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YOUR TELNO 203: NAMIBIA

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1. THE PRETORIA FIVE SAW PIK BOTHA THIS MORNING AND THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR SPOKE ON BEHALF OF US ALL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TEXT AS FINALLY AGREED.
2. PIK BOTHA RESPONDED IN AN UNUSUALLY QUIET AND BLAND MANNER. HE SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE WELL AWARE OF THE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD FLOW FROM AN IMPASSE IN THE TALKS AND HE WISHED TO ASSURE US THAT SHOULD SUCH AN IMPASSE OCCUR IT WOULD NOT BE THE FAULT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. THEY HAD THEIR OWN VIEW OF WHO WAS PRINCIPALLY TO BLAME FOR THE SLOW PROGRESS TO DATE. WE WOULD NOT AGREE WITH HIM ON THIS, BUT IN ANY CASE IT WOULD NOT BE PROFITABLE TO GO OVER ALL THAT NOW. HE WOULD NOT PRESUME TO TELL US WHERE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS LAY, BUT IT SURELY MUST BE IN OUR INTEREST NOT TO SAY ANYTHING IN PUBLIC OR TAKE ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD BE SEEN BY THE ANTI-SWAPO PARTIES IN NAMIBIA AS BEING HOSTILE TO THEM. THERE WAS, MOREOVER, ONE VERY SERIOUS MATTER OF WHICH HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS HAD YET SHOWN SUFFICIENT AWARENESS. AS HE HAD INDICATED TO US EVER SINCE THE TALKS BEGAN IN 1977 THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT TAKE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE FUTURE OF NAMIBIA BY ITSELF. THERE HAD TO BE A GREATER ROLE IN DECISION-MAKING FOR ALL THE PARTIES IN NAMIBIA. THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT OVERRULE THE VIEWS OF THE ANTI-SWAPO PARTIES. THE MAJOR OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN AGREEMENT WAS THE FACT THAT THE ANTI-SWAPO PARTIES WERE NOT TREATED ON A PAR WITH SWAPO AND HE ASKED OUR GOVERNMENTS TO LEND OUR EFFORTS TO CHANGE THIS SITUATION.
3. PIK BOTHA ALSO MADE A NEW POINT WHEN HE SAID THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE ALSO SUBJECT TO "LIMITATIONS" IN WHAT THEY COULD DO OVER NAMIBIA AS A RESULT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S POSITION AS A MAJOR POWER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THEY HAD TO CONSIDER HOW DEVELOPMENTS IN NAMIBIA MIGHT AFFECT THE WHOLE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION, INCLUDING SUCH STATES AS BOPHUTHATSWANA, VENDA AND TRANSKEI, WHICH WE MIGHT NOT RECOGNISE BUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DID. THESE PEOPLE HAD THEIR POINTS OF VIEW WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF .
4. PIK BOTHA WENT ON TO SAY THAT "TREMENDOUS PROGRESS" HAD BEEN MADE SINCE APRIL 1977. AT THAT TIME THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ON THE POINT OF ALLOWING NAMIBIA TO GO ITS

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OWN WAY TO INDEPENDENCE. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC TO FORFEIT ALL THAT PROGRESS NOW AND HE DID NOT FIND IT ACCEPTABLE THAT ANYONE SHOULD SUGGEST THAT UNLESS AGREEMENT WERE REACHED IMMEDIATELY DIRE CONSEQUENCES WOULD FOLLOW. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN A CONFRONTATIONAL NEGOTIATION OF THAT KIND. NOR DID HE BELIEVE THAT A CRITICAL STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN REACHED : MUCH PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND IT WAS POSSIBLE TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS STILL. THE NARROWING DOWN OF THE POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT THAT HAD OCCURRED SHOULD ENCOURAGE US TO FIND WAYS AND MEANS OF REACHING OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE . THERE WAS NOT JUST ONE WAY OF REACHING THIS OBJECTIVE, A NUMBER OF PATHS AND METHODS COULD BE USED SEMI COLON IT DID NOT MATTER MUCH WHICH AS LONG AS WE MADE PROGRESS. WE SHOULD NOT PUT QUOTE A CERTAIN METHOD UNQUOTE ON A PAR WITH THE OBJECTIVE. MOREOVER, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT NEEDED TIME TO DISCUSS WHAT WAS PROPOSED WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE TERRITORY. THEY COULD NOT RUSH THESE PEOPLE INTO DECISIONS, BECAUSE THEY NEEDED TIME TO ABSORB THE IMPLICATIONS.

5. IN CONCLUSION, PIK BOTHA ASKED OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO UNDERSTAND THE "PRACTICAL PROBLEMS" WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAD. HE IN TURN WOULD CONVEY OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE GOVERNMENT.

6. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THIS WAS AN UNUSUALLY RELAXED PERFORMANCE BY PIK BOTHA. WHETHER OR NOT HE REALLY DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE FULL IMPORT OF THE PRESSURES BUILDING UP IN THE UNITED NATIONS OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS MERELY BEING QUIETLY DEFIANT I AM NOT SURE. BUT IT DOES NOT AUGUR TOO WELL FOR THE TALKS.

7. I HAVE BEEN KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH BRIAN URQUHART AND HAVE GIVEN HIM THE GIST OF THE ABOVE BEFORE HE SEES BRAND FOURIE THIS AFTERNOON. I IMPRESSED UPON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS INDEED A CRUCIAL WEEK. HE SAID HE WOULD CERTAINLY DO THIS. URQUHART INTENDS TO GIVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS UNTIL WEDNESDAY TO AIR THEIR VIEWS ON OUTSTANDING POINTS IN THE DMZ AND ON IMPARTIALITY AND THEN TO PUT IT TO THEM THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE DECISIONS. WHEN I SAW HIM YESTERDAY FOR LUNCH I THOUGHT URQUHART WAS MUCH MORE RELAXED AND HOPEFUL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS THAT I HAD EXPECTED, BUT HIS MOOD TODAY HAD CHANGED SOMEWHAT AND HE TOLD ME THAT WHILE HE KEPT SAYING THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC HE WAS NOT IN FACT SO. HE UNDERSTANDS FULL WELL THAT HE WILL NOT GET THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES THIS WEEK TO A DEFINITE DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND HE MIGHT, I BELIEVE, BE WILLING TO COMTEMPLETE IF NECESSARY SOME FORMULA ALONG THE LINES OF THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF MANSFIELD'S TELELETTER 021/1 OF 16 (NOT REPEATED TO ALL).

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