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FCS/80/95

CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Prime Minister
[Signature] *[Signature]*

Military Assistance for Zimbabwe

1. In my minute of 16 May I asked you to look again at Zimbabwe's urgent need for military training assistance when General Fursdon's report was to hand. We now have / the report. The details are attached at Annex. If fully implemented the proposals would cost £3 million.
2. General Fursdon's recommendations (endorsed by the High Commissioner) represent the minimum needed if we are to contribute effectively to the creation of a reorganised and retrained Zimbabwe army. At Lancaster House we put the onus for integrating the rival forces in Zimbabwe on the post-independence government, with the clear implication that we were ready to help if asked to do so. We began to help with this process before independence and have continued to do so ever since. But what we are doing at present is manifestly not enough to overcome the problems of the past and to make good the incapacity of all sides of the present military establishment in Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister undertook in her conversation with Mr Mugabe on May 9 to look sympathetically at the case for doing more.
3. The single most important task facing the new government of Zimbabwe is to create a new army and return to civil life large numbers of the former combatants. Unless that is done, the task of reconstruction after the War will be impossible. The military situation must be stabilised. If it is not, I fear that, at the worst, renewed fighting could break out. Short of that, there is a grave risk of increasing discontent and disorder which will undermine white confidence and provoke further dissension between Mr Mugabe's followers and Mr Nkomo's. If that happens, much of what we have achieved

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in decolonising Rhodesia may be lost. Much of the blame, rightly or wrongly, will be attached to us. Moreover, if we fail to provide the help now sought, we shall offer yet one more opportunity for the Soviet Union and its allies and surrogates to exploit instability and to further the spread of their influence.

4. Mr Mugabe has specifically requested that we should supervise his military training programme. He does not want to have to have recourse to the East. Nor do we want him to have to run to other African countries, whose intervention in this highly sensitive area would have a serious effect on internal confidence and on South African attitudes. If he is forced to look elsewhere, the consequences for that part of Africa, for South Africa and for our own standing in the world could be disastrous. We must provide the money needed for this training aid. The Ministry of Defence are examining urgently the availability of personnel. I understand that it may not be possible to provide from our own Services all the men needed. But I am sure that the Defence Secretary will do his best to meet this important requirement. Subject to personnel being available for the augmented training team in Zimbabwe, we shall need to find about a further £2 million.

5. You suggested in your letter to me of 28 March that you would expect me to find as much of Zimbabwe's needs as I could from the £7.2 million UKMTAS provision. I have done so. £1 million of that has been allocated to Zimbabwe. I cannot find any more. Our military assistance policy is essential to our task of supporting our friends outside the NATO area where we no longer have stationed forces, but do have important interests. The £6.2 million available to me for the rest of the world is 35% less in real terms than I had last year and is itself not nearly sufficient. We have

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to safeguard ourselves elsewhere in Africa, in the Middle and Near East, the Caribbean and South East Asia. Not to do so would be short-sighted. I cannot divert any of the £75 million civil aid we have committed. Civil aid is not available for military purposes. When I announced our civil aid offer in Parliament on 15 April, I therefore said that our assistance with the training of the future Zimbabwe army would be provided separately from the aid programme.

6. The only possible way in which we can meet this essential need for Zimbabwe is to provide the further funds which may be needed from the Contingency Reserve. I hope that, despite the difficulty we face over public expenditure, you will feel able to assist.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary, other members of OD and to Sir Robert Armstrong.

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(CARRINGTON)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

27 May 1980

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ZIMBABWE MILITARY ASSISTANCE 1980/81

Armya) BMATT

58 man team 1.4 - 31.5.80	160,000*	
127 man team 1.6.80 - 31.3.81	1,680,000*	
Local costs	160,000.	2,000,000

b) Special Staff Course for 36 Men

Tuition	67,000	
Accommodation & Messing	18,150	
Fares	36,000	
Daily personal allowances at £3 per day	3,350	124,500

c) UK Courses

6 x Radio Tech 11.8.80 - 1.5.81	58,280	
2 x Regt. Sigs Instr. 9.3 - 17.4.81	4,640	
2 x All Arms Drill 1.9 - 9.10.80	2,310	
6 x Artificer Instr. 9.2.81 - 23.6.82 (pact)	12,550	
Air Fares	16,000	
Daily Personal Allowance	6,100	99,880

d) Training/Liaison Visits to UK for 30 Men

Air Fares	30,000	
Accommodation & Messing (2 weeks)	7,000	
Daily Personal Allowance	1,250	38,250

e) Attachments to British Army UnitsFor 54 Men

Air Fares	54,000	
Accommodation & Messing (3 months)	81,650	
Daily Personal Allowance	14,600	150,250

f) Consultancy Visits to Zimbabwe

Air Fares (24 individual visits)	24,000	
Subsistence (2 weeks at £15 per day)	5,000	29,000

Air Force

Estimated cost of package		500,000
		<hr/> 2,941,880
Add for contingencies		58,120
		<hr/> <hr/> £3,000,000

Note: *Air Fares included.