

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA AT THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER'S RESIDENCE, LUSAKA ON TUESDAY 31 JULY 1979 AT 1630.

Those Present:

The Rt Hon Lord Carrington
Mr G G H Walden
Mr J S Wall

The Hon Andrew Peacock MP
Mr D W Evans, Assistant Secretary,
Department of Foreign Affairs

*Enter over
GJM
2/8*

1. Mr Peacock said that he had had useful visits in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. He handed over a copy of a minute from himself to Mr Fraser, summarising his discussions with President Nyerere (copy attached).
2. Lord Carrington commented that Mr Peacock's discussions were borne out by the talk which he and the Prime Minister had had with President Nyerere earlier in the afternoon which in turn was very much in line with what President Nyerere had told Lord Harlech in June.
3. Mr Peacock asked whether the British Government would be able to give, during the Conference, a clearer idea of what they would be doing over Rhodesia. Lord Carrington said that the Prime Minister would explain our position in general terms on Friday and might be able to give a little bit more the following Monday. Mr Peacock thought that the British Government would have to go further. Lord Carrington pointed out that the issue had not yet been discussed in Cabinet. However, he thought that our general intention would be clear enough. We would not wish to go any further at this stage and the Australians should not fuss. We hoped to say that we had heard at the Conference certain things that pointed in a particular direction and that, having heard them, we would go away and put forward firm proposals.
4. Mr Peacock asked how Britain would answer the question of what would happen further down the road. Lord Carrington said that we would not answer that question at this point. Mr Peacock said that President Nyerere had thought that an international supervisory force would not be required in Rhodesia, but he thought that President Nyerere and others would be looking for certain assurances. Lord Carrington said that the entire Commonwealth acknowledged Britain's responsibility for Rhodesia. There could be no question therefore of assurances, but we would of course pay attention to what was said and would be grateful for it. He thought that President Nyerere had been satisfied by his discussions with the Prime Minister that afternoon. Mr Peacock said that President Nyerere was hoping that the British would be able to whisper in his ear from time to time.
5. Mr Peacock said that, during his visit to Nairobi, he had found President Moi very helpful on Rhodesia. The OAU declaration on Rhodesia had just been published. Vice-President Kibaki, who had been in Monrovia, had confirmed the initial British reaction that the OAU decision was largely tactical. Lord Carrington said that the OAU decision was not reflected in anything that President Nyerere had said.
6. Mr Peacock said that he had not arrived in Lagos to join Mr Fraser until after the latter's talks with General Obasanjo. General Obasanjo had said that Nigeria had gone out on a limb to sell the Anglo-American proposals. The Nigerians were now very suspicious of British motives and believed that

/Britain

This is a copy The original has been extracted and closed, 40 years.

Britain should come to CHGM with detailed proposals.

7. Mr Peacock said that Mr Fraser had raised the question of the possible nationalisation of BP in Nigeria with General Obasanjo in the car going out to the airport. Mr Fraser had had a somewhat equivocal response, but had come away with the impression that General Obasanjo had confirmed the decision.

8. Lord Carrington enquired whether President Nyerere had raised with the Australians the Uganda issue. Mr Peacock said that he had not, and that he understood that the Nigerians were not proposing to raise the issue in Lusaka. Lord Carrington said that President Nyerere had told the Prime Minister that he was stuck with Uganda and could not extricate himself. In other words it was a mess.

9. Reverting to Rhodesia, Mr Peacock said that Mr Fraser's posture would be a monitoring one, and that Mr Fraser would be ready to use his good offices. He read out from the Australian brief which said that pressure should only be brought to bear if the United Kingdom veered off course and if there were consequent dangers to the Commonwealth. The brief also said that Australia should acknowledge UK sensitivities to outside pressures. Mr Peacock said that Lord Carrington would realise from what he had read out that he had had to "hose down" Mr Fraser. It had not originally been his intention to go to Lagos at all but Mr Fraser had clearly been wound up by what General Obasanjo had told him and Mr Peacock had received an SOS from Australian officials asking him to go to Nigeria to cool things down. He thought he had succeeded for the time being. *

British High Commission, Lusaka

1 August 1979

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By bag to:

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* ~ * passage deleted and closed, 40 years, under a FOI Exemption.

Wayland

29 September 2009