



Ln
Walden

Miss
Chibesakunda

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER AND MR MARK CHONA ON 22 NOVEMBER AT 10.10AM IN THE FCO.

Those present:

The Rt Hon The Lord Carrington KCMG MC	Her Excellency Miss L P Chibesakunda
Mr D M Day CMG	
Mr G G H Walden	Mr Mark Chona

1. Lord Carrington said that he had received two very serious pieces of news that morning. The first was that the Zambian Foreign Minister had returned to Sir Leonard Allinson the Prime Minister's letter to President Kaunda. The second was that there were 4,000 demonstrators surrounding the British High Commission in Lusaka and 2,000 were inside the perimeter [the figures should have been 2,000 and 200, and we are correcting this with the Zambian High Commission]. We had no firm reports yet about what damage had been done. The High Commissioner himself had not been able to return to the building after seeing the Foreign Minister this morning. We had however just received a telegram saying that the demonstrators had moved away from the Mission, which was protected by the police.
2. Lord Carrington said that he took a grave view of these two events. He had spoken to Mr Chona yesterday about accusations of British responsibility for Salisbury's actions against Zambia, and had made it clear that these activities were nothing to do with us, and that we neither condoned them nor had any responsibility for them. He had asked Mr Chona to pass this on immediately to the President. He had also stressed that the sooner a ceasefire were arranged and a Governor arrived in Salisbury, the sooner all this could be stopped. Since both Miss Chibesakunda and Mr Chona knew this and had presumably communicated this to their government and to the President, he greatly regretted what was happening, especially in the light of the useful talks which the President had had with the Prime Minister two weeks ago. He could not understand why President Kaunda was now refusing to communicate with us. The British Government would hold the Zambian Government fully responsible for British lives and property in Zambia. Zambia's actions were incomprehensible and deeply distressing. The Prime Minister was trying to reach the President on the telephone, but he was apparently not available at the moment.
3. There would be a plenary session of the Lancaster House Conference later today. He had stressed as long as ten weeks ago, when the Conference began, that undue delay in concluding the Conference could lead to the escalation of the war. We should try to achieve a ceasefire as quickly as possible. This afternoon he intended to appeal once again to General Walls to refrain from action against Zambia, and to Nkomo to refrain from movements across the border. He hoped that Miss Chibesakunda and Mr Chona would be good enough to report this to Lusaka.
4. Mr Chona recalled the two points he had made to Lord Carrington yesterday. Firstly, he had told him that the President had said he



would not read Mrs Thatcher's letters until he had seen that the attacks on the Zambian people had stopped. The President had told Mr Chona to remain composed in dealing with the British, since he himself was very angry. Mr Chona had worked for 12 years with the President, and knew exactly the kind of mood he was in. One of the bridges that had been destroyed had been rebuilt at a cost of £6,000,000, having already been destroyed by the Portuguese. We must realise that the President was under extreme pressure from the people, especially from the relatives of those who had been killed in Rhodesian attacks. These had included some young boys. It was impossible for the President to restrain the anger of the people. He had spoken to him late last night, and it was clear that the President was not in control of peaceful demonstrations. In Zambia, such demonstrations were legal, just as they were in the United Kingdom. He hoped that Lord Carrington had noted that the High Commission had benefitted from police assistance. Lord Carrington said that he had indeed noted this. Mr Chona said that if the President had condoned these demonstrations, it would have been another Tehran and Islamabad. But the President did not believe in this sort of thing.

5. As regards the Prime Minister's letter, Mr Chona said that he was authorised to re-state that the President wanted to wait and see whether further attacks were to be launched on Zambia, despite the help President Kaunda had given us in the negotiations.

6. Lord Carrington said that it was strange that two Commonwealth leaders who got on so well should not be able to communicate with each other. Mr Chona recalled that in 1968 the President had spoken to the press about breaking oil sanctions against Rhodesia. At that time the Zambians had been asked to have confidence in the British Government, but it had been revealed in the end that successive British Governments had broken the sanctions. All that remained of Zambian relations with Britain was the personal link between the President and Mrs Thatcher. Lord Carrington said that, if this was so, it was a pity the President refused to communicate with the Prime Minister.

7. At this point, Lord Carrington said that he had to leave to attend a Cabinet meeting. Mr Chona expressed surprise, denied that he had been late for the interview, and was restrained by Lord Carrington from walking out. He explained that the President's view was still that if there were further attacks on Zambia today that would be the last straw. Lord Carrington emphasised once more that we were doing our best to restrain Salisbury, but that we did not control them.

8. Mr Chona said that he would tell the press everything about his conversations with the Secretary of State, which were supposed to be confidential, if we said that he had been "summoned" to see the Foreign Secretary. (Mr Chona had in fact been invited to accompany Miss Chibesakunda if he wished.)

Rhodesia Dept

cc: PS/LPS CAfD
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PS/PIUS