

ADVANCE COPY

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FALKLANDS SELECTIVE ADVANCES (38)

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MR GIFFARD
MR WRIGHT
MR GILLMORE
MR URE
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EMERGENCY ROOM
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FLASH

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PS/SIR M PALLISER

PS/SIR A DUFF

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MENTS STAFF

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GR 900

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK 181420Z MAY 82

TO FLASH F C O

TELEGRAM NUMBER 769 OF 18 MAY 1982

INFO FLASH WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAMS NO 765 AND 766: FALKLANDS.

1. I WALKED ROUND TO PEREZ DE CUELLAR'S HOUSE LAST NIGHT. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY NOW IN WHICH I CAN SEE HIM PRIVATELY WITHOUT THE PRESS KNOWING.

2. FIRST I ASKED HOW HE HAD GOT ON WITH ROS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED OUR POSITION AT A PLENARY MEETING STARTING SHORTLY

2. FIRST I ASKED HOW HE HAD GOT ON WITH ROS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED OUR POSITION AT A PLENARY MEETING STARTING SHORTLY AFTER 1930Z ON 17 MAY. HE HAD NOT HANDED OVER OUR PAPER FORMALLY TO ROS AT THE PLENARY BECAUSE HE WANTED TO SEE HIS PRIVATE REACTION: ROS'S TEAM HAD INCLUDED A NEW ARGENTINE SENIOR OFFICIAL FROM BUENOS AIRES WHOM PEREZ DE CUELLAR DID NOT KNOW. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE OR NO DISCUSSION AT THE PLENARY.

3. PEREZ DE CUELLAR HAD THEN FORMALLY HANDED ROS OUR PAPER IN PRIVATE SESSION (YOUR TELNO 423) WITH THE REQUEST THAT HE TRANSMIT IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE HAD TOLD ROS THAT HE, PEREZ DE CUELLAR, HAD GIVEN ME A DEADLINE FOR THE COMPLETION OF NEGOTIATIONS OF MIDDAY WEDNESDAY NEW YORK TIME. HE WAS GIVING ROS THE SAME DEADLINE. HE HAD URGED ROS TO REPLY ON TUESDAY IF POSSIBLE EVEN IF THIS MEANT HIS RESPONSE COMING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT.

4. ROS HAD READ THE PAPER CAREFULLY AND HAD UNDERTAKEN TO TRANSMIT IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. HE HAD LOOKED 'DISAPPOINTED'. HIS ONLY COMMENTS OF DETAIL WERE THAT HE SAW THAT WE WANTED THE AMERICANS IN THE ACT (FROM THE PLENARY MEETING) AND THAT WE HAD GONE BACK FROM 200 TO 150 MILES FOR THE WITHDRAWAL. I COMMENTED THAT THIS HAD FOLLOWED AN ARGENTINE PROPOSAL.

5. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HIS INSTINCT WAS THAT ROS WOULD COME BACK WITH ORAL COMMENTS: THE JUNTA WOULD NOT DARE SET OUT THEIR OWN POSITION IN WRITING FOR FEAR OF DOMESTIC REACTION. PEREZ DE CUELLAR STILL FELT THAT ROS WANTED AN AGREEMENT: HENCE HIS REACTION OF DISAPPOINTMENT RATHER THAN ANGER. PEREZ DE CUELLAR WAS THINKING (HE HAD NOT DECIDED) OF TELEPHONING HAIG TO SEE IF HAIG COULD BRING LAST MINUTE PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ARGENTINES TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSALS AS THEY WERE. HE WOULD NOT OF COURSE COMMUNICATE WITH ANYONE ELSE IN THE US ADMINISTRATION FOR REASONS WITH WHICH WE WERE BOTH FAMILIAR.

6. I HAD ASKED FOR THIS PRIVATE MEETING AND WENT ON TO EXPLAIN WHY. I SAID THAT I HAD REALISED FROM AHMED'S ATTITUDE THAT MORNING THAT OUR TACTICS HAD MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO END THE AFFAIR BY PRODUCING HIS OWN PAPER (PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT I SHOULD NOT BOTHER ABOUT AHMED'S MANNER: HE HAD BEEN TRAINED BY WALDHEIM TO BARK EVEN WHEN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS NOT IN DANGER). HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM. HE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE INADEQUATE FOR HIM SIMPLY TO END UP HAVING TRANSMITTED PROPOSALS FROM ONE SIDE TO ANOTHER WITHOUT DEMONSTRATING THAT HE HAD TAKEN ANY INITIATIVE HIMSELF.

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7. I SAID THAT I WOULD SPEAK VERY BLUNTLY. WITH HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE STATUS AND CONDITIONS OF OUR REPLY, HE WOULD KNOW THAT ANY 'MEDIAN' PAPER WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IF EVERYTHING BECAME PUBLIC - I HAD ALREADY TOLD HIM THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO PUBLISH OUR PAPER - TWO THINGS WOULD HAPPEN:

(I) I WOULD HAVE TO DISMEMBER HIS PAPER IN PUBLIC:

(II) MY MINISTERS WOULD LOSE CONFIDENCE IN HIM SINCE THEY WOULD BELIEVE THAT HE HAD PUT DOWN HIS PAPER IN ORDER EITHER TO WRONG-FOOT US OR TO COVER HIMSELF AGAINST CRITICISM.

PERSONALLY MY ONLY RESERVATION ABOUT (I) ABOVE WAS THAT, FOR REASONS OF OUR FRIENDSHIP, I DID NOT WANT TO HAVE TO CRITICISE HIM IN PUBLIC. THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT TO ME WAS SECONDARY. I WOULD HAVE ENOUGH ON MY PLATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THIS TO BE A COMPARATIVELY MINOR ELEMENT. I WAS MUCH MORE WORRIED ABOUT (II) ABOVE. I KNEW THAT YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAD A HIGH OPINION OF HIM AND I FELT SURE THAT WE WOULD NEED HIM AGAIN, NOT ONLY OVER THE FALKLANDS BUT OVER OTHER MATTERS. A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN HMG AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS THEREFORE TO BE AVOIDED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE.

8. PEREZ DE CUELLAR SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD EXACTLY WHAT I MEANT AND APPRECIATED MY SPEAKING SO FRANKLY. HE WOULD NOT PUT FORWARD A PAPER OF HIS OWN. WHAT HE WAS NOW THINKING OF DOING, IN THE LIGHT OF MY REMARKS, WAS TO PUT FORWARD SOME ORAL PROPOSALS WHICH HE KNEW WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO BOTH (UNDERLINED) SIDES. HE HAD NOT DECIDED ON THIS, BUT HE SIMPLY COULD NOT LET THE NEGOTIATIONS PETER OUT WITHOUT ANYTHING COMING FROM HIM.

9. FOR THE MOMENT WE LEFT IT AT THAT. I WILL BE PURSUING THIS WITH URQUHART (TO WHOM I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN) IN STRICT PRIVACY TODAY. URQUHART HAD SUGGESTED TO ME THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT FINISH UP WITH AN EMOTIONAL APPEAL. I TOLD HIM THAT, IF THIS AMOUNTED TO AN APPEAL TO BOTH SIDES TO CEASE HOSTILITIES, IT WOULD RECEIVE A FIRM AND IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FROM ME. URQUHART TOOK THE POINT, AND WE AGREED TO DISCUSS THE BEST WAY OUT OF THIS DIFFICULT DILEMMA TODAY (18 MAY).

PARSONS

FLASH

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