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DESKBY 020800Z  
FM DELHI 011430Z SEP 80  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 657 OF 1 SEPTEMBER.

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM LORD GREENHILL MEETING WITH MRS GANDHI ON 1 SEPTEMBER

1. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND I SAW MRS GANDHI THIS MORNING FOR AN HOUR AND 40 MINUTES. SHE LOOKED WELL, WAS RELAXED AND AMIABLE AND VERY READY TO SMILE. SHE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT YOU HAD SENT A SPECIAL EMISSARY, WHILE POINTING OUT THAT MR PAUL SHOULD NOT STRICTLY SPEAKING BE CALLED HER REPRESENTATIVE, BUT RATHER A FRIEND. I BELIEVE SHE HAS WRITTEN TO YOU ABOUT THIS.

2. I OPENED BY GIVING MRS GANDHI YOUR MANUSCRIPT LETTER WHICH SHE READ WITH EVIDENT SATISFACTION. SHE REACTED WELL TO YOUR MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY ABOUT SANJAY'S DEATH AND WHEN I QUOTED YOU AS SAYING THAT FOR A MOTHER A CHILD WAS ALWAYS A CHILD, SHE SAID "THAT'S QUITE TRUE". I SPOKE ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR BRIEFING AND STRESSED THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO KEEP UP A DIALOGUE WITH HER. SHE LIKED THE REFERENCES TO YOUR EARLIER CONVERSATIONS AND ESPECIALLY TO THE TIME WHEN YOU WERE IN OPPOSITION.

3. SHE SMILED WHEN I SAID THAT YOU HAD ASKED ME TO TELL HER THAT YOU WERE DEEPLY UPSET THAT SHE WAS UPSET WITH US. THIS CLEARLY HAD THE RIGHT EFFECT. IN RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTS ON THE PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH THE MEDIA, SHE SAID THAT SHE WAS NOT BOTHERED SO MUCH BY THE INDIVIDUAL PIECES OF CRITICISM, AS BY THE FACT THAT THE CAMPAIGN SEEMED "WELL ORCHESTRATED" AND "SOPHISTICATED". IT WAS NOT JUST IN BRITAIN AND IT WAS NOT JUST THE PRESS. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT VARIOUS ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES AS WELL AS THE PRESS SEEMED TO BE RUNNING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST INDIA AND HERSELF. SHE FELT THAT PARTICULARLY IN THE US, SOME SOCIETIES HAD NO OTHER FUNCTION. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT SHE SAW A COORDINATING HAND BEHIND THE CRITICISM AND ASCRIBED IT AT LEAST IN PART TO HER POLITICAL ENEMIES IN INDIA. SHE DECLINED TO NAME ANY BODY OR PERSON IN THE UK, BUT EVIDENTLY HAD IN MIND (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) INTER ALIA MACFARQUHAR'S INDO-BRITISH EXCHANGE CONFERENCE.

4. I SAID THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM COULD NEVER BE COMPLETELY SOLVED, BUT THERE WERE WAYS OF AMELIORATING IT. SPEAKING FRANKLY, INDIAN PUBLIC RELATIONS IN BRITAIN LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED. SHE AGREED WHOLE HEARTEDLY. I SAID WE WOULD BE READY FOR CONTINUING MUTUAL CONSULTATION IN LONDON ON HOW TO MEET OUR COMMON PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS. SHE DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY, BUT HER ATTITUDE SUGGESTED THAT SHE LIKED THIS IDEA.

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5. TURNING TO OTHER ASPECTS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, I SPOKE OF THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES AND OF THE FESTIVAL OF INDIA. SHE WAS EVIDENTLY DELIGHTED THAT YOU HAD AGREED TO BE PATRON OF THE LATTER. I SAID NOTHING WOULD PLEASE US MORE THAN IF SHE COULD SEE HER WAY TO JOIN YOU AND EVEN BEST OF ALL COME TO THE UK TO JOIN WITH YOU IN OPENING ONE OF THE EXHIBITIONS. HER RESPONSE TO THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE WHOLLY FAVOURABLE.

6. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS OF NATIONAL LEADERS KNOWING THE VIEWS AND THE PRECISE PURPOSES OF THEIR COUNTERPARTS. YOU WANTED A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH HER. I THEN DEPLOYED OUR VIEWS ON THE NORTH/SOUTH QUESTION, ON THE ARAB/ISRAEL SITUATION AND FINALLY ON SOVIET INTENTIONS. MRS GANDHI FOLLOWED THIS CAREFULLY AND TOOK AN OCCASIONAL NOTE. SHE RESPONDED AT SOME LENGTH ON EACH OF THESE POINTS AND A DISCUSSION DEVELOPED.

