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 COS 24TH MEETING/82 Copy No 65 of 77 copies

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

TO
 COS 24TH MEETING/82 HELD ON
 MONDAY 19 APRIL 1982 AT 9.30 am

ALQ 050/1		
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY		
23 APR 1982		
DESK OFFICER		REGISTRY
INDEX	PA	Action Taken

OPERATION CORPORATE

ITEM 1. INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

1. SIR TERENCE LEWIN invited the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence) to update them on current intelligence.
2. LIEUTENANT GENERAL GLOVER (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence)) reviewed the intelligence situation, as outlined (1) in the latest signalled summary.

ITEM 2. OWN FORCES

3. There had been no change to the Force Tote Sitrep (2) already published.

ITEM 3. PUBLIC RELATIONS

4. MR McDONALD (Deputy Chief of Public Relations) reviewed the major articles in the daily newspapers.
5. In discussion the following points were made:
 - a. Although some press facilities would have to be offered when the Royal Marines, who had been captured in South Georgia and the Falkland Islands, reached UK from Argentina, it could be inadvisable to allow the seven captured on the Falkland Islands to be interviewed. The Deputy Chief of Public Relations would submit his proposals to the Secretary of State later that day.
 - b. Local Overseas Allowance could become an emotive issue in view of adverse comments in the press, and could lead to Parliamentary interest. Ministers would need to be fully briefed.

Notes:

1. INTSUM No 30 190600Z April 1982.
2. Force Tote Sitrep (Issue 25).

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ITEM 4. ACTION AND DECISIONS REQUIRED

6. The Committee noted the summary of action in hand (3); a revised summary is at Annex A. They also noted the forecast of decisions (4) and instructed that it should be revised daily for their information using both formats. The decisions affecting the PARAQUET Group and the Carrier Battle Group were considered under Items 5 and 6.

ITEM 5. OPERATION PARAQUET

7. The Committee had before them a Note (5) by the Navy Department explaining the need to decide that day whether the PARAQUET surface forces should enter the Argentine-declared 200 nm zone around South Georgia; to authorise Annex B (6) Rules of Engagement if the force was to enter the zone; and in any event to authorise Annex B Rules for the submarine HMS CONQUEROR which was already inside the zone.

8. Summing up a short discussion, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to recommend to OD(SA) at its meeting that morning that the Operation PARAQUET surface ships should proceed into the Argentine-declared 200 nm zone, and that Annex B Rules of Engagement should be authorised for those ships and for HMS CONQUEROR.

Note by the Secretary

OD(SA) agreed this recommendation on 19 April 1982.

ITEM 6. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE MAIN FORCE

9. SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would have seen a minute (7) in which the Secretary of State sought the agreement of his OD(SA) colleagues to the authorisation of Operation PARAQUET high seas (Annex A) Rules of Engagement for use by the leading elements of the Carrier Battle Group. They now had before them a draft submission (8) to the Secretary of State in which the Navy Department sought a strengthening of the Rules for the PARAQUET force and for other naval forces on the high seas specifically to counter the Argentine EXOCET and torpedo threat.

Notes:

3. Annex A to COS 23rd Meeting/82.
4. COS(Misc) 135/742/1 dated 18 April 1982.
5. COS(Misc) 133/742/1 dated 18 April 1982.
6. CDS 2038/1 dated 16 April 1982.
7. MO 5/21 dated 16 April 1982.
8. Attachment to COS(Misc) 134/742/1 dated 18 April 1982.

10. In discussion the following points were made:
- a. A decision on these proposals was required by the next day if ships were to receive timely authorisation.
 - b. There was no military reason publicly to announce the implementation of these new Rules, nor in the circumstances was there any legal obligation to do so. The decision whether or not to make an announcement would therefore depend on political factors.
 - c. The United Kingdom could be in breach of the Antarctic Treaty if any military forces deployed South of 60° South. However, there was no intention of British forces deploying there and all proposed Rules of Engagement excluded this area.

11. Summing up SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations), in conjunction with the Defence Secretariat, to amend the draft submission (8) in the light of their discussion, and to present it to him by 4.00 pm that day for consideration at a meeting of OD(SA) senior officials; it would then be considered by OD(SA) on Tuesday 20 April 1982. The earlier request (7) for high seas rules for the leading elements of the Carrier Battle Group would be considered by OD(SA) later that morning.

Note by the Secretary

OD(SA) of 19 April 1982 authorised Op PARAQUET Annex A rules for the whole Task Force.

ITEM 7. SCOPE FOR DELAYING LANDING OPERATIONS

12. The Committee considered a study (9) into the scope for delaying landing operations on the Falkland Islands.
13. SIR HENRY LEACH said the main Carrier Battle Group had sailed from Ascension Island the previous day, and was estimated to be able to implement the blockade on 29 April.

Notes:

7. MO 5/21 dated 16 April 1982.
8. Attachment to COS(Misc) 134/742/1 dated 18 April 1982.
9. COS(Misc) 132/742 dated 18 April 1982.

The dates between which the landing force could mount their operation were 7 May to about 21 May. The Task Force Commander had told him that he wished 2 PARA Group to join the Landing Force at Ascension Island and for the Force then to sail as an entity on 29 April; it should arrive at the Falkland Islands on 16 May, which he now recommended as the optimum date for a landing operation. They should bear in mind that a landing operation would not necessarily be conclusive; a period of follow-up operations would be needed, and for this they should also consider the sustainability of the Task Force. As sea operations continued the effectiveness of the Force would be eroded by wear-and-tear quite apart from enemy action; the serviceability of the two carriers could not be relied upon beyond about August, and there were no comparable replacements; and aircraft serviceability could be a problem. The efficiency of the Landing Force, if not committed, would begin to decline from about the end of May, the rate of decline depending on the circumstances at the time. The worst situation would be to have established a blockade, have landed on the island but failed to take Port Stanley, and be faced with a long period of attrition while the Force effectiveness would be declining.

