



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 December 1980

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- 3/11

Poland.

Dear Michael,

Poland: Contingency Planning

Following discussion between the Prime Minister and Lord Carrington during their visit to Luxembourg, I enclose a list of the main contingency measures which have been discussed by the Quadripartite Political Directors. The discussion was ad referendum and there is no formal agreement on this list but, except where indicated, specific objections have not been raised.

The next meeting of the Political Directors is at present scheduled for 10 December. But the Americans have shown signs of wanting to hold it sooner, and it may be possible to arrange this.

The present situation, where the Russians are undertaking military moves which may be preparations for intervention, does not correspond exactly to any of the four contingencies mentioned in the list. But we have of course begun to take certain measures, such as private warnings to the Russians against intervention and public statements in favour of allowing the Poles to deal with their own problems, the statement by the European Council being the latest example of the latter.

You will see that two sections of the check list refer to the case of imminent and actual use of force by the Polish Government. We have told the Americans that we think this may happen, and that the Polish authorities should be left in no doubt about the effect such an action would have on our attitude, including our response to their requests for economic support. Use of force by the Polish Government could of course lead to violent demonstrations and thus to Soviet intervention. But we see a difference between any kind of Soviet intervention on one hand and, on the other hand, action by the Polish authorities in their own country on a scale and in circumstances which we cannot at present predict. This uncertainty is one reason why the planning for the two 'Polish' contingencies has made less progress than for the case of imminent or actual Soviet intervention.

In the situation of increased tension which has developed

/in recent



in recent days we are urgently considering whether there are further steps which we ought to be taking, either in co-operation with our allies or on a national basis.

*For ever
G G H*

(G G H Walden)

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POLAND: CONTINGENCY CHECKLIST

- I) Imminent use of force by Polish Government against workers
 - A) Public statements citing Polish assurances that violence would not be used and urging against outside intervention in Polish affairs.
 - B) Private messages to the Polish leaders warning of effects of use of force on relations with West.
 - C) Private message to Russians about importance of non-interference.
 - D) Continued careful avoidance of steps which would provide Moscow with pretext for intervention.

- II) After Polish Government have used force
(not yet discussed in detail in Quadripartite forum)
 - A) Western Ambassadors seek appointment with Party leader to deliver messages of concern.
 - B) Suspend economic assistance.
 - C) Recall Ambassadors for consultation.
 - D) Public statement of regret/condemnation.
 - E) Further approaches to Russians about dangers of intervention.
 - F) Condemnation of force at Madrid review conference.
 - G) Action in UN Security Council to forestall a threat to international peace.
 - H) Public warning to Russians against intervention.

- III) Indications that Soviet intervention imminent
 - A) Messages of warning to Brezhnev.
 - B) Public statements urging against outside intervention.
 - C) Action in UN Security Council to forestall threat to peace.
 - D) Tightening of sanctions adopted against USSR after Afghanistan and consultation about possible additional sanctions (France and Germany are likely to resist this strongly).

/IV

IV) Actual Soviet intervention

- A) Emergency meeting of North Atlantic Council, perhaps at level of Foreign Ministers; resolution condemning Soviet action.
- B) UN condemnation of Soviet action.
- C) Reassurance to Yugoslavia.
- D) Suspension of Madrid review conference.
- E) Possible return of US aircraft carrier task force to Mediterranean.
- F) Sanctions against USSR going beyond those imposed after Afghanistan (very uncertain that French or Germans would agree).
- G) Suspend MBFR negotiations (and perhaps CTB).

Note:- Under NATO's standard arrangements, low-level increases in defensive vigilance can be ordered by SACEUR. It would be wrong to interfere with this normal process, since the Russians might interpret failure to take normal steps as a signal that Western reactions to intervention might not be very severe. NATO must consult member governments before proceeding to any abnormal levels of alert.