7. AS A PRELUDE TO HER VIEWS ON NORTH/SOUTH QUESTIONS, MRS GANDHI GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION IN INDIA. SHE SAID THAT THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO HER HAD NEVER REALLY ACCEPTED THE VERDICT OF THE PEOPLE. EVEN AFTER HER 1971 VICTORY AND THE BANGLADESH WAR AN AGITATION HAD STARTED AGAINST HER AND THE SAME THING WAS HAPPENING NOW. HOWEVER, THE SO CALLED COMMUNAL RIOTING TAKING PLACE AT PRESENT WAS NOT FOLLOWING THE OLD PATTERN. THE PRESENT RIOTING HAD NOT ORIGINALLY BEEN A MATTER OF ONE COMMUNITY FIGHTING ANOTHER. IT HAD BEGUN AS ACTION AGAINST THE POLICE AND MORE GENERALLY THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. IT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED WITH A NEARLY TOTALLY FALSE PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN ON RAPE. NINE OUT OF TEN CASES REPORTED TURNED OUT TO BE BASELESS. SHE HAD PRIVATELY QUESTIONED ONE OF THE "VICTIMS". A SIMILAR SITUATION EXISTED IN ASSAM WITH SIMILAR ALLEGATIONS OF RAPE. THE ACTION THERE WAS NOT SO MUCH AGAINST THE POLICE WHO HAD JOINED THE AGITATORS AS AGAINST THE ARMY AND THE CENTRE. IN SHORT, SHE SAW A WIDESPREAD CONSPIRACY AGAINST THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHICH MADE USE OF COMMUNAL TENSIONS. THOSE WHO ORGANISED IT WERE ALSO MAKING A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO TURN ARAB COUNTRIES AGAINST HER. SHE SUSPECTED CERTAIN PERSONS, GROUPS AND PARTIES WHO WERE CONCENTRATING ON THIS QUESTION RATHER THAN ON THE GENUINE GRIEVANCES OF THE PEOPLE, EG IN RELATION TO PRICE RISES. THE VERY STABILITY OF INDIA WAS BEING ATTACKED AND THIS WAS SERIOUS NOT ONLY FOR INDIA, BUT FOR THE REGION AS A WHOLE. THE FACT THAT INDIA WAS A NEIGHBOUR OF PAKISTAN MADE IT EASY TO RAISE ALLEGATIONS OF PAKISTANI INCITEMENT. FOR HER OWN PART, SHE DID NOT BELIEVE THEM, ALTHOUGH NO DOUBT THERE WERE A FEW PAKISTANI SPIES. THE INDIAN MOSLEMS AS A WHOLE WERE NOT PRO-PAKISTANI. THE AGITATION WAS DIRECTED BY PARTIES WHICH HAD ALWAYS HAD ANIMOSITY TO BOTH MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER TELLS ME THAT SHE WAS CLEARLY POINTING THE FINGER AT THE JANA SANGH.

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8. MRS GANDHI DESCRIBED THE VERY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH SHE HAD INHERITED. SOME OF IT WAS INEVITABLE, BUT SOME WAS DUE TO THE INCAPACITY AND INTERNAL QUARRELS OF HER PREDECESSORS. BEFORE SHE TOOK OFFICE, SHE HAD NO IDEA OF THE REAL STATE OF DRIFT AND CONFUSION. THE RISE IN THE OIL PRICE CAME ON TOP OF ALL THAT. HER FIRST REACTION AFTER THE ELECTION HAD BEEN TO THROW UP HER HANDS IN HORROR. IT WAS TRUE THAT MANY COUNTRIES WERE EXPERIENCING THE SAME TYPE OF CRISIS, BUT EVERY PROBLEM WAS ALWAYS MAGNIFIED IN INDIA. THIS WAS IN PART DUE TO THE VERY STRONG POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE. THEIR AWARENESS OF POLITICAL ISSUES AT THE GRASS ROOTS WAS OF LONG STANDING. THIS SOMETIMES MADE IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE THE STEPS WHICH WOULD OBJECTIVELY SPEAKING BE THE MOST RATIONAL. INDIA WAS BETWEEN TWO STOOLS; ON THE ONE HAND THERE WAS A SOPHISTICATED SECTION OF THE ECONOMY AND ON THE OTHER, MASS UNDER-DEVELOPMENT. PROGRESS HAD TO BE MADE AND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PROVIDE AS MUCH SOCIAL JUSTICE AS SHE WOULD LIKE. SHE HAD MADE A BEGINNING WITH THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THERE WAS A VERY SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT BUT THIS WAS NOT SATISFACTORY. THOUGH INDIA HAD MADE GOOD USE OF THE AID PROVIDED TO HER AND OF HER OWN ADVANTAGES IN TECHNOLOGY TO SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS, THE RESULT HAD BEEN THE CREATION OF NEW PROBLEMS. NOBODY STOPPED TO REFLECT ON WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. THEY DEMANDED MORE. DEVELOPMENT CREATED DISSATISFACTION, THOUGH NO DOUBT THIS WAS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS.

