



Spot

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PRIME MINISTER

MOSCOW OLYMPICS

As you know, I may be delayed in getting to OD this afternoon if the discussion following my housing statement goes on longer than expected. It may therefore be helpful to you to know in advance my views on the issues raised in OD(80)14.

In general, I remain of the view that we must take all practicable steps to counter Russia's aggression by whatever means at our disposal. This must mean adopting a tough and consistent stance on the subsidiary issues which flow from our decisions to advise athletes not to go to the Games and to press the BOA not to accept the invitation to compete in Moscow.

Against this background, my views on the questions posed in para 4 of the paper are:-

- i. I support the recommended responses to questions 4(a) - 4(g) inclusive and to 4(i).
- ii. On 4(h) the fact is that the cost of sending a British team to Moscow comes from public subscriptions to the BOA Appeal Fund. No Government money (through the Sports Council) is involved: if it were I would wish to stop it. I think we should resist, however, any proposal to withhold future grants to governing bodies of sport. It is one thing to embrace the use of sport as a political weapon to deal with the circumstances surrounding Russia's aggression in Afghanistan. It is quite another to take action which could undermine the whole history of the voluntary sports movement in this country and threaten its future stability.
- iii. On 4(j) I am personally in favour of advising British office holders in international sports federations not to go to Moscow. As para 4(k) of the paper points out, you have publicly pointed to the obligations of all citizens, not just athletes, to consider the implications of their involvement in Moscow. I therefore believe that the logic for advising British nationals in international sports federations not to go to Moscow is overwhelming.
- iv. On 4(k) I think that the case for discouraging members of the public from going to the Games is again overwhelming. But the Law Officers' comments need to be considered carefully, and we may well need to look at the possibility of ex gratia payments to individuals who have suffered unreasonable losses as a consequence of our stance. Incidentally, should we not consider whether there is anything that can be done to stop British Airways offering special flights to Moscow to carry these passengers?



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v. On 4(l) I think that we should perhaps take a neutral stance. We have made our representations through the BOA and in Parliament. I see no reason to become any more involved in discussion of this question.

vi. On 4(m) a reversal of policy would be justified only if the USSR reversed its own policy. This is highly unlikely.

Of the other steps suggested as possibilities for action in para 5:-

vii. I agree with the proposition in 5(a) but only if the Chief Whip advises that it would be sensible.

viii. I have no firm view on 5(b) save for the fact that there must clearly be close consultation between FCO and DOE in undertaking follow up action.

ix. I agree with all of the proposals in 5(c) to 5(f) inclusive.

As for the financial issues arising in para 6, I agree that the financial implications of our decisions will need careful analysis. Certainly I believe that the possible areas of expenditure identified in the paper are real ones that need to be explored if our stance on the Olympics is going to be credible.

Finally, I note that there is no discussion in the paper about media coverage of the Games in Moscow. My own feeling is that we ought to be taking a tough line on this if we are going to stop the Soviet government exploiting all the propaganda opportunities which wide media coverage would provide. I should be interested to know what consideration has so far been given to this matter.

I am copying this minute to other members of OD Committee and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

with

MH

21 February 1980

OLYMPIC GAMES : KNOWN ATTITUDE OF GOVERNMENTS AS AT 21 FEBRUARY

A Governments who will support a boycott

Australia	Fiji	Malaysia	Saudi Arabia*
Bahrain	Haiti	Netherlands	Singapore*
Bermuda	Honduras	New ZealandØ	Somalia
Chile	Japan*Ø	Norway*Ø	Sudan
China	Kenya	Pakistan†*	United States*
Djibouti	Liberia	Papua New Guinea	West GermanyØ
Egypt*	Malawi	Qatar	Zaire*

B Governments still undecided

Belgium	Iceland	Niger*	Switzerland
Cameroon	Iran*	Nigeria*	Tanzania
Canada	Ireland	Philippines*	Tunisia*
Denmark	Italy	Portugal	Turkey*
Ecuador	Ivory Coast*	South Korea*	Uganda
Gambia	Luxembourg	Spain	Upper Volta*
Ghana*	Malta*	Sweden	

C Governments who have not taken a position : some are non-Olympic countries or have no participants

Burma	Kiribati	Sri Lanka	United Arab Emirates
Iraq	Panama	Solomon Islands	Yemen Arab Republic
Jordan	St Vincent	Tonga	

D Governments who are against or will not support a boycott

Algeria*	France	Kuwait*	Senegal
Austria	Greece	Libya	Seychelles
Botswana	Guyana*	Mexico*	Syria*
Costa Rica	India	Oman†X	Yugoslavia*
Cyprus	Jamaica*	Peru*	Zambia*
Finland			

* National Olympic Committee (a) has indicated it will follow lead of the Government, or (b) is likely to, or (c) has no choice in the matter.

/† Government



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- † Government is known to be in favour of boycott but has not declared itself publicly.
- X Government has taken a position but is unlikely to have any sportsmen of Olympic standard.
- ∅ Government position equivocal.

CULTURAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
21 February 1980