and it was already clear that Mr. Begin would be very difficult on the issue of powers and responsibilities, as well as on land tenure and water rights. Once the self-governing authority had been established, it would be possible for negotiations to begin on the longer term issues. The timescale, therefore, was quite a long one of at least six years.

The Lord Privy Seal asked whether Israel might not be more ready to enter the negotiations if their preferred solution were not excluded at the outset; it was clear that a Palestinian State joined to Jordan would constitute a stronger entity and consequently a greater threat to Israel. Mr. Vance said that he thought that confederation with Jordan would be the best outcome in practical terms and that King Hussein would be willing to accept this. Lord Carrington asked whether it would be possible to restrain the moderate Arab States for as long as six years without the achievement of a comprehensive settlement. Mr. Vance said that he thought this would be possible, provided that negotiations were seen to be continuing and progress seen to be made, if slowly. The essential was to built up trust and confidence, hence the importance of the settlements issue. Lord Carrington mentioned the possibility of a declaration by the Nine designed to put more pressure on Mr. Begin.

The Prime Minister said that in the last resort Israel could not exist without Western help and presumably depended on the United States for her oil supplies. Mr. Vance said that the US had agreed to supply Israel with oil for 15 years if other sources of supply failed; but President Sadat, against the ^{of} opposition of his Prime

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/ Minister

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Minister, had agreed to supply Israel with Egypt's surplus oil and the American undertaking was therefore only a reinsurance.

The Prime Minister commented that Mr. Begin had achieved a good deal by separating the strongest Arab state from the others, hence his present euphoric mood. Mr. Vance agreed that Syria and Jordan would not launch a major attack on Israel without Egyptian help. The Prime Minister said that this improvement in Israel's position would only last for as long as President Sadat remained in power; but all the other Arabs were, literally, gunning for him. Mr. Vance agreed and said that President Sadat needed all the help the West could give him. Lord Carrington said that it was essential to re-assure the moderate Arabs that the West wished to see a comprehensive settlement. Mr. Vance said that he was always careful to emphasise this.

Iran

Mr. Vance told the Prime Minister that the Iranian acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Yazdi, had summoned the US Charge d'Affaires on the previous day to make representations about the report produced by the US Senate against the continuing executions in Iran. Mr. Yazdi had been careful to emphasise that the Iranian Government drew a distinction between the Senate and the US President and had said that Iran wished to continue to develop good relations with the United States. Mr. Vance said that the problems in Iran stemmed from the existence of two Governments, that of Prime Minister Bazargan and the revolutionary committees under the Ayatollah Khomeini and his mullahs. Bazargan knew very well that he needed the help of the West whereas the Ayatollah was prone to fly off at tangents. In answer to the Prime Minister's question, Mr. Vance said that the Ayatollah was in control of his own religious hierarchy but that there were a number of Maoist and PLO splinter groups which could constitute a danger if Bazargan failed to establish his Government's control over the country. However, opposition was building up within the Islamic movement to the Ayatollah Khomeini's excessive interference in political matters. Mr. Vance said that the United States would continue to maintain its presence in Iran - it would be folly to

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pull out - and would adapt a low profile while working towards better relations.

Turkey

Lord Carrington said that Turkey's negotiations with the IMF would reach the crunch during the following week and that the OECD countries would have to give their pledges on financial assistance. Mr. Vance made the point that, although the Turks had so far refused to agree to the IMF's terms, Mr. Ecevit might find it easier to persuade his colleagues to do so if the Western countries had made their financial pledges conditional on this.

The Prime Minister said that the UK's contribution would have to be looked at against the background of a massive quantity of UK exports to Turkey which would never be paid for and consequently amounted to welfare. Mr. Vance agreed that the Turks had made a mess of their economy by expanding too fast, especially in the industrial sector. Turkey nevertheless continued to have great strategic importance. The Prime Minister said that, strategically, Turkey was vital; were the Turks trading on this? Mr. Vance replied that they might be but realised at the same time that they would have to come close to acceptance of the IMF's terms eventually in any case. The Prime Minister said that the West, and the UK, would be obliged to help Turkey, on strategic grounds alone - these must take priority.

Lord Carrington commented that the Turks were very touchy about the accession of Greece to the EEC, for themselves they wished to secure all the advantages of EEC membership without joining or exposing themselves to a Greek veto. The Prime Minister asked whether the Greek Treaty of Accession would have conditions attached to it designed to safeguard Turkey's position. Lord Carrington said that it would not but that it would be important to pay extra attention to the Turks after the Treaty had been signed - consideration might be given to sending an envoy from the EEC.

The discussion ended at 1100.

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