

S E C R E T

GRS 120

D E D I P

SECRET BURNING BUSH

DESKBY 110820Z

FM UKDEL NATO 110820Z DEC 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 483 OF 11 DECEMBER 1980.

FOR PS/LPS FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

POLAND.

MY 2 IFTS CONTAIN AN ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT AT THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS' DINNER LAST NIGHT. THERE WAS UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT THAT THE LIKELY PUBLIC REACTION TO A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND WOULD BE SUCH AS TO REQUIRE WESTERN RETALIATORY MEASURES GOING BEYOND THE CATALOGUE DRAWN UP BY OFFICIALS. THE LORD PRIVY SEAL MAY WISH TO SAY IN CABINET THAT THIS WAS THE MOOD AND THAT A WIDE RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES WILL NEED TO BE URGENTLY LOOKED AT, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VIEW IS THAT THIS CONVOY WILL IN PRACTISE ONLY BE ABLE TO MOVE AT THE SPEED OF THE SLOWEST SHIP, WHICH WILL NOT BE THE UK.

ROSE.

LIMITED

HEAD/PLANNING STAFF
HEAD/ACDD
HEAD/EESD
HEAD/DEFENCE D
HEAD/UND
HEAD/NEWS D
HEAD/PUSD
HEAD/WED
HEAD/TRED
HEAD/FED
HEAD/ECD(E)
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
MR BULLARD
LORD BRIDGES
MR FERGUSSON
MR EVANS

COPIES TO:

MR R L WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE

S E C R E T

12

Poland

mt

D E D I P

SECRET BURNING BUSH

DESKBY 110800Z

FM UKDEL NATO 110822Z DEC 80

TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

TELEGRAM NUMBER 484 OF 11 DECEMBER 1980,

INFO PRIORITY MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, WARSAW.

POLAND.

1. AT THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS' DINNER HERE ON 10 DECEMBER BLECH (FRG) REPORTED AS FOLLOWS ON THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED EARLIER BY THE FOUR POLITICAL DIRECTORS.

2. THERE WAS MORE AGREEMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION THAN ON THE CHANCES OF AVOIDING OUTRIGHT SOVIET INTERVENTION. SO LONG AS THINGS REMAINED AS AT PRESENT, THERE WAS LITTLE THE WEST COULD DO THAT WE HAD NOT DONE ALREADY. WE SHOULD REITERATE OUR WARNINGS, BUT NOT TO THE POINT WHERE THEY BECAME DEVALUED BY REPETITION OR WHERE THE RUSSIANS FELT COMPELLED TO DEFY THEM. THE BRITISH SUGGESTION OF INVITING A SENIOR CHINESE POLITICAL FIGURE TO WASHINGTON AND EUROPEAN CAPITALS QUOTE FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION UNQUOTE RAISED TOO MANY DIFFICULTIES. NOR COULD WE THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION WITH PRECISE FORMS OF RETALIATION, EG A GRAIN EMBARGO, AS ALSO SUGGESTED BY THE UK, UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN CLEAR DECISIONS IN WESTERN CAPITALS ON WHAT TO DO AND IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES.

3. THE QUESTION WHETHER SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND WOULD INCREASE THE MILITARY THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO BE STUDIED FURTHER: IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL CONTROL OF MILITARY DECISIONS. THIS MIGHT REQUIRE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS IN NATO AT THE TIME.

4. INTERVENTION MIGHT TAKE MANY FORMS, BUT A LIST OF COUNTERMEASURES APPROPRIATE TO THE EXTREME CASE OF A FULL-SCALE INVASION COULD BE DRAWN UPON SELECTIVELY FOR INTERMEDIATE CONTINGENCIES, EG REPRESSION BY THE POLISH SECURITY FORCES WITH SOVIET FORCES IN THE BACKGROUND. SUCH A LIST MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS (POLITICAL DIRECTORS' COMMENTS IN BRACKETS):

- (A) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS BY NATO AND NATO MEMBER STATES.
- (B) SPECIAL MEETING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.
- (C) HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD CEASE EXCEPT FOR PURPOSES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT, IN WHICH CASE THERE SHOULD BE PRIOR CONSULTATION.

*There is precision
with in this whole
with*

like P/S handle

S E C R E T

- (D) USE MADRID FORUM TO CONDEMN SOVIET ACTION, AND POSSIBLE SUSPEND THE CONFERENCE. (NO AGREEMENT ON WHETHER BETTER FOR THE WEST TO SUSPEND ITS OWN PARTICIPATION OR ORGANIZE MATTERS SO THAT THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES WOULD WALK OUT. FURTHER STUDY NEEDED). ?!
- (E) REQUEST MEETING OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL. FOLLOWING SOVIET VETO, TAKE MATTER TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY. (VOTE MIGHT NOT BE SO OVERWHELMING AS ON AFGHANISTAN).
- (F) INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO FOCUS 3RD WORLD OPINION.
- (G) SPECIAL STEPS TO CONCERT POLICY WITH KEY NON-MEMBERS OF NATO EG JAPAN.
- (H) SUSPEND MBFR AND POSSIBLY OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS (TNF? SALT?).
- (I) POSSIBLE SPECIAL MEASURES IN THE BALTIC, EG TO PROTECT POLISH REFUGEES OR ASSERT RIGHT OF NATO WARSHIPS TO OPERATE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. (FURTHER STUDY NEEDED).
- (J) ECONOMIC MEASURES. (DISCUSSION HAD BEEN BRIEF AND NOT CARRIED TO CONCLUSIONS. COCOM AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY HAD BEEN MENTIONED. SHOULD INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS BE ABROGATED, OR COULD THEIR APPLICATION BE SUSPENDED?).
- (K) SPECIAL CONSIDERATION OF SITUATION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
- (L) ASK SPANIARDS WHETHER THEY DREW ANY CONCLUSIONS AS REGARDS THEIR POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP OF NATO.
- (M) MUTATIS MUTANDIS, TAKING ACCOUNT EG OF DEGREE OF ZEAL SHOWN, ANY MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH TOOK PART IN AN INVASION OF POLAND.

