FALKLAND ISLANDS: FCO SITREP (DETAILED VERSION): 0700 HOURS 1 JUNE

485 to

York)

899)

UKMis New

(a) Sir A Parsons' Meeting with the Secretary General

A (FCO telno 1. Sir A Parsons delivered the Secretary of State's message. The Secretary General told Sir A Parsons privately that, in an attempt to avert a bloody battle for Port Stanley, he was disposed to make a final attempt over the next two days to bring about implementation of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of SCR 502 (the Secretary General fully understands B (UKMis New that there is now no question of parallel British withdrawal).

(b) Argentine Views

2. The Argentines have not come up with anything new. They are seeking clarification of references in the Secretary of State's message to 'the longer term' and 'alternative international security arrangements'.

(c) Secretary General's Five Point Plan

(i) At Time T a ceasefire would come into force and be monitored by UN observers;

(ii) At Time T plus 24 hours, Argentine withdrawal would begin in implementation of SCR 502 (ie total Argentine withdrawal);

(iii) At Time T plus 24 hours, token British withdrawal would begin, [Secretariat thought that 'token' might mean the removal of one battalion];

(iv) (2) and (3) above would be completed within 'X' days;

(v) Negotiations would begin under the auspices of the Secretary-General within the framework of SCR 505.

The plan has been given to both Argentina and the UK. According to a member of the Secretariat, the Secretary General believes that points (2) and (4) would give us total Argentine withdrawal, whereas point (3) on token British withdrawal would amount to the restoration of British administration. In the Secretary General's view, if accepted by the Argentines, this package would amount to the transformation of the situation mentioned in the last sentence of the Secretary of State's message.

(d) Sir A Parsons' Assessment

C (UKMis New 4. Sir A Parsons judges that the Secretary General is York telno acting in good faith; (The Secretary General may have been encouraged to some extent to have a last try by his D (UKMis New meeting with Dr David Owen on 31 May). Sir A Parsons
York telno believes the Secretary General's proposals are unacceptable: if UN Observers were in situ under a mandatory resolution, and the Argentines found pretexts not to withdraw, it would be very difficult for us to resume military action: the plan involves some British withdrawal: it could also resuscitate the whole idea of UN interim administration, target dates and UN provision on negotiations for a final solution.

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MR GIFFARD

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PS/BOME SECRETARY PS/HOME SECRETARY (c/o MO 10 DSt)

PS/ATTORNEI GENERAL PE/CHANCELLOR DUCHT OF LANCASTER

PS/SIR R ARMSTRONG PS/STR N PALLISER PS/SIR A DUFF MR WADE-GERT

MR FULLER MR COLVIN MR O'METTAL HD ASSESS-MENTS STAFF

MR J M STRWART AUSD START MOD AUMITRAL SIR HOY HALLIDAY DOI NOD DIRECTOR G.C.H.Q. (Vis Roce 8)

FM LIMA 3115502 MAY 82 TO FLASH FCO TELEGRAM NUMBER 216 OF 31 MAY INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON UKKIS HEW YORK

FALKLANDS/PERUVIAN AID TO ARGENTINA

THE FORETSE MINISTER HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT PERU PAS OFFERED ARGENTINA & PERUVIAN AIR FORCE BUFFALO TO HELR EVACUATE ARGENTINE WOUNDED FROM GOOSE GREEN SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO YOUR GIVING PERRISSION FOR THE AURCRAFT TO LAVO THERE, DO ARIAS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE LARGER HERCULES AIRCRAFT (C.F. PARA 2) OF MY TELHO 207) CANNOT LAND AT GOOSE SHEEV AND THAT PERU KISHED TO TAKE THIS GESTURE TOWARDS APECENTINA EVEN THOUGH, AS I EXPLAINED AND, HE KNEW, THE ARGENTINE VOUNDED WERE BEING EVACUATED ON THE ENTREM HOSPITAL SHIPS IN THE SAME WAY AS THE BRITISH LOUYDED. DR AR IAS ADDED THAT THE PERMYIAN OFFER WAS NOW BEING COYSIDERED BY THE ARRESTITIVES AND THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HE AGAIN HEIGH AND WHEN IT WAS ACCEPTED.

2. IN RATHER LODKS AS THOUGH THE MILITARY PRESSURES FOR LORS PRACTICAL AID TO ARGENTINA AND MOUTHING AND THAT THIS MAY BE A HALF-WAY PROPOSAL WHICH IS SELVE TAKE! BUTH AS A SOP TO THOSE WHE ADVOCATE THE ADDPTION OF MORE RADICAL PEASURES FOLLOWING THE APPROVAL OF THE \$45 RESOLUTION AND 12 ORDER TO HIUS THE DISTINCTICN BETLET MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

3. I REALISE THE HURRENDOUS COMPLICATIONS THIS FLIGHT IS LIKELY TO POSE IF THE ARCENTIVES ACCEPT AND THE PERUVIANS PERSIST IN SOINCE THROUGH WITH THIS IDEA. ON THE OTHER HAND, I MEED NOT SPELL COTT THE EFFECT OF LOCAL OPINION OF A STITISH REFUSAL TO ALLOW PEND TO UNDERTAKE A MISSION OF THIS MATURE.

WALLACE.

5. But Sir A Parsons suggests that the Secretary General's proposals pose greater difficulties for the Argentines than for us. The proposals also allow us to buy a little more time, since the Secretary General is thinking of delaying his report to the Council until 2 June in order to explore his ideas. Sir A Parsons recommends that he should be instructed to give the Secretary General a reasoned response, pointing out the genuine objections, drawing attention to positive elements, and seeking clarification of those points which are obscure, eg the relationship in time between points (4) and (5) and what is meant by 'token'. If possible, Sir A Parsons would wish to give the Secretary General a response by 1900Z.

E (Washing- (e) Rio Treaty Meeting Resolution ton telno

1985) 6. The Argentines have circulated this as a document of (UKMis the Security Council. Sir A Parsons recommends that we telno 897)1400Z on his draft of a possible reply.

York tel (f) Libyan Arms for Argentina no 898)

7. We have received information that Libya is supplying Argentina with French-made arms, including air to air missiles and that these have been shipped by Aerolineas Argentinas via Cape Verde/Las Palmas and Brazil. Action is being taken to stop these flights with Brazilian, Portuguese, Moroccan, Spanish and Cape Verde authorities. We have also asked the French and the US respectively to put pressure on the Libyans and the Brazilians to stop these supplies.

(g) Comment

- 8. Although the Secretary-General's new proposals have delayed further Security Council action, they pose in themselves new difficulties for us. It is likely that the Argentines will reject them. But we are required to give a response today, though this could be by way of seeking clarification. Sir A Parsons will need instructions by 1900Z.
- 9. The main difficulties are:
 - (a) A UN presence on the Islands;
 - (b) the lack of clear linkages between ceasefire and irrevocable Argentine withdrawal;
 - (c) a ''token'' British withdrawal;
 - (d) a commitment to immediate negotiations on the future of the Islands with, though this is not clearly spelt out,

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a probable UN interim administration.

10. The text of SCR 505 is attached for reference.

11. Further action is required on Sir A Parsons' proposed comments on a reply to the Argentines introduction of the Rio Treaty Resolution as a Security Council document.

R Fearn Emergency Unit

1 June 1982

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