9. MRS GANDHI EXPLAINED THAT THESE DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WERE THE BACKGROUND TO HER THINKING ON NORTH/SOUTH QUESTIONS. SHE BELIEVED THERE SHOULD BE A DIALOGUE WITH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. THE LATTER HAD THEIR OWN DIFFICULTIES, BUT THEIR SITUATION WOULD NOT BE HELPED IF THE GAP BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING INCREASED. I DREW ON THE GOVERNMENT'S WHITE PAPER ON THE BRANDT REPORT TO EXPLAIN SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE BRITISH POSITION. IN RESPONSE, MRS GANDHI AGREED THAT NOT ALL OF THE PROPOSALS IN THE BRANDT REPORT WERE WORTHY OF SUPPORT. THE REPORT CONTAINED LITTLE THAT WAS NEW, BUT SOME OF IT WAS WORTHWHILE AND A BEGINNING SHOULD BE MADE IN DEVELOPING THE DIALOGUE. SHE DID NOT DISPUTE THAT HMG'S ATTITUDE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE PASSAGE IN THE WHITE PAPER ON RESTRUCTURING. SHE READILY UNDERSTOOD THE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS THAT DEVELOPED COUNTRIES HAD IN PURSUING THIS POLICY AT A TIME OF DEPRESSION AND UNEMPLOYMENT. I COMMENTED THAT SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHO WERE WELL ABLE TO LOOK AFTER THEMSELVES WERE NEVERTHELESS SEEKING UNDESERVED PRIVILEGES. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE OPEC COUNTRIES IN THE DIALOGUE, MRS GANDHI WAS CAUTIOUS AND UNENTHUSIASTIC. SHE SAID THE NEWEST PROPOSALS OF OPEC WERE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO INDIA. THEY LOOKED ONLY AT OIL CONSUMPTION AS A WHOLE, DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT INDIA'S CONSUMPTION, THOUGH CONSIDERABLE IN ABSOLUTE TERMS, WAS POSSIBLY THE LOWEST PER CAPITA IN THE WORLD. IN ADDITION, INDIA WAS EXPERIENCING INCREASED DEMAND

ESPECIALLY FROM FARMERS. OPEC COUNTRIES SAID THEY WISHED TO BE HELPFUL, BUT HAD DONE NOTHING TANGIBLE. SHE SHARED MY HOPE THAT THE GLOBAL TALKS WOULD DRAW THE OPEC COUNTRIES INTO THE DIALOGUE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY.

10. THIS MADE A NATURAL TRANSITION TO HER COMMENTS ON THE ARAB/ISRAELI SITUATION. MRS GANDHI SAID FRANKLY THAT INDIA HAD NO OPTION BUT TO SUPPORT THE ARABS. HOWEVER, INDIA WAS NOT ANTI-ISRAEL. SHE WAS GLAD THAT THE PLO NOW APPEARED TO ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE WAS A RUNNING SORE TO WHICH SHE COULD SEE NO SOLUTION. HOWEVER, ANY SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO MOST ARABS. AT THE SAME TIME, SHE NOTED THE ARABS WERE FAR FROM UNITED. SHE SPOKE WARMLY OF SADAT AS A MAN, BUT WAS EVIDENTLY DOUBTFUL ABOUT SUPPORTING HIS POLICIES. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS CLEAR THAT MRS GANDHI WAS LESS THAN SATISFIED WITH THE SUPPORT AND HELP THAT SHE RECEIVED FROM THE ARABS GENERALLY AND THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARABS HAD BEEN OPPOSED TO THE PREVIOUS INDIAN GOVERNMENT, THEY HAD NOT DONE ANYTHING SPECIFIC TO IMPLEMENT THE KIND WORDS THAT THEY HAD SAID WHEN SHE RETURNED TO POWER. SHE BELIEVED THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE ISRAELIS AS WELL AS THAT OF THE ARABS HAD SOFTENED A BIT. HOWEVER, WHEN I REFERRED TO THE CURRENT EUROPEAN INITIATIVE AND ASKED IF SHE SAW ANY SPECIFIC ACTION THAT WE OR INDEED SHE COULD USEFULLY TAKE, SHE REPLIED "FRANKLY NO". I SUGGESTED THAT INDIA MIGHT PLAY A ROLE IN ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE SEARCH FOR AN ARAB/ISRAELI SETTLEMENT AFTER THE AMERICAN ELECTION.