14. Continuing, SIR HENRY LEACH said a delay at Ascension Island would not be desirable. There would be continual wear-and-tear on equipment, particularly landing craft and helicopters, and any such delay would also result in any landing slipping from the optimum date nearer to the time when sustainability might be a problem. He would prefer the Force to sail on 29 April, and then be held off the Falkland Islands if any delay was needed; they would then be well placed to execute the operation with minimum delay. On the other hand, if the Landing Force was held at Ascension after 29 April then the option to land on 16 May would be removed. In conclusion, he said that if the operation was to be executed after the end of May there would be an increasing operational risk which could only be assessed in the light of enemy action, the condition of our own troops and equipment, and the weather. It was, however, for the Commander to make his recommendations as to timing, and he proposed they should address this problem when they considered the Operational Plan the next day.

15. In discussion the following points were made:

- a. The plight of the Falkland Islanders, and the impact of this on British and world opinion, was a factor to be considered before any prolonged delay was imposed.
- b. If Stanley airfield was put out of action and an effective sea blockade implemented, the Argentine occupation forces would soon become less effective.

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19 April 1982

There were also risks in an early landing if the blockade was not fully effective. Both of these factors supported a landing date some time after the imposition of a blockade.

c. It might be difficult to prevent a prolonged stay at Ascension Island being interpreted as a lack of resolution, or as giving the wrong signal in the diplomatic negotiations at the time.

d. If the Landing Force was held at Ascension Island, tentage and water supplies could need to be provided. Tentage might also be needed on the Falkland Islands in due course, and it would be an advantage to have this pre-stocked at Ascension Island, particularly as either eventuality would call for almost the entire tentage stock held by the Army. A decision need not be taken until the next day.

16. Summing up, SIR TERENCE LEWIN said they would wish to agree that militarily the landing operation should take place between 7 May and the end of May, with 16 May being the optimum date. After the end of May there would be an increasing operational risk which would need careful and constant assessment. They would wish to hold the Landing Force at Ascension Island from 19 - 29 April, and Ministers might wish to extend this period. Tentage and water supply could be needed, although they would defer a decision on this until the next day when they had considered the Operational Plan. In conclusion he said they would wish to instruct the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy), in conjunction with the Defence Secretariat, to summarise the main points of the draft paper (10) and their discussion in a draft submission to the Secretary of State for their approval out of committee that afternoon.

Note by the Secretary

The submission has been forwarded (11).

Annex:

A. Operation CORPORATE - State of COS Remits Not Yet Completed (1 page only).


Notes:

10. COS(Misc) 132/742/1 dated 18 April 1982.
11. CDS 2038/1/1 dated 19 April 1982.

OPERATION CORPORATE - STATE OF COS REMITS NOT YET COMPLETED

ITEM	ARISING FROM COS MEETING	DECISION OR ACTION REQUIRED	SPONSOR	ACTION/ DECISION BY	CONTINUED	CURRENT STATE
0023	6/82 Item 1	Op CORPORATE - Military Appreciation	COS	DS 11	7/82 Item 5 12/82 Item 6	To be revised -
0056	20/82 Item 3	OP SUTTON - Plan	ACDS(Ops)	CINCFLEET		For COS 20 Apr 82
0059	23/82 Item 6	Prisoners of War	ACDS(P&L)	ACDS(P&L)		
0060	23/82 Item 5	ROE Op PARAQUET	ND	ND	24/82 Item 5	For OD(SA) 20 Apr 82
0061	23/82 Item 7	Battle Casualty Replacements	ACDS(P&L)	ACDS(P&L)		
0062	24/82 Item 6	ROE High Seas	ND	ACDS(Ops)		For OD(SA) 20 Apr 82

One page only



ANNEX B TO
 COS(Misc) 135/742/1
 DATED 18 APRIL 1982

DECISIONS REQUIRED

TIME OF ISSUE

182000Z

DATE	PARAQUET GROUP	CARRIER BATTLE GROUP (MAIN)	ADVANCE GROUP	AMPHIBIOUS GROUP	DECISIONS BY:		
					COS	OD(SA)	
19 APR MON	a. Authority to cross 200 mile limit b. ROE for Surface Ships c. ROE for SSN	a. Decide Mission b. Authorise ROE c. Issue Directive d. Order ROE for High Seas South of 10°S	as for CBG			am am am am am am	pm pm pm pm pm pm
20 APR TUES	[Cross 200 mile limit] Order to implement Landing Plan					am	pm
21 APR WED	[Earliest landing of advanced Elements]		[Arrive in Holding Position 40°S 35°W]				
22 APR THUR	a. Option to Abort Main Landing - If exercised, decide new ROE [Earliest Main Landing]		Review decision to "Hold"			- if req am	if req - if req
23 APR FRI						am	pm
24 APR SAT							
25 APR SUN		a. Authority to cross 200 mile limit b. ROE change for Surface Ships and aircraft [Carrier Battle Group joins up with Advance Group]				am am	pm pm
26 APR MON		Approve insertion of advanced elements into Falkland Islands				am	pm
27 APR TUES		[Cross 200 mile limit from FI]					