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DESK BY FCO 131900Z

DESK BY UKMIS GENEVA 131900Z

FM CAPE TOWN EMBASSY 131710Z JAN 81

TO IMMEDIATE F C O

TEL NO 005 OF 13 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, PRETORIA

INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, OTTAWA, WASHINGTON, CAIRO (FOR
PRIVATE SECRETARY), LUSAKA, LUANDA, MAPUTO, GABORONE,
DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, SALISBURY, ADDIS ABABA, FREETOWN

UKMIS GENEVA TELS NOS 17 AND 18: **NAMIBIA**

*Five telegrams giving the
picture as it looks in Cape Town,
Washington, N-York, Bonn, G
glance through.*

1. AS I MENTIONED TO BARDER ON THE TELEPHONE THE CAPE TOWN FIVE HAD MADE A DATE TO SEE PIK BOTHA THIS AFTERNOON (13 JANUARY) WITH A VIEW TO HANDING OVER THE MESSAGE FOR P W BOTHA WHICH WAS THEN UNDER CONSIDERATION (ALTHOUGH WE HAD NOT STATED THAT AS THE PURPOSE OF OUR REQUEST TO SEE HIM). EVEN THOUGH THE MESSAGE DID NOT MATERIALISE WE DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE MEETING, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE WERE SPEAKING ON OUR OWN INITIATIVE AND NOT (NOT) ON INSTRUCTIONS. WE HAD MORE THAN 2 AND A HALF HOURS WITH HIM.
2. DURING THE COURSE OF THE LONG DISCUSSION PIK WENT OVER, ONCE AGAIN THE HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. YOU HAVE HEARD ALL THIS BEFORE AND THERE IS NO NEED FOR ME TO RECAPITULATE IT, ON THE PIM THE MAIN CONCLUSION I DRAW FROM WHAT HE SAID IS THAT HE IS NOT SERIOUSLY WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVIDENT FAILURE OF THE MEETING AND IS EXPECTING THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO PULL THE CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. HE WENT IN FOR SOME FAIRLY OBVIOUS WEDGE-DRIVING IN THE DISTINCTION HE MADE BETWEEN THE VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE FIVE AND THOSE OF THE AMERICANS, WHICH HE SUGGESTED WERE NOT YET CLEAR. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SEE BRAND FOURIE AT ONCE TO DISCUSS THE IMPLICATIONS. FOR THIS REASON AND BECAUSE FOURIE HAD BEEN UNDER PRESSURE IN GENEVA AND "NEEDED A BREAK" HE HAD ASKED HIM TO RETURN TO CAPE TOWN THIS EVENING. EKSTEEN AND TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION (THE TWO STEWARDS) WOULD BE STAYING ON UNTIL THE END OF THE CONFERENCE TOMORROW. THE MEETING HAD NOT BEEN BY ANY MEANS USELESS: IF THE PROBLEM OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED AT LEAST IT HAD BEEN EXPOSED AND THE INTERNAL PARTIES HAD BEEN ABLE TO EXPERIENCE AT FIRST HAND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION AND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. WHERE THINGS WENT FROM HERE HE COULD NOT TELL US: HE WANTED TO STUDY THE PROBLEM CAREFULLY AND TO THINK ABOUT IT. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THERE WAS NOT GOING TO BE MUCH TIME FOR REFLECTION AND THAT WE MUST ALL EXPECT IMMEDIATE PRESSURES TO MANIFEST THEMSELVES IN THE U N, PIK SAID CALMLY AND WITHOUT ANY SIGN OF ANXIETY THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING OR EXPECTING ANY FAVOURS OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND IF WE FELT THE TIME HAD COME TO QUOTE TAKE THE U N LINE UNQUOTE AND ACT

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ACCORDINGLY THAT WAS OUR BUSINESS. SO FAR AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WERE CONCERNED THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT IT WAS BETTER TO FACE INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST THEM THAN THE PROSPECT OF A SWAPO VICTORY BY UNFAIR MEANS LEADING TO THE INSTALLATION OF THE RUSSIANS IN WINDHOEK. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT AN ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT WOULD BE EVEN MORE LIKELY TO LEAD TO THIS, PIK SAID HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THAT ARGUMENT. THE CHOICES BEFORE US ALL WERE BOUND TO BE PAINFUL BUT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT POLITICAL TERROR SHOULD BE USED AS A MEANS OF GAINING POWER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. IF THAT HAPPENED IN NAMIBIA, IT WOULD NOT BE LONG BEFORE THE SAME THING HAPPENED IN BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND.

3. WHEN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TRIED TO PIN PIK DOWN ON WHAT MORE IT WAS THAT THE DTA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WANTED BY WAY OF DEMONSTRATING U N IMPARTIALITY, PIK SAID THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION NOW. HE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN HE HAD HAD TIME FOR FURTHER REFLECTION HE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER WITH THE CAPE TOWN FIVE WAYS AND MEANS OF PICKING UP THE PIECES AFTER THE BREAKDOWN OF PIM. HE DID MENTION AS SOMETHING OF AN AFTER-THOUGHT THAT WE SHOULD ALL THINK ABOUT WAYS OF GUARANTEEING MINORITY RIGHTS. HE ALSO SAID THAT MUDGE HAD BEEN VERY UPSET AT REPORTS OF HIS REMARKS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF UKMIS GENEVA TELEGRAM NO 15. HE WAS NOT MERELY CONCERNED WITH GAINING MORE TIME AS SUCH; HIS POINT WAS THAT IT WOULD NEED MORE TIME BEFORE THE EVIDENCE OF U N IMPARTIALITY BECAME ESTABLISHED IN THE MINDS OF NAMIBIAN VOTERS. FINALLY PIK SAID THAT IT HAD NEEDED A GREAT DEAL OF ARM-TWISTING TO GET MUDGE TO GO TO GENEVA (THIS IS CLEARLY WHAT P W BOTHA'S THREAT REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF UKMIS GENEVA TELEGRAM NO 7 HAD BEEN ABOUT). WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IN FUTURE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PLAY A "HIGHLY VISIBLE" ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

COMMENT

4. I WILL TELEGRAPH CONSIDERED COMMENTS TOMORROW 14 JANUARY.

LEAHY

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NAMIBIA STANDARD

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ERD
CABINET OFFICE