Lan discussed this proposed with Peter Middleton who believed both - as an intrin amorganet until the reserve asset of in the officer of the Colorabers, Parliament Street, SWIP 3AG abstract at the time of the coloraber 1980 of the British is T. P. Lanksont. Prom anist T P Lankester Esq perpose is much the same as Private Secretary Prime Minister's Office special Back assistance - is to prevent No.10 Downing Street a mijor each shorter duranting LONDON SWI when the gott. accounts go into siguins. (You will recall that Cordon Peppe Dear Tim, accepts but assistance at a time of THE BANKS' RESERVE ASSETS RATIO Surplus is correct.) The Bank want At the Prime Minister's meeting on 18 November, it was to announce agreed that the reserve assets ratio (RAR) could not be abolished until new prudential guidelines had been established, and that this could not be done before the' Budget. However, it was also agreed that it would be desirable to consider an interim change to avoid, if possible, the need for special Bank assistance to the market in the first quarter of 1981, when the central government surplus will drain cash out of the system. The Chancellor and the Governor have concluded that such a change could indeed be made. A reduction in the ratio from 121% to 10% of banks' eligible liabilities should just enable the banking system to get through the revenue quarter without further sale and repurchase operations in gilts. It accords with the approach to the new prudential system of recognising that liquid assets are there to be Since The run down at times of pressure. No prudential risks would be created. The reduction would not prejudge decisions RA ratio on future monetary controls or future prudential guidelines. is being The Chancellor and the Governor therefore propose to phased announce the reduction early in January, when the central government goes into surplus. out anyway next have The scale of the problem is as follows. On present runcing projections, the Government surplus is likely to take the it to 10% cumulative cash shortage in the market from nearly \$900 million at the end of banking December to about £3.2 billion with buts by the end of banking April. (The shortage could be open to smaller if the Government's first quarter surplus falls short of the forecast or larger if sales of Government misurdes have debt are higher than is projected.) The Bank must meet ing them repeating last year's /this shortage by mascire Special assistance.



this shortage by converting other assets into cash, unless short term interest rates are to rise in a way entirely inconsistent with the reduction in MLR and unhelpful to monetary control (because the increase in market interest rates would simply encourage round-tripping).

The additional cash shortage in the first quarter will be of roughly the same order of magnitude as in the revenue quarter last year; but the problem of alleviating it will be more difficult for two reasons. First, there are no special deposits to release, as there were in the first quarter of 1981. Second, we start 1981, unlike 1980, with the Bank already providing nearly £900 million of assistance, mainly through purchases of commercial bills. Nonetheless, the problem should be manageable provided the RAR is reduced.

A reduction from 12½% to 10% will release something over £1½ billion of reserves to be converted into cash. The amount by which the Bank's need to buy in commercial bills will be reduced may well be somewhat smaller. It depends how far the banking system is prepared to run down its holdings of reserve asset claims on the public sector (ie Treasury Bills and local authority bills). The Bank judges that the reduction in such assets might not exceed £1 billion, but that it is right to make room for a somewhat larger reduction in case it proves possible.

If the reduction amounts to £1 billion, some £2 billion will remain to be provided by purchase of other assets. The Bank will aim to do so by buying in commercial bills and, to a lesser extent, swapping the banks' foreign currency holdings into sterling. This should be just possible without recourse to special arrangements.

To reduce the RAR below 10% would not reduce the need for the Bank to buy in commercial bills because the ability of the banking system to run down its holdings of reserve asset claims on the public sector would be already exhausted - if not more than exhausted - by the reduction to 10%. Nor would it help to allow more private sector assets to count as reserves, for the same reason. Nor would it help to bring in gilts over one year (the present boundary), because this would make them more attractive to banks, and so could conflict with the objective of broadening the market in central government debt of this maturity.

/The Chancellor and



The Chancellor and the Governor are satisfied that to reduce the RAR to 10% is the right course to follow in the circumstances. If the Prime Minister is content, the Bank of England will announce the change on or about 5 January.

I am copying this letter to Tim Allen at the Bank of England.

yours

John

A J WIGGINS Principal Private Secretary

Brooks to forward to Friday.