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11. I REFERRED TO THE DECLINE OF THE ATTRACTION OF COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY, COUPLED WITH THE STEADY INCREASE IN SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH. THE SOVIETS NOW DEPENDED FOR RESPECT, NOT ON THEIR IDEOLOGY, BUT ON THEIR BRUTAL USE OF POWER. MRS GANDHI AGREED. SHE SAID THAT PERSONALLY SPEAKING SHE THOUGHT THAT BOTH CAPITALISM AND COMMUNISM HAD FAILED, BUT SHE COULD NOT SEE WHAT WOULD TAKE THEIR PLACE. SHE SPOKE OF HER CONVERSATIONS WITH VARIOUS SOVIET LEADERS OVER THE YEARS AND SAID THAT SHE WAS CONVINCED THAT THEY WERE GENUINELY DESIROUS OF PEACE. HOWEVER, THEY WERE HAUNTED BY THE THREAT OF ENCIRCLEMENT. SHE THOUGHT THE CRITICAL POINT HAD BEEN PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO CHINA. OR WITHOUT REASON, THE SOVIETS WERE OBSESSED BY THE CHINESE MENACE AND VICE VERSA. THE US POSITION, NOT LEAST IN DIEGO GRACIA AND THROUGH THEIR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE SHAH, HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE SOVIET FEELING BELEAGUED AS THEY HAD IN THE EARLY 1920S. THEY WERE BOUND TO REACT. SHE HERSELF ABHORRED INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY MILITARY INTERFERENCE. SHE HAD MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE RUSSIANS, BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE. HOWEVER, SHE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT THEY HAD FELT COMPELLED TO SECURE THEIR POSITION IN AFGHANISTAN AS A BORDERING STATE. THEY HAD CERTAINLY MISCALCULATED THE AFGHAN REACTION. SHE SEEMED READY TO EXCUSE RUSSIAN ACTION IN AFGHANISTAN AS AN UNDERSTANDABLE SELF-PROTECTIVE MOVE. SHE HAD HAD A LONG CONVERSATION WITH ABDUL GHAFFER KHAN, THE FRONTIER GANDHI. HE HAD

SAID THAT INITIALLY THE AFGHANS WERE PLEASE TO SEE THE RUSSIANS, BUT, AS SOON AS THEY LEARNED THAT THEY HAD COME TO STAY, FRIENDSHIP HAD TURNED TO HOSTILITY. THE RUSSIANS' POSITION HAD HARDENED. ORIGINALLY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD TOLD HER THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD LEAVE MOMENTARILY, THEN GROMYKO HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE A SITTLE LONGER AND NOW THERE WAS NO TALK OF THEIR GOING AT ALL. SHE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE UN RESOLUTION HAD BEEN ADMIRABLE IF IT WAS DIESIGNED MERELY AS A CONDEMNATION, BUT HAD BEEN AN OVER-REACTION IF THE REAL AIM WAS A NEGOTIATION TO GET THE SOVIETS OUT. SEVERAL AFRICANS HAD EXPRESSED TO HER THEIR REGRET THAT THEY HAD VOTED FOR THE ORIGINAL RESOLUTION AS THEY FELT THAT IT WAS IMPEDING NEGOTIATIONS.

12. I REFERRED TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR A NEUTRAL AND NON ALIGNED AFGHANISTAN. SHE WAS EVASIVE. THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT GO IF THEY THEY THOUGHT AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT WOULD COME UNDER US INFLUENCE BUT IT WAS NOW VERY HARD TO SEE HOW THERE COULD BE A GOVERNMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT AFGHANISTAN WHICH WAS SUFFICIENTLY PRO-SOVIET TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS. SHE BELIEVED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN HAD DETERIORATED CONSIDERABLY.

13. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INFLUENCE OF RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND AND THE SITUATION IN THE MOSLEM REPUBLICS OF THE SOVIET UNION, MRS GANDHI SAID SHE HAD NO CLEAR INFORMATION. HOWEVER, SHE WAS INCLINED TO THINK THAT EVENTS IN POLAND WOULD HARDEN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. AS TO THE INTERNAL POSIMON IN THE SOVIET UNION, SHE THOUGHT THE SEPARATIST TENDENCIES IN GEORGIA AND THE UKRAINE WERE, OR HAD BEEN STRONGER THAN IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICS.

14. THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTION IN IRAN. MRS GANDHI DID NOT SEEK TO MINIMISE THE SERIOUSNESS OF ANY SUCH ACTION, BUT SHE DID NOT THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACT SIMPLY OUT OF A CONCERN FOR THEIR QIL SUPPLIES. NOR DID SHE THINK IT LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD AIM TO ANNEXE PART OF THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, SHE BELIEVED IT LIKELY THAT THEY WOULD TRY TO BUILD UP THE IRANIAN COMMUNISTS. SHE RETURNED TO HER THEME THAT WE MUST AVOID SUGGESTING TO THE RUSSIANS THAT THEY WERE BEING ENCIRCLED. IF THEY FELT THEIR BACKS WERE TO THE WALL, THEY WOULD HIT OUT REGARDLESS. THIS LED TO AN EXCHANGE ABOUT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN WHICH SHE RECALLED THAT KHRUSCHEV HAD SAID THAT THE CHINESE DID NOT NEED AN ARMY: THEY WOULD SIMPLY MOVE THEIR POPULATION EN MASSE. MAO HAD TALKED OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ONE MILLION CHINESE CASUALTIES. NEVERTHELESS, SHE GAVE ME THE IMPRESSION THAT SHE ATTRIBUTED A GREATER MILITARY STRENGTH TO CHINA THAN IN FACT IS THE CASE.

15. MRS GANDHI SAID THAT THAILAND WAS NOW THE CENTRE OF AMERICAN CIA ACTIVITY IN ASIA AND SHE SPOKE OF AN ARTICLE IN THE WESTERN

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PRESS WHICH HAD SUGGESTED DOLLARS 64 MILLION HAD BEEN PASSED FROM THAILAND INTO ASSAM. SHE ALSO REFERRED TO THE TROUBLE MAKERS IN ASSAM HAVING A MASTERY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE WHICH WAS CERTAINLY NOT JUSTIFIED BY THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, SHE BALANCED THIS BY SAYING THAT DESPITE SOVIET OBJECTIONS INDIA WISHED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THIS SHE WOULD SEEK TO DO.

16. AS I WAS LEAVING, I REPEATED YOUR WARM WISHES TOWARDS HER, WHICH SHE FULLY RECIPROCATED. I SAID THAT I KNEW YOU WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT INDIA NEXT YEAR, SHE SAID YOU WOULD ALWAYS BE WELCOME.

17. IN SUMMARY I HOPE YOU WILL FIND THIS CONVERSATION TO HAVE BEEN OF ASSISTANCE. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT MRS GANDHI'S ATTITUDE WAS RECEPTIVE AND FRIENDLY. SHE ENGAGED IN A LONGER DISCUSSION THAN I EXPECTED AND TOOK TROUBLE TO ANSWER SPECIFICALLY THE POINTS THAT HAD BEEN RAISED WITH HER. IF I MAY SUGGEST IT, I WOULD HOPE YOU COULD FOLLOW THIS UP BY SOME VISIBLE GESTURE. BOTH THE HIGH COMMISSIONER AND I THINK THAT A MEAL AT CHEQUERS, IN HONOUR OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE NEW HIGH COMMISSIONER, WOULD STRIKE EXACTLY THE RIGHT NOTE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THIS ARRANGEMENT BECAME KNOWN EARLY. HER LAST WORDS WERE THAT WHILE IT WAS ALWAYS GOOD TO HAVE A DIALOGUE, SHE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO HAVE ONE WITH YOU AND ESPECIALLY AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME. I AM RETURNING TO LONDON TONIGHT AND I AM AT YOUR DISPOSAL UNTIL 9 SEPTEMBER.

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