5. SEE MIFT.

ROSE.

LIMITED

HEAD/PLANNING STAFF	SIR E YOUDE
HEAD/ACDD	MR BULLARD
HEAD/EESD	LORD BRIDGES
HEAD/DEFENCE D	MR FERGUSSON
HEAD/UND	MR EVANS
HEAD/NEWS D	
HEAD/FUSD	
HEAD/WED	
HEAD/TRED	
HEAD/FED	
HEAD/ECD(E)	
PS	
PS/LPS	
PS/MR BLAKER	
PS/PUS	

COPIES TO:

MR R L WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE

- 2 -

S E C R E T

12c

Ps(2)

GRS 440

S E C R E T

D E D I P
SECRET BURNING BUSH
DESKBY 110800Z
FM UKDEL NATO 110825Z DEC 80
TO IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
TELEGRAM NUMBER 485 OF 11 DECEMBER 1980,
INFO PRIORITY MODUK, WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, MOSCOW, WARSAW.

MIPT : POLAND.

1. FOLLOWING THIS REPORT FOREIGN MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT FOR ABOUT AN HOUR.
2. GENSCHER SAID THAT IN A SENSE SOVIET INTERVENTION HAD ALREADY BEGUN, WITH 50 DIVISIONS MASSED ON POLAND'S BORDERS CONTRARY TO THE HELSINKI PRINCIPLE ON NO THREAT OF FORCE. BUT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO REGARD AN OUTRIGHT INVASION AS INEVITABLE. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT COULD TAKE MANY FORMS, JUST AS PREVIOUS EXAMPLES HAD DIFFERED, FROM THE BALTIC STATES IN 1940 TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE FREE TRADE UNIONS AS SUCH HAD NOT BEEN CRITICIZED BY EASTERN MEDIA SINCE THE MOSCOW MEETING OF 5 DECEMBER. EVIDENTLY THE POLISH LEADERS HAD CONVINCED THEIR ALLIES THAT WALESZA AND HIS COLLEAGUES WERE NECESSARY. A NATIONAL CONSENSUS HAD BEEN CREATED, AND THIS WOULD BE SYMBOLISED BY THE ATTENDANCE OF WALESZA AND THE PRESIDENT OF POLAND AT THE DEDICATION OF THE MEMORIAL TO THE GDANSK VICTIMS OF 1970. BUT THERE WERE REPORTS OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVE NEXT WEEK UNDER COVER OF MANUEUVRES.
3. SPEAKING FOR THE UK YOU DISTINGUISHED 3 QUESTIONS, OF WHICH THE FIRST WAS WHETHER ANYTHING MORE COULD BE DONE TO MAKE THE WORST CASE LESS LIKELY. AS A RESULT OF WESTERN WARNINGS, INCLUDING THOSE OF MEMBERS OF MR REAGAN'S TEAM, THE SOVIET UNION WAS AWARE - NOT IN DETAIL, BUT IN SCALE - OF WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION WOULD BE. IF THEY TOOK THIS DECISION IT WOULD BE WITH THEIR EYES OPEN. BUT THE WESTERN RESPONSE TO POLISH REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC SUPPORT COULD HELP, AND THIS SHOULD BE DECIDED AT THE MEETING IN PARIS ON 22 DECEMBER.

S E C R E T

/ 4. SECONDLY,

S E C R E T

4. SECONDLY, WAS THE POLITICAL DIRECTOR' CATALOGUE OF MEASURES ADEQUATE? YOU DID NOT THINK SO. EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAD SPECIAL REASONS TO FEEL DEEPLY ABOUT POLAND. PUBLIC REACTION WOULD BE INFINITELY STRONGER THAN IN THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. (THE OTHER 3 FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED, MUSKIE WITH PARTICULAR VEHEMENCE. POLITICAL DIRECTORS WERE INSTRUCTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (A) TO ENLARGE AND STRENGTHEN THE CATALOGUE OF MEASURES AND (B) TO DEFINE THE VARIOUS POSSIBLE FORMS WHICH SOVIET INTERVENTION MIGHT TAKE).

5. THIRDLY, YOU ASKED HOW THE SUBJECT COULD BEST BE HANDLED AT THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING TODAY. IT WAS AGREED TO TRY TO AVOID A FULL DISCUSSION AND TO WORK FOR A STRONG BUT COMPACT FORM OF WORDS FOR INCLUSION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. MEANWHILE THE PRESS SHOULD BE TOLD SIMPLY THAT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO KEEP THE MATTER UNDER CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW.

6. AS DINNER WAS ENDING GENSCHER, SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENTLY WITH HIS EARLIER REMARKS, ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD BEEN INVITED TO VISIT PRAGUE ON 13 DECEMBER AND THAT BILAK HAD ASSURED HIM THAT NOTHING UNTOWARD WOULD HAPPEN BEFORE THEN.

ROSE.

LIMITED

HEAD/PLANNING STAFF
HEAD/ACDD
HEAD/EESD
HEAD/DEFENCE D
HEAD/UND
HEAD/NEWS D
HEAD/PUSD
HEAD/WED
HEAD/TRED
HEAD/FED
HEAD/ECD(E)
PS
PS/LPS
PS/MR BLAKER
PS/PUS
SIR E YOUDE
MR BULLARD
LORD BRIDGES
MR FERGUSSON
MR EVANS

COPIES TO:

MR R L WADE-GERY
CABINET OFFICE