

FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

[PLEASE RETURN COPY TO TYPISTS]

19A

PS/MR HURD  
PS/MR ONSLOW  
PS/PUS  
MR BULLARD  
SIR I SINCLAIR  
MR GIFFARD  
MR WRIGHT  
MR GILLMORE  
MR URE  
MR BARRETT  
HS/S AM D  
HD/DEF D  
HD/PLANNING STAFF  
HD/UND  
HD/NEWS D  
HD/ERD  
HD/ECD(B)  
HD/PUSD  
EMERGENCY ROOM  
RESIDENT CLERK

Ps/Ld Belstead 1

IMMEDIATE

~~PS/NO 10 DOWNING STREET~~ (2 copies)

PS/S OF S DEFENCE

PS/HOME SECRETARY

PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o NO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEY GENERAL

PS/CHANCELLOR DUCHY OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG )

PS/SIR M PALLISER )

PS/SIR A DUFF )

CABINET

MR WADE-GERY )

MR FULLER )

OFFICE

MR O'NEILL HD ASSESS- )  
MENTS STAFF )

DIO

MR J M STEWART AUSD STAFF MOD

ADMIRAL SIR ROY HALLIDAY DGI MOD

DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (via Room 8)

GR 450

SECRET

FM WASHINGTON 182050Z MAY 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1803 OF 18 MAY 1982

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

MY TELEGRAM NO 1796: FALKLANDS

1. I SAW JUDGE CLARK THIS AFTERNOON AND TOLD HIM WHERE WE STOOD ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT MRS KIRKPATRICK WAS TRYING TO REACH HIM URGENTLY. HE UNDERSTOOD SHE HAD SOME SUGGESTION TO MAKE AND IMPLIED THAT IT MIGHT BE FOR SOME LAST-MINUTE NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE BY THE PRESIDENT.

2. I TOLD CLARK THAT WE HAD GONE DOWN THE NEGOTIATING ROAD FOR 6 AND A HALF WEEKS AND IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE ARGENTINE LEADERS EITHER WOULD OR COULD NOT ACCEPT A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT. WE WERE NOW MOVING ON FROM THAT AND THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN A US NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE AT THIS STAGE. LATER, AFTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION SOME US ROLE MIGHT BE USEFUL. BUT WE COULD NOT JUDGE THAT NOW. MEANWHILE, IF JEANE KIRKPATRICK

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION SOME US ROLE MIGHT BE USEFUL. BUT WE COULD NOT JUDGE THAT NOW. MEANWHILE, IF JEANE KIRKPATRICK PUT FORWARD TO HIM SOME PROPOSAL FOR A PRESIDENTIAL MOVE NOW, OR A MOVE BY THE US GOVERNMENT IN SOME WAY, I ASKED HIM TO BE SURE GET IN TOUCH WITH ME BEFORE DOING ANYTHING. MRS KIRKPATRICK'S INTERVENTION LAST WEEK, WHEN SHE HAD SUGGESTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE THAT THE ARGENTINES HAD MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION AND IT NOW ONLY DEPENDED ON A SMALL MOVE BY THE BRITISH, HAD LED THE PRESIDENT TO MISREAD THE SITUATION.

3. CLARK SAID THAT HAIG DID NOT LIKE MRS KIRKPATRICK'S INVOLVEMENT, BUT NEVERTHELESS AS SHE WAS THE US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN, SHE HAD TO BE LISTENED TO. I REPEATED THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF YET A FURTHER US NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE AT THE PRESENT JUNCTURE AND CLARK SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT.

4. WE THEN DISCUSSED THE MILITARY SITUATION AND, IN THE LIGHT OF THE BRIEFING I HAD HAD IN LONDON, I WAS ABLE TO REASSURE CLARK ON THE SUBJECTS ABOUT WHICH HE HAD EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS WHEN I HAD SEEN HIM LAST WEEK. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR MILITARY SUPERIORITY OR ABOUT OUR WILL. THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF CASUALTIES, TO WHICH I SAID THAT FEELING IN BRITAIN HAD IF ANYTHING BECOME FIRMER, RATHER THAN THE OPPOSITE.

5. AFTER WE HAD HAD SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESORT BY SOME COUNTRIES TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN THE EVENT OF INTENSIFIED MILITARY ACTION, CLARK SAID THAT WE COULD RELY ON US SUPPORT. HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ME BEFORE THAT I MUST REST ASSURED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT WHERE THE PRESIDENT'S SYMPATHIES AND SUPPORT LAY.

6. CLARK WAS WORKING ON THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO PARLIAMENT. THIS GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAY HOW CLOSELY ANY WORDS HE UTTERED BETWEEN NOW AND HIS EUROPEAN VISIT RELATING TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WOULD BE LISTENED TO IN THE UK.

HENDERSON

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