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TELEGRAM NUMBER 892 OF 22 SEPTEMBER 1981

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INFO BONN, PARIS, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, DAMASCUS.

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER:  
22 SEPTEMBER.

SUMMARY

1. SHAMIR RAISED THE IRAQI SPONSORED RESOLUTION AT THE IAEA CONFERENCE, BUT DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOLD HIM THAT COMMUNITY DELEGATIONS WOULD NOT VOTE FOR PROVISIONS CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORGANISATION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENDED MR MOBERLY AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT SHAMIR WOULD SEE HIM SOON. SHAMIR SEEMED DISPOSED TO AGREE. HE ALSO RESPONDED POSITIVELY AND WITHOUT HESITATION TO LORD CARRINGTON'S SUGGESTION THAT HE PAY A VISIT TO ISRAEL IN THE NEW YEAR. FOR THE REST, SHAMIR WAS CONFIDENT AND UNYIELDING ON LEBANON AND ON ARAB/ISRAEL QUESTION GENERALLY.

ARAB/ISRAEL

2. LORD CARRINGTON REMINDED SHAMIR OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL AND ADDED THAT ALTHOUGH ISRAEL MIGHT NOT HAVE A MILITARY PROBLEM WITH THE ARABS THEY HAD A POLITICAL PROBLEM. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THEIR PRESENT POLICY WOULD LEAD TO A SOLUTION. ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIRED THE NEGOTIATION OF A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD ENSURE LASTING PEACE. HE ACCEPTED THAT ISRAEL COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO WHILE IT REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE CONVENANT, BUT THERE WOULD BE A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION IF THE PLO WERE PREPARED TO MAKE A CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF ISRAEL AND AN UNDERTAKING TO ACCEPT THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE PLO WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO THIS BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT ARAFAT DID NOT INTEND TO PURSUE THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL.

3. MAIN POINTS MADE BY SHAMIR WERE:

1. THE AUTONOMY TALKS WERE GOING WELL. THE APRIL DATE FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI WAS APPROACHING AND ALL THREE PARTIES WERE INTERESTED IN AGREEMENT BEFORE THEN. SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE USEFUL AND HELPFUL.

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- ii. THE POSITION THEREAFTER WOULD DEPEND ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THEIR PROGRESS WOULD DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN EGYPT ISRAEL AND BETWEEN THE ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN POPULATION. IF "A GOOD COEXISTENCE" WAS ESTABLISHED THERE WOULD BE AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, BUT ISRAEL WOULD NOT AGREE TO A PALESTINIAN STATE. TIME MUST BE ALLOWED TO HAVE ITS EFFECT: IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT NOW THE POSITION OF THE PALESTINIAN POPULATION OR OF JORDAN.
- iii. IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROCEED STEP BY STEP. AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD BE USELESS. WHEN THE ARABS GOT TOGETHER THE MOST EXTREME ALWAYS PREVAILED.
- iv. THE STATEMENTS BY BRITAIN THAT THE US SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO CHANGE HER POLICY HAD CAUSED "A CERTAIN IRRITATION" IN ISRAEL.
- v. THE UNITED STATES HAD "AN OBLIGATION" NOT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PLO UNLESS THEY ACCEPTED SC 242 ETC. THE BRITISH IDEAS ON CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION WERE VERY MUCH WEAKER. IT WAS A QUESTION OF IDEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY FOR THE PLO TO DESTROY ISRAEL. A STATE OF 2,000 SQUARE MILES WOULD NOT SATISFY THEM.
- vi. JORDAN SHOULD BE SEEN AS A FULFILMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. IT COMPRISED 80 PER CENT OF PALESTINE. IT WAS THEREFORE NOT TRUE TO SAY THE PALESTINIAN ARABS WERE HOMELESS. AUTONOMY PROVIDED A FAIR SOLUTION FOR THOSE LIVING ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA.
- vii. THE SETTLEMENTS WERE NOT A PROBLEM. THEY DID NOT DISTURB ANYBODY. THERE WERE ARABS LIVING IN ISRAEL, SO WHY NOT ISRAELIS IN SAMARIA? (THOUGH THEIR STATUS MIGHT BE A SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION). THE WHOLE STATE OF ISRAEL WAS A NEW REALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: "WE CREATED IT AND NOW IT IS A FACT".

LEBANON

4. LORD CARRINGTON EMPHASISED THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH LEBANON AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT COULD BE BUILT UPON. SHAMIR SPOKE IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT ISRAEL NOT WANTING TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION BUT AVOIDED SPECIFICS ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CEASEFIRE. HE SAID AT ONE STAGE THAT THE PLO WAS NOT A MILITARY PROBLEM FOR ISRAEL AND LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD BE RIGHT IN INFERRING THAT THERE WAS THEREFORE NO RISK OF ISRAEL MOVING ACROSS THE BORDER. SHAMIR DUCKED.

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5. SHAMIR SAID THAT ISRAEL WANTED A FREE AND INDEPENDENT LEBANON, BY WHICH HE MEANT FREE OF SYRIAN AND PLO OCCUPATION. THE PLO WAS AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE EVERYWHERE. THE SAUDIS SHOULD STOP GIVING THEM MONEY AND THE TEN SHOULD STOP GIVING THEM ENCOURAGEMENT THROUGH DECLARATIONS AND CONTACTS. THEN THE PLO WOULD DISAPPEAR. LORD CARRINGTON REPLIED THAT IF SHAMIR BELIEVED THAT HE WOULD BELIEVE ANYTHING.

6. SHAMIR HAVING AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, LORD CARRINGTON ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD HELP TO EXTEND THE SCOPE OF UNIFIL. SHAMIR REPLIED THAT UNIFIL HAD BEEN A POSITIVE FACTOR AND THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE HELPFUL TO EXTEND IT TO THE NORTH. BUT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR IT IN THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY HADDAD, WHOSE PEOPLE BELONGED WHERE THEY WERE AND HAD NEVER CAUSED TROUBLE FOR ISRAEL.

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